Metaphysics as an Error

[TheArtfulDodger]

I don’t see any deeper implications to the concepts “internal-external” than what is, in a sense, empirically transparent: X observes Y, X and Y are in a spatial relation to one another. The concepts of internality-externality have their meanings grounded in such relations, not in some hidden (non-empirical) metaphysical sense.

Well, this is the crux of the issue, so forgive me for wanting to explore it further... What you say implies that you are ignoring/whitewashing the significance of 'observation' - certainly, that you give no significance to that concept. But what is 'empirical information', other than that which is conceived by the/a conceiving entity?

Firstly, I disagree that the internal-external dichotomy should have any significant relevance to understanding ‘observation’. This does not then entail I think observation is itself insignificant.

Secondly, I take ‘empirical information’ to be non-conceptual. I don’t endorse conceptual idealism.

... All events within the empirical realm are reducible to opinion/report. That is, any relationship between two+ entities within the empirical realm is not purely objective/absolute, in that it is open to doubt/revision. That's how science operates: empirical information is always subject to revision.

I undertsand things quite differently, it would seem.

Just because empirical relations are not ‘purely objective/absolute’ dosnt entail such events are reducible to opinion. This just moves from one ridiculous extreme to another. Youre certainly entitled to your opinion, but don’t expect events within the empirical realm to be subject to it.

Empirical events are not open to doubt or revision at all; rather, our conceptions (as discourses) of these occurences are. Our conceptions of empirical information are always subject to revision; a scientist rewrites or falsifies a conception, not ‘empirical information’. Empirical events are not the kinds of things which can be right or wrong, good or bad.

We are fallible primarily because the empirical realm is dynamic in nature, and our cognitive systems are comparitively inexhaustive.

In a nutshell, I think that it's vitally important - in regards to this issue - to acknowledge the significance of 'a reportER' as integral to 'empirical data'. Consequently, I think that your response fails to counter/refute what I said. That is, any enquiry regarding the internal/external nature of 'empirical data', is still valid.

Perhaps you could clarify what you have in mind as regards to “reporter”, and “the internal/external nature of empirical data”, so I might have a better idea as to what Im arguing against?

[GrahamH]

The point of my post that you cite, is to focus upon the observational aspect of the empirical realm. That is, if an entity observes/sees/acknowledges an entity within 'the world', then what can be said about 'that' which is observed/seen/acknowledged? Is it 'something' observed/seen/acknowledged internally or externally to that which is observing/seeing/acknowledging?

I don’t see any deeper implications to the concepts “internal-external” than what is, in a sense, empirically transparent: X observes Y, X and Y are in a spatial relation to one another. The concepts of internality-externality have their meanings grounded in such relations, not in some hidden (non-empirical) metaphysical sense.

Well, this is the crux of the issue, so forgive me for wanting to explore it further.

... What you say implies that you are ignoring/whitewashing the significance of 'observation' - certainly, that you give no significance to that concept. But what is 'empirical information', other than that which is conceived by the/a conceiving entity?

... All events within the empirical realm are reducible to opinion/report. That is, any relationship between two+ entities within the empirical realm is not purely objective/absolute, in that it is open to doubt/revision. That's how science operates: empirical information is always subject to revision.

... Consequently, empirical information is to be understood as not just the relationship between two+ entities within the empirical realm, but as the conceived relationship between two+ entities within that realm.

In a nutshell, I think that it's vitally important - in regards to this issue - to acknowledge the significance of 'a reportER' as integral to 'empirical data'. Consequently, I think that your response fails to counter/refute what I said. That is, any enquiry regarding the internal/external nature of 'empirical data', is still valid.

Okay, heres how I understand things: observation is an event that involves an observer component and an observed component. Observation cannot be reduced to either one or the other, it is both apsects.

The 'observed component' MUST be either internal/integral or external/separate to the 'observer component'.

Observation is a causal relation between both these aspects. Further, observation involves a synthesis (or entanglement) between observer and observed.

If there is an 'entanglement' between both aspects, then both aspects are reducible to One 'thing'. That is, the observed is integral/internal to the observer... and vice versa.

Metaphysics endorses a dualism I myself find repulsive ie the incommensurable nature of “appearance” and “reality”. Your post didn’t provide an argument in favour of maintaining this dualism.

I'm not a dualist. I think that whatever is observed is reducible to both that which creates the observation, and observes 'it'.

What if 'observation' amounts to growing patterns of connection in the brain, much as the roots of a tree grow in a pattern influenced by the characteristics of the ground and wind loads they 'observe'? Should we insist on an ontological inside/outside there?

[jamest]

What if 'observation' amounts to growing patterns of connection in the brain, much as the roots of a tree grow in a pattern influenced by the characteristics of the ground and wind loads they 'observe'? Should we insist on an ontological inside/outside there?

Well, then 'observation' would be something reducible to an event happening internally to the brain, so yes.

[GrahamH]

What if 'observation' amounts to growing patterns of connection in the brain, much as the roots of a tree grow in a pattern influenced by the characteristics of the ground and wind loads they 'observe'? Should we insist on an ontological inside/outside there?

Well, then 'observation' would be something reducible to an event happening internally to the brain, so yes.

So do you accept that...

The 'observed component' MUST be either internal/integral or external/separate to the 'observer component'.

...Is not correct? MUST should be replaced with MIGHT

[jamest]

What if 'observation' amounts to growing patterns of connection in the brain, much as the roots of a tree grow in a pattern influenced by the characteristics of the ground and wind loads they 'observe'? Should we insist on an ontological inside/outside there?

Well, then 'observation' would be something reducible to an event happening internally to the brain, so yes.

So do you accept that...

The 'observed component' MUST be either internal/integral or external/separate to the 'observer component'.

...Is not correct? MUST should be replaced with MIGHT

I'm not sure what you're driving at.
In the instance that you have suggested, the observed component is happening internally to 'the brain'. But since you are implying that the brain exists distinctly to that which is being observed, you are in fact advocating a material reality, distinct and external to the observed component. That is, the instance you present entails an ontology commensurate with materialism.

We do not know whether 'brains' are the source of empirical construction ('experience'). If we did, then philosophy would be obsolete, since we would have found the ultimate answer to our age-old metaphysical enquiry. In fact, brains - like everything else - are empirical constructs. They are entities observed/conceived to exist amongst the rest of the empirical realm. But if you want to consider that brains are the aforementioned source, then they must exist distinctly to the observed component (aka the empirical realm).

The irony is that a relativist cannot claim that brains are the source of 'observation', because of the ontological implications. For a relativist, the conceived nature of the empirical realm truly is a thorn in his side. And then, if he pretends that there's nothing 'conceived' about the empirical realm (if he ignores the internalism prevalent in observation)(thus ignoring the history of ill-conceived ideas about what the empirical realm is), then his position has to be reducible to, and commensurate with, materialism: that 'empirical data' is of constructs that exist externally to the field of one's study:

That is, if A sees B and B isn't an internal construct [of A], then B must be a construct that exists externally to A.

Whatever... at this juncture, it is not important that we don't know whether B is an internal or external construct. What is important, is that either way, an ontology is implied: that is, there is something upon which a metaphysic can be constructed.

[jamest]

We are at the pivotal point of this discourse. My opinion - a consequence of the reason that I have employed - is that 'relativism' is grounded upon an ignorance of what 'empirical data' is, and how it comes to our attention. That is, relativism fails to account for the significance of observation and conception in consideration of the empirical realm. For relativists, the claim is that there is ONLY empirical data itself. But this opinion just ignores the integral importance of observer conception in determining 'empirical data'.

The values or measures we take from the world are borne of parameters conceived within our own minds. Concepts such as 'causality'; 'effect'; 'spacetime'; 'distance'; 'velocity'; 'gravity'; Newtonian mechanics; etc., are all constructs of an observing mind, forever seeking self-understanding of that which is observed.
The history of humanity is littered with revised concepts; theories; values and their associated parameters. Indeed, science itself is eternally fluid - forever reshaping its understanding of what is happening within the empirical realm.

It's absolutely senseless to discuss 'empirical data' as though it has a life of its own, and as though it has no dependency upon the observer of it. And this senselessness is the only thing that will sustain relativism.

[SpeedOfSound]

We are at the pivotal point of this discourse. My opinion - a consequence of the reason that I have employed - is that 'relativism' is grounded upon an ignorance of what 'empirical data' is, and how it comes to our attention. That is, relativism fails to account for the significance of observation and conception in consideration of the empirical realm. For relativists, the claim is that there is ONLY empirical data itself. But this opinion just ignores the integral importance of observer conception in determining 'empirical data'.

The values or measures we take from the world are borne of parameters conceived within our own minds. Concepts such as 'causality'; 'effect'; 'spacetime'; 'distance'; 'velocity'; 'gravity'; Newtonian mechanics; etc., are all constructs of an observing mind, forever seeking self-understanding of that which is observed.
The history of humanity is littered with revised concepts; theories; values and their associated parameters. Indeed, science itself is eternally fluid - forever reshaping its understanding of what is happening within the empirical realm.

It's absolutely senseless to discuss 'empirical data' as though it has a life of its own, and as though it has no dependency upon the observer of it. And this senselessness is the only thing that will sustain relativism.

The independence of the the observer IS what defines empiricism. I don't ignore the observer. I study the brain. One of the things that fascinates me about it is that it draws from the data patterns that are the thing in itself. It's the core of the whole thing.

I get the impression that this drawing of patterns is something that you think of as proof that the patterns don't exist. Which is the real senselessness of your approach.

I don't just observe A tree and then imagine some treeness. The treeness in my brain was gleaned from thousands of tree observations. If there was no such thing as treeness I could not have done that.

Prove to me that there is no treeness among us, independent of us. Prove that it is only 'inside' us.

[Surendra Darathy]

In the instance that you have suggested, the observed component is happening internally to 'the brain'. But since you are implying that the brain exists distinctly to that which is being observed, you are in fact advocating a material reality, distinct and external to the observed component. That is, the instance you present entails an ontology commensurate with materialism.

You are imposing metaphysics on those with whom you are discussing this. Of the discussants, you are the only one here talking about the brain in terms of how and whether it "exists". The empiricist states that the empirical brain is the part of the empirical model of empirical cognition where empirical sensory information is organized. Schrodinger's cat catches Schrodinger's mouse. You put the cat and the mouse in a room and when, the next day, the mouse is no longer there, but a tail and a hairball, and the cat are, you conclude that the cat observed the mouse. That's the empirical model. It may not be what really-o, truly-o "occurred" or "happened", but that's the conclusion from the empirical data. All you're left with is a set of observations. Scientists are not in the habit of saying "I observed this" and then start talking about themselves. You seem to think they should. That may only be because you think it's a great deal for people to talk about themselves.

The whole business of knowing something fershur is what the enterprise of "metaphysics" hoped to achieve. It's fucked. So you want to say that the model statements about brains means that empiricists know fershur that materialism is true, and that (though they don't state anything about the metaphysics of brains) empiricists are secret materialists. Do you think you've really shown this? No, you've extracted the assertion from your hindquarters.

you are implying that the brain exists distinctly to that which is being observed, you are in fact advocating a material reality

So your hypothesis is that when an empiricist says that "brain" and "observed phenomena" are distinct components of a "model" and that this implies that the scientist models them as distinct components of a "material reality" with a metaphysics behind it? Just how do you think you have shown this? Could you be any more adept at canards? If you don't start out with metaphysics, you won't end up with it. Starting with metaphysics is the only way to end with it. You haven't shown that you can start with metaphysics at all. You skipped that part. You know, the one where you actually wrote down a definition for "existence".

We do not know whether 'brains' are the source of empirical construction ('experience'). If we did, then philosophy would be obsolete, since we would have found the ultimate answer to our age-old metaphysical enquiry. In fact, brains - like everything else - are empirical constructs. They are entities observed/conceived to exist amongst the rest of the empirical realm. But if you want to consider that brains are the aforementioned source, then they must exist distinctly to the observed component (aka the empirical realm).

That is the entire point of empiricism, James. Empiricists don't claim to know anything "fershur". That is what skepticism is about. The empirical relationships we state are aspects of a tentative model. That is the whole point of science, and all you seem interested in doing is to repeat your canards about existence, and your strawmen about what science claims to "prove" or to know "fershur". You're so good at missing the point that you could join Custer at Little Big Horn and still be making plans for the weekend barbecue.

The irony is that a relativist cannot claim that brains are the source of 'observation', because of the ontological implications. For a relativist, the conceived nature of the empirical realm truly is a thorn in his side. And then, if he pretends that there's nothing 'conceived' about the empirical realm (if he ignores the internalism prevalent in observation)(thus ignoring the history of ill-conceived ideas about what the empirical realm is), then his position has to be reducible to, and commensurate with, materialism: that 'empirical data' is of constructs that exist externally to the field of one's study:

Empiricists do not talk about "sources" and "essences", James. Scientists say that the brain is an organ in a physiological and anatomical model of human beings. Science does not talk about what the "essence" of a human being consists of. In order to do that, the scientist would have to engage in the intellectual masturbation of metaphysics, but she desists.

That is, if A sees B and B isn't an internal construct [of A], then B must be a construct that exists externally to A.

Internal and external are features of a model. No scientist wants to locate the real metaphysical boundary separating the cat from the mouse. The cat and the mouse are separate components of a model of predator-prey behavior. In private moments, everyone speculates idly about what the implications might be if the universe was a giant cheddar cheese ball infused with port wine and coated with walnuts, and the universe right next door to it was made entirely out of biscuits. What is the true nature of a biscuit? Crispinessness!

Whatever... at this juncture, it is not important that we don't know whether B is an internal or external construct. What is important, is that either way, an ontology is implied: that is, there is something upon which a metaphysic can be constructed.

Saying the word "important" by itself is as much as to admit that one is saying "it is important to me". Since you are not the teacher here, and we are not the students, there doesn't seem to be any dire consequences in the offing if we do not pretend that you are the teacher.

[jamest]

The independence of the the observer IS what defines empiricism. I don't ignore the observer. I study the brain. One of the things that fascinates me about it is that it draws from the data patterns that are the thing in itself. It's the core of the whole thing.

I get the impression that this drawing of patterns is something that you think of as proof that the patterns don't exist. Which is the real senselessness of your approach.

I don't just observe A tree and then imagine some treeness. The treeness in my brain was gleaned from thousands of tree observations. If there was no such thing as treeness I could not have done that.

Prove to me that there is no treeness among us, independent of us. Prove that it is only 'inside' us.

You keep forgetting what this thread is about. It's not about me proving that there is nothing else external to the self (whatever the 'self' may be), it's about me proving that there is 'something else' other than empirical data. Whether that 'thing' is the brain itself, God, or a pile of turtles, is not the issue here.

Your problem, here, is that you aren't a relativist. Your concern in the debate is really reducible to 'anti-idealism'. Implicit in your statement above, for example, is that the brain is the source of everything that it conceives of. But of what help is that to the relativist? None, since an ontology/metaphysic is implied.

There will be a thread, soon, that focusses upon idealism - or materialism - and then we can discuss your request in great detail. But for now, relativism is in the spotlight.

[Surendra Darathy]

it's about me proving that there is 'something else'

No, it's about you extracting from your hindquarters an insistent assertion that there "must" be something else. And repeating this naked assertion ad nauseam. Another view:

it's about me proving that there is 'something else'

What you're saying, in summary, is that if nothing existed, there would be nothing to talk about. You repeat this as much as you like, but once you start describing the "essence" of this 'something else", you will be in the business of "making shit up".

If the entirety of meatheadfizzics consists in saying "There must be something else", and then not saying another fucking thing about it, we will be hard-pressed to call it an intellectual achievement of any stature.

You keep forgetting what this thread is about.

This thread, which was not started by you, is about the impossibility of saying anything after you produce your one-note symphony on the theme of "something else". This thread is about the incompetence of metaphysics actually to say "anything else" after saying "there must be something else".

[Surendra Darathy]

I don't just observe A tree and then imagine some treeness. The treeness in my brain was gleaned from thousands of tree observations. If there was no such thing as treeness I could not have done that.

Words ending in -ness are my speciality, and you should keep that in (no pun intended) mind.

Have fun chewing on your chewtoy, SoS. I know you are interested in presenting your physicalist — or should I say "middle-ist"? — model of observer and observed. I think for the purposes of chewing (or as it is sometimes known, "masticating") that presenting a more or less scientific model does not imply any sort of metaphysics, and that "treeness" is a coinage of a model, rather than a metaphysical gambit, and it doesn't matter whether or not a working model of cognition finds that retaining such a coinage bends parsimony to the point of being FUBAR.

I agree that an empirical model of what happens between receipt of empirical photons and speaking the word "tree" will help, but if it is too unparsimonious, how will you ever use it to kill off metaphysics? It will be a sword too heavy to lift. People also want to know what is going on inside a tornado, but have concluded that following the trajectories of every single air molecule is not the way to go about it.

Really, phyiscal experiments in repetitions of a stimulus and a response show that thousands of trials are not necessary. Further studies by botanists show that they can produce a taxonomy of trees for the purposes of doing botany.

You are, I think, correct in concluding that James is focusing on the metaphysical existence of the "brain" because we all know that an empirical model of cognition is about ready to toast the ghost in the machine. The way around this for James is to undermine the entire notion of an empirical program to account for "knowing".

[SpeedOfSound]

The independence of the the observer IS what defines empiricism. I don't ignore the observer. I study the brain. One of the things that fascinates me about it is that it draws from the data patterns that are the thing in itself. It's the core of the whole thing.

I get the impression that this drawing of patterns is something that you think of as proof that the patterns don't exist. Which is the real senselessness of your approach.

I don't just observe A tree and then imagine some treeness. The treeness in my brain was gleaned from thousands of tree observations. If there was no such thing as treeness I could not have done that.

Prove to me that there is no treeness among us, independent of us. Prove that it is only 'inside' us.

You keep forgetting what this thread is about. It's not about me proving that there is nothing else external to the self (whatever the 'self' may be), it's about me proving that there is 'something else' other than empirical data. Whether that 'thing' is the brain itself, God, or a pile of turtles, is not the issue here.

Your problem, here, is that you aren't a relativist. Your concern in the debate is really reducible to 'anti-idealism'. Implicit in your statement above, for example, is that the brain is the source of everything that it conceives of. But of what help is that to the relativist? None, since an ontology/metaphysic is implied.

There will be a thread, soon, that focusses upon idealism - or materialism - and then we can discuss your request in great detail. But for now, relativism is in the spotlight.

No I have not forgot what the thread is about. I am simply questioning your hangup about observers.

The point is that there is treeness. I know it. You know it. I know that you know it....

You want to make an issue of where the treeness is. Not me. I'm an anit-idealist because I'm a relativist, not because I am a materialist.

I study treeness on brainess. But we'll get into that in another thread.

[Surendra Darathy]

I study treeness on brainess.

You mean "brainness". "Brainess" sounds like a "female principle" to me. Brain and brainess created He them. I told you I was an expert on those -ness words. James, OTOH, studies the action of nessness on nessness.

While we're at it, we might profit from contemplating the brainlessness of treeness.

[SpeedOfSound]

I agree that an empirical model of what happens between receipt of empirical photons and speaking the word "tree" will help, but if it is too unparsimonious, how will you ever use it to kill off metaphysics?

Metaphysics will be killed of in the same way as 8-track tape players. The whole crapshoot got started to solve a perceived problem of our perceiving things. The problem doesn't exist anymore except at the bottom of trash heaps where it is decaying along side my four channel, 8-track, copy of Quadrophenia.

Anyway. I'm just keeping the idealists busy until they die of attrition. Patience.

(damn. I had a four channel discrete 8-track in my '79 T-bird Baby Blue Heritage Edition. Probably be worth something today. The car came with a Who tape.)

[SpeedOfSound]

I study treeness on brainess.

You mean "brainness". "Brainess" sounds like a "female principle" to me. Brain and brainess created He them. I told you I was an expert on those -ness words. James, OTOH, studies the action of nessness on nessness.

Yeh BrainNess. You confuse brainness with bitchness.