jamest wrote:In the instance that you have suggested, the observed component is happening internally to 'the brain'. But since you are implying that the brain exists distinctly to that which is being observed, you are in fact advocating a material reality, distinct and external to the observed component. That is, the instance you present entails an ontology commensurate with materialism.
You are imposing metaphysics on those with whom you are discussing this. Of the discussants, you are the only one here talking about the brain in terms of how and whether it "exists". The empiricist states that the empirical brain is the part of the empirical model of empirical cognition where empirical sensory information is organized. Schrodinger's cat catches Schrodinger's mouse. You put the cat and the mouse in a room and when, the next day, the mouse is no longer there, but a tail and a hairball, and the cat are, you conclude that the cat observed the mouse. That's the empirical model. It may not be what really-o, truly-o "occurred" or "happened", but that's the conclusion from the empirical data. All you're left with is a set of observations. Scientists are not in the habit of saying "I observed this" and then start talking about themselves. You seem to think they should. That may only be because you think it's a great deal for people to talk about themselves.
The whole business of knowing something
fershur is what the enterprise of "metaphysics" hoped to achieve. It's fucked. So you want to say that the model statements about brains means that empiricists know fershur that materialism is true, and that (though they don't state anything about the metaphysics of brains) empiricists are secret materialists. Do you think you've really shown this? No, you've extracted the assertion from your hindquarters.
you are implying that the brain exists distinctly to that which is being observed, you are in fact advocating a material reality
So your hypothesis is that when an empiricist says that "brain" and "observed phenomena" are distinct components of a "model" and that this implies that the scientist models them as distinct components of a "material reality" with a metaphysics behind it? Just how do you think you have shown this? Could you be any more adept at canards? If you don't start out with metaphysics, you won't end up with it. Starting with metaphysics is the only way to end with it. You haven't shown that you can start with metaphysics at all. You skipped that part. You know, the one where you actually wrote down a definition for "existence".
jamest wrote:We do not know whether 'brains' are the source of empirical construction ('experience'). If we did, then philosophy would be obsolete, since we would have found the ultimate answer to our age-old metaphysical enquiry. In fact, brains - like everything else - are empirical constructs. They are entities observed/conceived to exist amongst the rest of the empirical realm. But if you want to consider that brains are the aforementioned source, then they must exist distinctly to the observed component (aka the empirical realm).
That is the entire point of empiricism, James. Empiricists don't claim to know anything "fershur". That is what skepticism is about. The empirical relationships we state are aspects of a tentative model. That is the whole point of science, and all you seem interested in doing is to repeat your canards about existence, and your strawmen about what science claims to "prove" or to know "fershur". You're so good at missing the point that you could join Custer at Little Big Horn and still be making plans for the weekend barbecue.
jamest wrote:The irony is that a relativist cannot claim that brains are the source of 'observation', because of the ontological implications. For a relativist, the conceived nature of the empirical realm truly is a thorn in his side. And then, if he pretends that there's nothing 'conceived' about the empirical realm (if he ignores the internalism prevalent in observation)(thus ignoring the history of ill-conceived ideas about what the empirical realm is), then his position has to be reducible to, and commensurate with, materialism: that 'empirical data' is of constructs that exist externally to the field of one's study:
Empiricists do not talk about "sources" and "essences", James. Scientists say that the brain is an organ in a physiological and anatomical model of human beings. Science does not talk about what the "essence" of a human being consists of. In order to do that, the scientist would have to engage in the intellectual masturbation of metaphysics, but she desists.
jamest wrote:That is, if A sees B and B isn't an internal construct [of A], then B must be a construct that exists externally to A.
Internal and external are features of a model. No scientist wants to locate the real metaphysical boundary separating the cat from the mouse. The cat and the mouse are separate components of a model of predator-prey behavior. In private moments, everyone speculates idly about what the implications might be if the universe was a giant cheddar cheese ball infused with port wine and coated with walnuts, and the universe right next door to it was made entirely out of biscuits. What is the true nature of a biscuit? Crispinessness!
jamest wrote:Whatever... at this juncture, it is not important that we don't know whether B is an internal or external construct. What is important, is that either way, an ontology is implied: that is, there is something upon which a metaphysic can be constructed.
Saying the word "important" by itself is as much as to admit that one is saying "it is important to me". Since you are not the teacher here, and we are not the students, there doesn't seem to be any dire consequences in the offing if we do not pretend that you are the teacher.
