http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/The_god_delusionSince there are a number of different theistic ideas relating to the nature of God(s), Dawkins defines the concept of God that he wishes to address early in the book. Dawkins distinguishes between an abstract, impersonal god (such as found in pantheism, or as promoted by Spinoza or Einstein[15]) from a personal God who is the creator of the universe, who is interested in human affairs, and who should be worshipped.[16]
So I seem to recall that Bertrand Russell said a lot of different things at different points, but at one point he endorsed neutral monism (if I recall correctly).
IMHO, a materialist monism or a neutral monism in the style of Russell should be able to stand up to anything Dawkins can throw at it.
http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Neutral_monism
I'm not an expert, but Wikipedia lists Spinoza as a neutral monist.
An obvious alternative to monism is dualism, such as that of the Catholic Church, which claims that there are natural bodies and supernatural souls. I assume most people on this board will not be terribly interested in that kind of dualism, but there might be some people who want to pick nits about neutral monism versus materialist monism.
Then, if one is willing to entertain any kind of monism, whether materialist or not, one can start thinking about Immaterialism, which as far as I can tell is monistic.
http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Immaterialism
So, two questions:
1) Can Dawkins disprove Spinoza's and Einstein's pantheistic "God" as well as the other "Gods"?
2) Can Dawkins address Berkeley's work in the context of its major axiom, "Esse est percipi"? (IMHO Berkeley doesn't exactly need to be disproven, since Berkeley starts with an axiom, "Esse est percipi." The lazy approach would be to say, "No, I deny your axiom, there is something that is but is not perceived, so I don't have to listen to anything Berkeley says based on that axiom."