The "no miracles" argument against scientific realism

[ColonelZen]

Apart from evidence which borders on certainty that this is not a deterministic universe, I see no reason to agree with this:

It seems to me that it would be a bit of a miracle if it turned out that we lived in a universe whose initial state and causal laws were such that they gave rise to conscious entities whose beliefs about their universe were true beliefs.

The "magic" of Gödel's proof of incompleteness is that with sufficient complexity any numerical system (and while I haven't done it, I suspect a proof that a deterministic system is equivalent to a formal arithmetic system would be fairly simple) will embody systems capable of self reference. Once you concede self reference and pull in evolution to be the filter and accumulator to sieve through the combinatorial explosion of - to create us, and then us to apply a kind of evolution to our beliefs, the ordering of proofs - to find "true beliefs", the magic disappears completely.

Your presumption that such is miraculous also seems to rely upon the utterly wrong intuition that determinism implies predestination. It doesn't. In fact it is a fairly simple demonstration that relatively trivial deterministic but not pre-determinable universes exist: A deterministic universe containing a Turing machine running a non-trivial program with a blue light when running, red when stopped; the Halting Problem says we cannot know when/if the light will change.

But that points another problem. Your hypothetical universe may indeed have beings with "true" beliefs. But again by Gödel we know their beliefs are not complete, and we have no reason to presume that the deterministic rules which govern it are wholly determinable from *within* that universe even to the extent that they are completely describable within it.

In other words your "implausibility argument" is clever, but contains a number of presumptions which render it a question begging argument of the miraculous. No, when examined more carefully, your consequent is not a miracle and does not require a miracle in its predicate.

-- TWZ

PS. hmmm. How do you do an o-umlaut around here?

[epepke]

PS. hmmm. How do you do an o-umlaut around here?

Good question. Gödel.

It appears that one types Unicode into the box.

[FBM]

Is it not acknowledged by scientists that scientific knowledge is incomplete, therefore, inaccurate? Until we get it ALL figured out, we're in one of those deceptive universes, eh?

Not necessarily. Even incomplete theories could still tell us something true about the underlying nature of reality, even if they weren't correct in every respect. See "Structural Realism".

The issue is that science relies entirely on our observations. But it requires a leap of faith to assert that our observations tell us something true about how the world really is. For instance, if we were in The Matrix, our observations (and any science based on them) would only tell us about The Matrix's simulated version of reality, not about how the universe outside the Matrix *really* is.

Any scientific experiments you performed when you were in the Matrix would only tell you about the rules of the simulation. The experiments would never reveal anything about the hardware the simulation ran on, OR the physical laws of the universe that contained the hardware.

Any set of observations that matched the observations we have, would lead one to derive the laws of physics that we have, EVEN if you are in a simulation running on an alien supercomputer in an alternate universe with completely different physical laws (laws which still allow for implementations of Turing machines).

Just a suggestion: Rather than involve wild speculation involving The Matrix and untestable 'what ifs', you may find firmer, less contentious ground upon which to base your arguments by using the problem with induction and/or Gödel's incompleteness theorems.

[CJ]

Even incomplete theories could still tell us something true about the underlying nature of reality

No.

The Origin of Species, published in 1859 was hardly complete. Yet it did tell us something true about the underlying nature of reality. E=mc2 is the result of a potentially flawed theory, I say flawed because we still can't completely resolve the relationship of relativity with Quantum theory. In fact show me one theory that when first stated was perfect? There probably is one but I'm not aware of it. The history of the advancement of human knowledge is one of insight and refinement.

[CJ]

Let's assume that our best scientific theories tell us something true about the way the world *really* is, in an ontological sense. And further, for simplicity, let's assume a deterministic interpretation of those theories.

In this view, the universe as we know it began ~13.7 billion years ago. We'll set aside any questions about what, if anything, preceded the first instant and just draw a line there and call that our "initial state".

Given the specifics of that initial state, plus the particular causal laws of physics that we have, the universe can only evolve along one path. The state of the universe at this moment is entirely determined by two, and only two, things: its initial state and its casual laws.

But this means that the development of our scientific theories *about* the universe was also entirely determined by the initial state of the universe and it's causal laws. Our discovery of the true nature of the universe has to have been "baked into" the structure of the universe in its first instant.

By comparison, how many sets of possible initial states plus causal laws are there that would give rise to conscious entities who develop *false* scientific theories about their universe? It seems to me that this set of "deceptive" universes is likely much larger than the set of "honest" universes.

What would make universes with honest initial conditions + causal laws more probable than deceptive ones? For every honest universe it would seem possible to have an infinite number of deceptive universes that are the equivalent of "The Matrix" - they give rise to conscious entities who have convincing but incorrect beliefs about how their universe really is. These entities' beliefs are based on perceptions that are only illusions, or simulations (naturally occurring or intelligently designed), or hallucinations, or dreams.

It seems to me that it would be a bit of a miracle if it turned out that we lived in a universe whose initial state and causal laws were such that they gave rise to conscious entities whose beliefs about their universe were true beliefs.

A similar argument can also be made if we choose an indeterministic interpretation of our best scientific theories (e.g., quantum mechanics), though it involves a few extra steps.

Hi Rex

Welcome aboard.

In your post you state we should not worry about how the universe started "We'll set aside any questions about what, if anything, preceded the first instant and just draw a line there and call that our "initial state"." However later on you appear to disregard your own condition and presume multiple realities "It seems to me that this set of "deceptive" universes is likely much larger than the set of "honest" universes." How do your resolve this dichotomy?

Regards
Chris

[RexAllen]

Apart from evidence which borders on certainty that this is not a deterministic universe

I think you're overconfident on that point, BUT, it doesn't matter. My argument can be extended to the indeterministic case just as well.

So I'm starting with an assumption of strong determinism only because it's the simpler case. IF we reach an agreement on that case, then I will explain how my argument extends to cover the indeterministic case.

But, ultimately, indeterminism doesn't buy you very much. See my earlier reply to Twiglet.

The "magic" of Godel's proof of incompleteness is that with sufficient complexity any numerical system (and while I haven't done it, I suspect a proof that a deterministic system is equivalent to a formal arithmetic system would be fairly simple) will embody systems capable of self reference. Once you concede self reference...

While true, this seems irrelevant to the original post. What does self-reference have to do with initial conditions and causal laws?

and pull in evolution to be the filter and accumulator to sieve through the combinatorial explosion of - to create us, and then us to apply a kind of evolution to our beliefs, the ordering of proofs - to find "true beliefs", the magic disappears completely.

How do "evolutionary processes" differ from regular physical processes? There is no intrinsic difference, right?

All processes must reduce to fundamental physical laws governing the behavior of fundamental entities. "Evolution" is not a fundamental physical law. There is no "evolution field". There are no "evolution" particles. So what is this "evolution" you refer to?

"Evolutionary" is just a descriptive label that we can apply to a certain category of processes that share some set of properties that we humans have picked out as significant.

Evolution doesn't add anything to this discussion because, ultimately, everything is explained by initial conditions and *fundamental* causal laws. In a determinisitic universe, things can only happen one way. So evolution has no real work to do. It's a description of what *has* happened, not an explanation of *why* it happened.

The state of the world is today was fixed by the initial conditions plus the causal laws of physics. Any explanation for the way we are lies there, not with "evolution".

There is no “competition” for survival. There is no “selection”. Instead, events involving fundamental particles unfold as they must…in the only way that they can.

When we say “competition among creatures”, what we really mean is “it is as though there were competition among creatures”. Because what really exists are fundamental particles (quantum fields, strings, whatever), not “creatures”. It is only in our minds that we take collections of quarks and electrons and form them into creatures.

Since they aren't fundamental laws, evolution and natural selection have no causal power. We just speak of them as if they did.

Your presumption that such is miraculous also seems to rely upon the utterly wrong intuition that determinism implies predestination. It doesn't. In fact it is a fairly simple demonstration that relatively trivial deterministic but not pre-determinable universes exist: A deterministic universe containing a Turing machine running a non-trivial program with a blue light when running, red when stopped; the Halting Problem says we cannot know when/if the light will change.

It doesn't matter whether we can *know* when/if the light will change. Whether the light will or won't change *is* predetermined though. The light's state at some particular later time (say 2 hours after beginning execution) is a *necessary* consequence of the initial state of the Turing machine's tape and it's "action table" (equivalent to the universe's initial conditions and causal laws).

We have to run the program to find out whether it halts within 2 hours, but that result is a forgone conclusion given it's starting state. The light's state at the 2 hour mark was predetermined. Predestined.

No matter how many times we run that Turing machine, we will always get the same outcome.

Predestinition is not whether we can *know* the outcome...but rather whether the outcome is fixed.

So, I don't know where you got your definition of "predestination" from, but I think it's wrong. Here's a pretty good one that I found:

Noun 1. predestination - previous determination as if by destiny or fate

destiny, fate - an event (or a course of events) that will inevitably happen in the future

But that points another problem. Your hypothetical universe may indeed have beings with "true" beliefs. But again by Godel we know their beliefs are not complete, and we have no reason to presume that the deterministic rules which govern it are wholly determinable from *within* that universe even to the extent that they are completely describable within it.

Again, this strikes me as irrelevant to the original post. I don't see why you're introducing it into the conversation.

Nowhere did I say anything about gaining complete knowledge, or a complete theory, of the nature of the universe.

My central point is that if we are in a deterministic universe, then for us to have *any* true understanding of this universe, that understanding *must* have already been implicit and inevitable in the universe's first instant.

I don't see how this claim in anyway involves Godel's incompleteness theorems.

In other words your "implausibility argument" is clever

Ah! Rare praise! Nectar of the Gods!

but contains a number of presumptions which render it a question begging argument of the miraculous.

This may be true, but even if so, I don't see that you've uncovered any of them.

[RexAllen]

Just a suggestion: Rather than involve wild speculation involving The Matrix and untestable 'what ifs', you may find firmer, less contentious ground upon which to base your arguments by using the problem with induction and/or Gödel's incompleteness theorems.

I don't see any significant difference between using "The Matrix" versus Descartes' "Deceiving Demon" or his "Dream Argument", or the common "brain-in-a-vat" thought experiments.

Do you?

Further, the possibility of a multiverse is commonly discussed in cosmology - not to mention the many worlds interpretation of quantum mechanics, or Tegmark's MUH.

If this is still to far out for you, then just use the concept of "possible worlds" from modal logic. There's nothing logically inconsistent about any of the "alternate universes" that I've mentioned. My argument is still valid even if we take the modal logic interpretation.

So, none of the concepts I've used here are particularly wild or original.

[Azathoth]

PS. hmmm. How do you do an o-umlaut around here?

Good question. Gödel.

It appears that one types Unicode into the box.

I have one on my keyboard along with æ, ð and þ It is in the character map if you don't though.

[RexAllen]

In your post you state we should not worry about how the universe started "We'll set aside any questions about what, if anything, preceded the first instant and just draw a line there and call that our "initial state"." However later on you appear to disregard your own condition and presume multiple realities "It seems to me that this set of "deceptive" universes is likely much larger than the set of "honest" universes." How do your resolve this dichotomy?

So my argument doesn't depend on the *actual* existence of these alternate universes. Just their *possible* existence.

So the basic idea is just that an alternate universe with a drastically different set of initial conditions and causal laws than what our universe appears to have could still generate perceptions of *this* universe.

If you claim that such "deceptive" initial conditions and causal laws are impossible, how do you justify your claim? Why do you think that? What is your reasoning?

Further, if we just consider the set of all possible combinations of "initial conditions + causal laws", the most common type of conceivable universe would seem to be lifeless universes. The next most common would seem to be universes that gave rise to "life", but where this life never arrives at any true understanding of the universe that contains it (because that universe is "deceptive"). And LEAST common would be "honest" universes that contain life which does achieve some true understanding of the universe that contains it.

I've described my reasoning on the relative frequency of deceptive to honest universes in prior posts in this thread.

If you don't believe that our universe was selected at random from the list of conceivable universes, how do you justify that belief? What is your reasoning?

My deeper point is that observation and reason aren't enough to pierce the veil of perception to see what *really* exists. This is obviously not an original idea...Berkeley, Hume, and Kant all made the same point over 200 years ago. And the point remains valid.

[CJ]

In your post you state we should not worry about how the universe started "We'll set aside any questions about what, if anything, preceded the first instant and just draw a line there and call that our "initial state"." However later on you appear to disregard your own condition and presume multiple realities "It seems to me that this set of "deceptive" universes is likely much larger than the set of "honest" universes." How do your resolve this dichotomy?

So my argument doesn't depend on the *actual* existence of these alternate universes. Just their *possible* existence.

That's all I need to read thanks.

Regards
Chris

[Hermit]

The issue is that science relies entirely on our observations. But it requires a leap of faith to assert that our observations tell us something true about how the world really is. For instance, if we were in The Matrix, our observations (and any science based on them) would only tell us about The Matrix's simulated version of reality, not about how the universe outside the Matrix *really* is.

Any scientific experiments you performed when you were in the Matrix would only tell you about the rules of the simulation. The experiments would never reveal anything about the hardware the simulation ran on, OR the physical laws of the universe that contained the hardware.

Any set of observations that matched the observations we have, would lead one to derive the laws of physics that we have, EVEN if you are in a simulation running on an alien supercomputer in an alternate universe with completely different physical laws (laws which still allow for implementations of Turing machines).

we start with our observations, and then we construct plausible narratives that are consistent with what we have observed. These narratives may be useful in analyzing recurring patterns in the records of our past observations, but that doesn’t necessarily mean that they are true of anything that exists outside of our observations.

The possible existence of matter in the form of quarks and electrons (or strings, or quantum fields, or whatever) is consistent with our observations, but obviously we have no direct knowledge of quarks and electrons or the rest. Their existence, and the physical laws associated with them, are only inferred from our observations.

I agree with everything you said in the above quotes. What I have difficulties with is why the following is even a relevant continuation of them:

Even something right in front of me, like my chair, I still only know through my conscious experience. I see a chair here, but I don’t know that the chair actually exists. I could be dreaming, for instance, in which case the chair exists entirely within my mind.

Why can't we simply conclude that phenomena are knowable by empiric means, but noumena are beyond our ken by definition until we discover some hitherto undiscovered method of getting to know them? In the absence of such method, would it not be prudent to admit that our knowledge is limited to fashioning ever more encompassing theories by detecting patterns of behaviour? That - pending hitherto unanticipated insights 'essential reality' - or whatever else you might want to call the noumena - is out of bounds and therefore totally irrelevant in regard to any discussion of what we can possibly know?

In short, I don't really give a fuck if the chair in front of me 'actually exists' precisely because all I can know is through sensory perception.

[Trolldor]

Actually, we can know the chair exists. Saying we can't is philosophical bullshit. It exists because we can interact with it and it is detectable by objective means - machines. Saying anything like 'ohh it's all a dream, or a construct of our imagination' requires proof or evidence, and oddly enough nobody's ever been able to substantiate anything even remotely close to that. Want to know why? Cause it's bullshit.
Secondly, any experiments within the matrix are not confined to the matrix at all, the whole point of the matrix is that it is a computer simulation with glitches and faults, hence why people are able to escape from it, and defy the rules it attempts to enforce.
If this were a dream then you'd have to establish on what principle basis you could make any such conclusion, even philsophically, given that dreams are constructs of experience, and an individual who's "whole life is a dream" has never experienced anything and can not, therefore, dream.
Finally, the set of physical laws we have observed are not only known to deviate, but there are physical laws which change when observed compared to unobserved.

[Hermit]

Actually, we can know the chair exists. Saying we can't is philosophical bullshit. It exists because we can interact with it and it is detectable by objective means - machines.

The machines that only exist in your mind, like, you know, the chair? Sorry that is no counter to solipsism.

I prefer to regard metaphysical speculations - of which solipsism is but one - as inherently unproductive, irresolvable and irrelevant. They deserve the exact same amount of attention and respect as there is evidence supporting whatever it is that is claimed.