The subjective observer is a fictional character

[SpeedOfSound]

Firstly, your knowledge of philosophy is not extensive. Secondly, anyone who thinks that a knowledge of science provides him with a knowledge of philosophy, only goes to prove the former point.

So you are claiming extensive knowledge of philosophy? Good. Show me a contemporary philosopher, who has a real job as a philosopher, that agrees with you that a physical brain can't tell the difference between a bunion and his mom's face without a metaphysical soul.

[jamest]

2) Materialistic models can account for human behaviour.

Given the popular definition of materialism this word is a problem in this statement.

'The world' is an internal phenomena. It's what 'you' perceive and think of it. There are a few pertinent questions:

1) What exactly am 'I'?
2) Does the world exist externally to 'me'?
3) Am 'I' then, essentially the brain harbouring this internal event of 'the world'?

What emerges from these questions, are a few telling facts:

a) If the world is real, then there are two worlds: the one that I perceive of; and the one that my perceptions are representative of. (Real and perceived worlds).
b) If the brain is real, then 'I' have two identities: the one that I perceive of myself; and 'brain' (with body). (Real and perceived identities)

c) If the brain can explain human behaviour, then this explanation must necessarily embrace the real world, only. That is, it's no good just using perceptions/observations as proof of what real brains do. That would amount to a conflation of the perceived and real world. A fallacious metaphysical argument.

This conversation is about metaphysics. Graham is seeking to explain the abstract (our notion/perception of the world) with a non-abstract (real) brain, thus rebuking the existence of the 'immaterial' observer.

Behaviour? (I wish the fuck you brits would learn how to spell. Don't make us bring our troops over there to teach you how to have a right spelling democracy!! :pissed: )

Yeah, we gave you our language and you 'made stuff up' to feel good about yourselves. Now, you're doing the same thing with philosophy.

[GrahamH]

2) Materialistic models can account for human behaviour.

Given the popular definition of materialism this word is a problem in this statement.

'The world' is an internal phenomena. It's what 'you' perceive and think of it. There are a few pertinent questions:

1) What exactly am 'I'?
2) Does the world exist externally to 'me'?
3) Am 'I' then, essentially the brain harbouring this internal event of 'the world'?

What can be said with certainty in reply is:

1) 'I' am not The Subjective Observer creating what 'I' observe ('I' do not observe any 'construction' of experience)
2) 'The world', whatever it may Really Be, exists external to 'The Subjective Observer' (Since The Subjective Observer observes a world It did not create.
3) Am I a brain responding to a world? Quite probably.

What emerges from these questions, are a few telling facts:

a) If the world is real, then there are two worlds: the one that I perceive of; and the one that my perceptions are representative of. (Real and perceived worlds).

There is a world and perceptions of it, not actually two worlds. The perceptions and the world are probably of the same substance.

b) If the brain is real, then 'I' have two identities: the one that I perceive of myself; and 'brain' (with body). (Real and perceived identities)

There is the person, and how the person is perceived. There can be many and various perceptions of a person, or a cloud, or anything in the world.

c) If the brain can explain human behaviour, then this explanation must necessarily embrace the real world, only. That is, it's no good just using perceptions/observations as proof of what real brains do. That would amount to a conflation of the perceived and real world. A fallacious metaphysical argument.

Brains do the perceiving, by growing NN recognisers than determine how the brain functions in response to the world. The NNs are 'real world' and their performance in acurate categorisation of the world is the variable perception. Each brain grows its own categories, based on its history of interactions with the world, and therefore has an individual 'view of the world'.

This conversation is about metaphysics. Graham is seeking to explain the abstract (our notion/perception of the world) with a non-abstract (real) brain, thus rebuking the existence of the 'immaterial' observer.

You admit that there is the thing that actually observes, and the perceived identity of a self as subjective observer, and that these are not identical. We agree on that then. I merely say that the perceived identity of "I - The Subjective Observer" is a metaphysical error. The thing that recognises the world, the brain, recognises this fictional character as a thing inside itself, but the attributes of the S.O. are different to the measurable attributes of physical brains, hence the confusion and apparent 'Hard Problem'.

[SpeedOfSound]

2) Materialistic models can account for human behaviour.

Given the popular definition of materialism this word is a problem in this statement.

'The world' is an internal phenomena. It's what 'you' perceive and think of it. There are a few pertinent questions:

1) What exactly am 'I'?
2) Does the world exist externally to 'me'?
3) Am 'I' then, essentially the brain harbouring this internal event of 'the world'?

What emerges from these questions, are a few telling facts:

a) If the world is real, then there are two worlds: the one that I perceive of; and the one that my perceptions are representative of. (Real and perceived worlds).
b) If the brain is real, then 'I' have two identities: the one that I perceive of myself; and 'brain' (with body). (Real and perceived identities)

c) If the brain can explain human behaviour, then this explanation must necessarily embrace the real world, only. That is, it's no good just using perceptions/observations as proof of what real brains do. That would amount to a conflation of the perceived and real world. A fallacious metaphysical argument.

This conversation is about metaphysics. Graham is seeking to explain the abstract (our notion/perception of the world) with a non-abstract (real) brain, thus rebuking the existence of the 'immaterial' observer.

So many problems. Lets' pick one.

c) If the brain can explain human behaviour, then this explanation must necessarily embrace the real world, only. That is, it's no good just using perceptions/observations as proof of what real brains do. That would amount to a conflation of the perceived and real world. A fallacious metaphysical argument.

This is where you show us that metaphysics is bullocks. Well at least for you CosmoCons and your StrangeCosmoConThingy. I call them SCATS. CosmoCon's shit SCATS when their arguments run into trouble.

Here's how it works. The CC brings arguments based on dreams, the Argument from Illusion(AFI), cartoon characters, paintings etc. This is supposed to convince us that our perceptions may not be reality.

Next the CC's arguments fail in many ways to match empirical evidence or to dispel such evidence.

The the SCAT appears. Let's throw all empirical evidnce out because of the assumption of the AFI.

The problem is that cartoons and dreams and anything we know about illusion is based completely on empirical evidence and knowledge about the world so derived.

While it impossible to disprove brain in vat ideas they have the substantive problem of always resulting extreme solipsism.

So the CC's opening volley uses the empirical evidence that he then later denies when things get tough for him. He has to do a little category-jumping-two-step to do this but it never seems to bother the CC judging from the Smug that usually accompanies the SCAT.

You have the nerve use the expression "fallacious metaphysical argument" ?? Wow.

[Surendra Darathy]

Each brain grows its own categories, based on its history of interactions with the world, and therefore has an individual 'view of the world'.

The question then is about how much weight to give to this individual "view of the world" when different brains communicate with one another. That is what I take to be metaphysical position being "defended" by jamest (here by attacking the metaphysical "potency" of science to address this question of weighting).

It is a mystery to me what makes it necessary so to obfuscate the question, by trying to argue away any basis for differences of opinion about "what we are" in our metaphysical essence.

The more empirical position of brain interacting with world (one part of the world interacting with another) explains the differences in "view of the world" by differences in the histories of these interactions.

What is unfortunate is that the metaphysical position of idealism cannot establish any basis for differences of subjective view, and has to produce a very unparsimonious explanation for the differences between different "subjective observers". This is done by describing these various subjective observers as having been manufactured purposefully. It's just a sickeningly round-about route to theism, and leads to feelings of vertigo in contemplating the depths of duplicity that one must go through in order to promote it with a straight face.

This is supposed to convince us that our perceptions may not be reality.

The need for an unfalsifiable theism situated relative to the scientific view of the world leads to lots of obfuscation. The natural problem for a solipsist like jamest is to conjure up how his subjective perceptions correctly apprehend "reality", a unique reality that forms the basis of his metaphysics. Reality "has to be more" than is given in perception, otherwise the immaterial god-thingy is likewise just part of an individual history stamped on a brain, and cannot dictate anything to anyone except to the brain it "owns". Or, more properly, "pwns".

[SpeedOfSound]

It's just a sickeningly round-about route to theism, and leads to feelings of vertigo in contemplating the depths of duplicity that one must go through in order to promote it with a straight face.

You have it in a nutshell.

[jamest]

1) 'I' am not The Subjective Observer creating what 'I' observe ('I' do not observe any 'construction' of experience)
2) 'The world', whatever it may Really Be, exists external to 'The Subjective Observer' (Since The Subjective Observer observes a world It did not create.

What constructs your dreams, each night? The brain, according to you.
What observes its dreams each night? The brain, according to you.
Whilst dreaming, do 'you' (the brain) observe the construction of the dream? No. You are immersed within the dream.

Even your model requires a brain that loses sight of its own creativity.

What emerges from these questions, are a few telling facts:

a) If the world is real, then there are two worlds: the one that I perceive of; and the one that my perceptions are representative of. (Real and perceived worlds).

There is a world and perceptions of it, not actually two worlds. The perceptions and the world are probably of the same substance.

Your vision/perception/notion of a tree, is not the tree itself. Therefore, there are two versions of that tree: itself and your notion of it. The point is that our notion/perception/experience of the world, is not the world itself.

b) If the brain is real, then 'I' have two identities: the one that I perceive of myself; and 'brain' (with body). (Real and perceived identities)

There is the person, and how the person is perceived. There can be many and various perceptions of a person, or a cloud, or anything in the world.

The point is that what we perceive about anything, including ourselves, is necessarily not the actual reality of that thing.

c) If the brain can explain human behaviour, then this explanation must necessarily embrace the real world, only. That is, it's no good just using perceptions/observations as proof of what real brains do. That would amount to a conflation of the perceived and real world. A fallacious metaphysical argument.

Brains do the perceiving, by growing NN recognisers than determine how the brain functions in response to the world. The NNs are 'real world' and their performance in acurate categorisation of the world is the variable perception. Each brain grows its own categories, based on its history of interactions with the world, and therefore has an individual 'view of the world'.

Whenever we observe the brain in action (neuroscience), we are observing perceptions of brains. We simply don't have access to real brains - we can't study them. So, any correlations that we mention, relate to perceived phenomena. This is why observation cannot serve as proof for your argument. Observation gets you nowhere, metaphysically.

This conversation is about metaphysics. Graham is seeking to explain the abstract (our notion/perception of the world) with a non-abstract (real) brain, thus rebuking the existence of the 'immaterial' observer.

You admit that there is the thing that actually observes, and the perceived identity of a self as subjective observer, and that these are not identical.

Actually, 'perceived entities' cannot observe anything - they are part of what is observed. It is not 'Graham', for instance, that perceives, but 'Graham' that is perceived. In other words, 'Graham' is subjectively observed, but is not the entity doing the observing.

The thing that recognises the world, the brain, recognises this fictional character as a thing inside itself,

You're not on the same wavelength as me. You're mixed-up between observer and observed. Note that the observer cannot be observed. If the brain recognises this "fictional character", then it does so by means other than observation.

[Surendra Darathy]

Note that the observer cannot be observed.

There is no observer. Only Zuul.

It is not 'Graham', for instance, that perceives, but 'Graham' that is perceived. In other words, 'Graham' is subjectively observed, but is not the entity doing the observing.

There is no "Graham", only jamest.

[jamest]

Note that the observer cannot be observed.

There is no observer. Only Zuul.

It is not 'Graham', for instance, that perceives, but 'Graham' that is perceived. In other words, 'Graham' is subjectively observed, but is not the entity doing the observing.

There is no "Graham", only jamest.

No, even james is observed.

[Surendra Darathy]

Note that the observer cannot be observed.

There is no observer. Only Zuul.

It is not 'Graham', for instance, that perceives, but 'Graham' that is perceived. In other words, 'Graham' is subjectively observed, but is not the entity doing the observing.

There is no "Graham", only jamest.

No, even james is observed.

Your point no doubt being that identity is socially-constructed. What a state in which to find oneself after all that. No wonder you think you need God to make jamest something more than what Graham can observe.

Really, James, if God could only help you bend a spoon, or something. But all it has done is allow other observers to observe you indefatigably chase the rightness of your metaphysics down the empty corridors of an internet forum.

Socially-constructed, indeed.

[jamest]

Your point no doubt being that identity is socially-constructed.

Psychology is fucked up. Do you know, according to social constructionists, language creates identity. Let's give it a round of applause.

You appear afraid of the idea that 'God' may be the essence of 'you'. Is it guilt, would you say, that invokes such a reaction? Or selfishness - the desire to remain as you are?

[GrahamH]

1) 'I' am not The Subjective Observer creating what 'I' observe ('I' do not observe any 'construction' of experience)
2) 'The world', whatever it may Really Be, exists external to 'The Subjective Observer' (Since The Subjective Observer observes a world It did not create.

What constructs your dreams, each night? The brain, according to you.

It is clearly not 'I - Subjective Observer'. It can't be, can it? Even idealists accept this necessary fact, although they may seek to obfuscate the issue.

What observes its dreams each night? The brain, according to you.

What does it mean to 'observe a dream, and what is doing it?

What I am suggesting about the fictional SO is that the brain recognises events as happening to the SO. The brain doesn't recognise itself, since it never encounters itself as a brain, only, and persistently, as a person with apparent motivations and mental states. When the dream events occur the brain recognises them as <SO is experiencing a dream>. While awake the brain recognises sensory events as <SO experiencing the world>

Whilst dreaming, do 'you' (the brain) observe the construction of the dream? No. You are immersed within the dream.

Exactly. 'I' construct nothing, if 'I' am the SO. Construction and observation are separate functions. 'Knowing' and 'Experiencing' are separate functions. Knowing <I experience> accounts for experience without the need for some metaphysically distinct substance of 'experience'. Knowing about it is sufficient.

Even your model requires a brain that loses sight of its own creativity.

Yes, indeed, but my model is not baseD on the reality of The Subjective Observer really having experiences. My model is of an unknowing brain functioning as a knowing agent. No homunculus, no magic understanding inside the mechanism, the effect is not the thing itself.

You seek to conflate the SO with the knowing mind, but there is no justification for that. We don't need to invoke SE as an element of knowledge, and if we have knowledge we can account for any perception, including those of SO and qualia.

What emerges from these questions, are a few telling facts:

a) If the world is real, then there are two worlds: the one that I perceive of; and the one that my perceptions are representative of. (Real and perceived worlds).

There is a world and perceptions of it, not actually two worlds. The perceptions and the world are probably of the same substance.

Your vision/perception/notion of a tree, is not the tree itself. Therefore, there are two versions of that tree: itself and your notion of it. The point is that our notion/perception/experience of the world, is not the world itself.

Agreed, but you have no justification for your claim that there cannot be a tree, nor that our perceptions necessarily convey no information about it. That is pure fantasy on your part.

b) If the brain is real, then 'I' have two identities: the one that I perceive of myself; and 'brain' (with body). (Real and perceived identities)

There is the person, and how the person is perceived. There can be many and various perceptions of a person, or a cloud, or anything in the world.

The point is that what we perceive about anything, including ourselves, is necessarily not the actual reality of that thing.

Yes, we don't have certain knowledge about ourselves. You think you have certain knowledge about yourself as a Subjective Observer. You can't defend that certainty, by your own reasoning! You very well may be a brain that erroneously knows these things.

We have established, and neuroscience and cognitive science shows, that NNs do learn to recognise patterns, which is an essential function of knowledge, it is justified to say that the brain knows there is a SO, even if there is no such metaphysical entity.

c) If the brain can explain human behaviour, then this explanation must necessarily embrace the real world, only. That is, it's no good just using perceptions/observations as proof of what real brains do. That would amount to a conflation of the perceived and real world. A fallacious metaphysical argument.

Brains do the perceiving, by growing NN recognisers than determine how the brain functions in response to the world. The NNs are 'real world' and their performance in acurate categorisation of the world is the variable perception. Each brain grows its own categories, based on its history of interactions with the world, and therefore has an individual 'view of the world'.

Whenever we observe the brain in action (neuroscience), we are observing perceptions of brains. We simply don't have access to real brains - we can't study them. So, any correlations that we mention, relate to perceived phenomena. This is why observation cannot serve as proof for your argument. Observation gets you nowhere, metaphysically.

Only for you, who deny the validity of all empirical observation, even though your entire philosophy is actually based on it (all that talk of worlds, perception, minds, blah, blah, blah). We can certainly study brains an find out how they work to the same degree we can study any science. If we find that such study accounts for all aspects of mind then either it does account for mind, or some bastard wants us to think that and life is a lie. At that point we just have to take our pick, don't we?

This conversation is about metaphysics. Graham is seeking to explain the abstract (our notion/perception of the world) with a non-abstract (real) brain, thus rebuking the existence of the 'immaterial' observer.

You admit that there is the thing that actually observes, and the perceived identity of a self as subjective observer, and that these are not identical.

Actually, 'perceived entities' cannot observe anything - they are part of what is observed. It is not 'Graham', for instance, that perceives, but 'Graham' that is perceived. In other words, 'Graham' is subjectively observed, but is not the entity doing the observing.

<I - the Subjective Observer> is a concept that is not the same,at all, as 'Graham', but both are concepts. Both might be mistaken. The SO can lack personal identity, but that doesn't make it any more real.

It is not that qualia are experienced, but that qualia are the identities associated with perceptions, the pattern of responses in the NNs. This is where we get to NNs 'seeing' NN states. The brain recognises that part of it is responding in a pattern characteristic of, say, smelling a rose. The brain thus recognises <SO experiencing rose scent>. The 'qualia' is particular, because it has grown in response to the sensory response to that combination of aromatic molecules. It is ineffable, because it is a pattern of NN activation that permits no analysis. It is not knowingly orchestrated, because it grew biologically (self-organising).

So why does it feel that way to smell a rose? My suggestion is that, metaphysically speaking, it doesn't. The brain recognises that something particular is occurring. It recognises <me smelling a rose> as a distinctive pattern, but there is no 'feeling' about it distinct from that recognition. That is what it is to smell a rose, it is that pattern recognised. It is necessarily personal because it is a response to an internal pattern taht is not accessible from outside.

I expect that once neuroscience gets the tools to map, probe and stimulate live NNs (it doesn't have them now), we might be able to observe and stimulate 'qualia patterns' (if we can decode the immense complexity. I'm don't expect there to be a <me smelling a rose> neuron though, it will involve lots of neurons that may be widely distributed.

The thing that recognises the world, the brain, recognises this fictional character as a thing inside itself,

You're not on the same wavelength as me. You're mixed-up between observer and observed. Note that the observer cannot be observed. If the brain recognises this "fictional character", then it does so by means other than observation.

We are certainly on different wavelengths, Hasn't that been clear from the beginning?

Observation is acquisition of information. The brain accounts for that in its capacity to grow pattern classifiers in its NNs that enact its behaviour. The brain is therefore well able to recognise that the person it is part of is <aware of the world> and seems to <have motivations> (just as other people seem to have them, without necessity for any direct access to their SO. The brain models the subjective response of others to predict and select best course of action. The same tools applied to its own person give rise to a story of a unitary mind that observes and intends and knows. But this is all a useful fiction to describe, in very simplified terms, that the brain observes, holds information and selects between available actions.

[Surendra Darathy]

Whenever we observe the brain in action (neuroscience), we are observing perceptions of brains. We simply don't have access to real brains - we can't study them. So, any correlations that we mention, relate to perceived phenomena. This is why observation cannot serve as proof for your argument. Observation gets you nowhere, metaphysically.

Only for you, who deny the validity of all empirical observation, even though your entire philosophy is actually based on it (all that talk of worlds, perception, minds, blah, blah, blah). We can certainly study brains an find out how they work to the same degree we can study any science. If we find that such study accounts for all aspects of mind then either it does account for mind, or some bastard wants us to think that and life is a lie. At that point we just have to take our pick, don't we?

And the only reason we don't make the right choice is by virtue of fear, guilt, or selfishness.

We simply don't have access to real brains...

You don't think we have access to real anything, James. It's a kind of special pleading to focus so much on the unreality of brains. I mean, fear, guilt, and selfishness don't have any reality to them, either, in that case, and have no place in any of your rationalisations of anything. Unless you want to explain how they have more reality than, say, a tree.

Lifegazer was a member of another forum, a long time ago, James, and his repetition of this irrelevancy about our access to real brains became quite tedious. It doesn't enhance your reputation with me if you quote him. But I think you should give him proper credit for his ideas if you do.

[GrahamH]

we are observing perceptions of brains

I wonder what it means to observe a perception? How do we do that? We perceive, or observe (much the same thing). I don't think one can perceive perception, or observe observation. Observing perception is meaningless.

[Surendra Darathy]

we are observing perceptions of brains

I wonder what it means to observe a perception? How do we do that? We perceive, or observe (much the same thing). I don't think one can perceive perception, or observe observation. Observing perception is meaningless.

We can reflect on perceptions, Graham. We can recall them. I think that's what is indicated there. Reflections and memories are fascinating, of course, but one can easily pop down the rabbit-hole with them, and end up with the recto-cranial inversion.

Now, scientific reflections are of one kind, and metaphysical reflections are another. Guess which we can use to unbend a spoon.