Do you craft/choose your thoughts before you have them?

[GrahamH]

If...and I do mean if...we get our sense of selfhood/identity from the interplay of various parts of the brain, then does that mean that a person's self/identity isn't a singular thing, but a composite?

Like a body is a composite? Probably.

Yes. And as a composite, how can the 'self' be considered to be a singular thing, except perhaps, as an abstraction or an emergent property? As far as I can tell, neither abstractions nor emergent properties have ontological priority on the level of matter or phenomena. Do you conceive of your 'self' as a transient mental construct and nothing more?

No, 'the self' is not transient, it's as persistent as the shape of a tree. 'The shape of a tree' is a handy concept, but it isn't actually an accurate representation of tree geometry, or what the tree is.

I wouldn't call 'self' a 'mental construct' because that implies 'conscious thought' and I think it is deeply buried. However, if you call your recognition of a tree a 'mental construct' then yes, recognition of 'self' is probably much the same sort of process.

[FBM]

No, 'the self' is not transient, it's as persistent as the shape of a tree. 'The shape of a tree' is a handy concept, but it isn't actually an accurate representation of tree geometry, or what the tree is.

I wouldn't call 'self' a 'mental construct' because that implies 'conscious thought' and I think it is deeply buried. However, if you call your recognition of a tree a 'mental construct' then yes, recognition of 'self' is probably much the same sort of process.

Well...the actual shape of any particular tree is transient. The wind blows and it changes. Next month it will be slightly bigger, etc. The mental model that I make to represent the idea of non-specific 'tree-shapeness' doesn't refer to any particular thing that is, does it? It's just a mental construct. Real trees aren't static and neither are selves, as far as I can tell. Trees don't conform to my mental model, nor, I suppose, does any 'self'. Rather, my mental models are rough representations drawn from experience. Neither trees nor selves nor mental models are stable. They all change over time, do they not? Hence, transience.

[SpeedOfSound]

Not as speculative as some people are still thinking...Anyone who has not carefully developed these overseers and is given to impulse is not a moral person. Our historical choices make us moral. The sum of our moral value as human beings is in the choices we have made about which thoughts to allow free reign and which to nip...

Cool. I'm old enough to have consciously implanted a number of those automatic switch-offs myself. Let me just clarify the latter part of your post that I didn't elide. It's similar to an earlier comment by someone else that I didn't have time to respond to. You don't mean to say that a person "who has not carefully developed these overseers" is free from moral confines, right? That is, they are still bound by conventional morality, regardless of their failure to cultivate moral behavior? Earlier, someone made a comment that seemed to suggest that a person who had not cultivated moral behavior would not be a moral agent at all, which makes me

They ARE NOT free of moral confines. we have to judge a person on what he currently is and understand that what he is is the sum of all of his history. If he failed in the past to instill morals in his cumulative brain then he hangs. Just because we know that everything is physical and determined does not mean that we shouldn't clean the dog crap off the carpet. I don't even care if it isn't his fault that he's immoral. He hangs.

There is a parallel with the coyotes and mountain lion in my back yard. I live 5 minutes form the Mall of America and I have to worry about a fucking mountain lion eating me when I'm outside my house. People say they have the right to be there and eat our joggers and children. They are correct. I also have the right to pop a cap in their asses. Morality is a practical matter of survival.

[charlou]

Even young children are good at this form of self preservation ... For example, telling fibs to avoid consequences that make them uncomfortable, for example. They know from how adults behave when the adults are displeased with them. They may even know what this will mean in terms of consequences, but it may just be the displeasure itself that is enough to cause a child to lie in an attempt to make things 'better' ... I never like to see a child in this position and am always quick to reassure them that they are safe with me, encouraging honesty.

When your kid tells his first lie you should throw him a party and take pictures just like for his first step. It shows a major milestone in the development of his brain. Give your lying little brat a hug today!

Indeed.

[FBM]

They ARE NOT free of moral confines...Morality is a practical matter of survival.

I'm very cool with the pragmatic approach to morality. Trust me on this. What I'm trying to get at is whether or not an idividual is actually a moral agent. If one's apparent choices are determined by previous conditions, then in what sense do moral agents exist at all? I'm all for whacking the child rapists, etc, but not on the basis of morals, simply on the basics of practicality. W/out moral agency, the whole edifice of morality is bankrupt, eh? Let's ditch it altogether and proceed w/out the unnecessary concept of agency.

[GrahamH]

No, 'the self' is not transient, it's as persistent as the shape of a tree. 'The shape of a tree' is a handy concept, but it isn't actually an accurate representation of tree geometry, or what the tree is.

I wouldn't call 'self' a 'mental construct' because that implies 'conscious thought' and I think it is deeply buried. However, if you call your recognition of a tree a 'mental construct' then yes, recognition of 'self' is probably much the same sort of process.

Well...the actual shape of any particular tree is transient. The wind blows and it changes. Next month it will be slightly bigger, etc. The mental model that I make to represent the idea of non-specific 'tree-shapeness' doesn't refer to any particular thing that is, does it? It's just a mental construct. Real trees aren't static and neither are selves, as far as I can tell. Trees don't conform to my mental model, nor, I suppose, does any 'self'. Rather, my mental models are rough representations drawn from experience. Neither trees nor selves nor mental models are stable. They all change over time, do they not? Hence, transience.

We get our recognition of things by repeated exposure. That can be the same thing always present (when we look - subjectivity), or when we encounter many instances of similar things (trees). Although the details of tree shape and selfness do vary we can't forget what a tree looks like, or what the pattern of 'having subjective experience' is. When the pattern is present we can't help but recognise it.

Recognition of 'self having experience' is the most persistent thing we encounter because it is associated with all events involving attention. That is, whenever we attend to it, it is necessarily there.

[GrahamH]

They ARE NOT free of moral confines...Morality is a practical matter of survival.

I'm very cool with the pragmatic approach to morality. Trust me on this. What I'm trying to get at is whether or not an idividual is actually a moral agent. If one's apparent choices are determined by previous conditions, then in what sense do moral agents exist at all? I'm all for whacking the child rapists, etc, but not on the basis of morals, simply on the basics of practicality. W/out moral agency, the whole edifice of morality is bankrupt, eh? Let's ditch it altogether and proceed w/out the unnecessary concept of agency.

Aren't morals supposed to influence behaviour? A 'moral agent' is therefore one who includes moral evaluations in the decision matrix, i.e. one who has learned those rules and not learned to bypass them. Morals are fables describing usually productive, social behaviours.

[SpeedOfSound]

No, 'the self' is not transient, it's as persistent as the shape of a tree. 'The shape of a tree' is a handy concept, but it isn't actually an accurate representation of tree geometry, or what the tree is.

I wouldn't call 'self' a 'mental construct' because that implies 'conscious thought' and I think it is deeply buried. However, if you call your recognition of a tree a 'mental construct' then yes, recognition of 'self' is probably much the same sort of process.

Well...the actual shape of any particular tree is transient. The wind blows and it changes. Next month it will be slightly bigger, etc. The mental model that I make to represent the idea of non-specific 'tree-shapeness' doesn't refer to any particular thing that is, does it? It's just a mental construct. Real trees aren't static and neither are selves, as far as I can tell. Trees don't conform to my mental model, nor, I suppose, does any 'self'. Rather, my mental models are rough representations drawn from experience. Neither trees nor selves nor mental models are stable. They all change over time, do they not? Hence, transience.

We get our recognition of things by repeated exposure. That can be the same thing always present (when we look - subjectivity), or when we encounter many instances of similar things (trees). Although the details of tree shape and selfness do vary we can't forget what a tree looks like, or what the pattern of 'having subjective experience' is. When the pattern is present we can't help but recognise it.

Recognition of 'self having experience' is the most persistent thing we encounter because it is associated with all events involving attention. That is, whenever we attend to it, it is necessarily there.

We run into this problem in all areas of philosophy. The solution is simple. It's frame of reference. When you are doing science of the mind you are reducing and picking things apart. When you are talking about morality or free-will and agency you have to be in the frame of taking the whole organism at once. You can't have it both ways. We are either in the R1(reality 1 of the treeness thread) frame of reference or we are being scientists.

Human interaction and hence moral judgments are in the R1 frame.

[FBM]

They ARE NOT free of moral confines...Morality is a practical matter of survival.

I'm very cool with the pragmatic approach to morality. Trust me on this. What I'm trying to get at is whether or not an idividual is actually a moral agent. If one's apparent choices are determined by previous conditions, then in what sense do moral agents exist at all? I'm all for whacking the child rapists, etc, but not on the basis of morals, simply on the basics of practicality. W/out moral agency, the whole edifice of morality is bankrupt, eh? Let's ditch it altogether and proceed w/out the unnecessary concept of agency.

Aren't morals supposed to influence behaviour?

That seems to be what they're designed to do, yes...

A 'moral agent' is therefore one who includes moral evaluations in the decision matrix, i.e. one who has learned those rules and not learned to bypass them. Morals are fables describing usually productive, social behaviours.

But that's presupposing that there exists a singular entity that qualifies as a moral agent. If what is commonly presupposed to be a singular entity turns out to be a perceptual illusion and is instead a composite of various brain functions, then selfhood disappears, and as moral agency depends upon the factual truth of selfhood, then moral agency can't obtain. Instead of stopping an agent from behaving destructively, we'd be curtailing an impersonal set of effects conditioned by an uncountable number of conditions. Thus, my acceptance of a pragmatic rationale behind enforcing healthy behavior, but not mis-identifying it as moral. With respect to the legal system, that would mean rehabilitation or, failing that, incarceration for practical reasons, but not punitive reasons.

[FBM]

We get our recognition of things by repeated exposure. That can be the same thing always present (when we look - subjectivity), or when we encounter many instances of similar things (trees).

Heraclitus' river seems to apply here. When we say that the "same thing" is always here, that's a perceptual illusion. Everything is always changing. Neither the perceived and the perceiver are identical in this instance compared to the previous instance.

Although the details of tree shape and selfness do vary we can't forget what a tree looks like, or what the pattern of 'having subjective experience' is. When the pattern is present we can't help but recognise it.

Would you not agree that the pattern is distinct from any particular that is lumped into that category? Do patterns have independent existence equal to that of perceived things? Plato thought so, but I don't see and have yet to perceive any of the forms he described.

Recognition of 'self having experience' is the most persistent thing we encounter because it is associated with all events involving attention. That is, whenever we attend to it, it is necessarily there.

People involved in the certainty bias 'encounter persistent truths' that they relate to events involving attention, despite evidence to the contrary. The sense of self doesn't require or evince true selfhood. The sense of self is only evidence for the sense of selfhood, not for selfhood.

Again, destructive behavior can and should be suppressed for practical reasons, but not moral ones. Without true singular, discrete moral agency, applying moral standards is absurd.

[GrahamH]

They ARE NOT free of moral confines...Morality is a practical matter of survival.

I'm very cool with the pragmatic approach to morality. Trust me on this. What I'm trying to get at is whether or not an idividual is actually a moral agent. If one's apparent choices are determined by previous conditions, then in what sense do moral agents exist at all? I'm all for whacking the child rapists, etc, but not on the basis of morals, simply on the basics of practicality. W/out moral agency, the whole edifice of morality is bankrupt, eh? Let's ditch it altogether and proceed w/out the unnecessary concept of agency.

Aren't morals supposed to influence behaviour?

That seems to be what they're designed to do, yes...

A 'moral agent' is therefore one who includes moral evaluations in the decision matrix, i.e. one who has learned those rules and not learned to bypass them. Morals are fables describing usually productive, social behaviours.

But that's presupposing that there exists a singular entity that qualifies as a moral agent. If what is commonly presupposed to be a singular entity turns out to be a perceptual illusion and is instead a composite of various brain functions, then selfhood disappears, and as moral agency depends upon the factual truth of selfhood, then moral agency can't obtain. Instead of stopping an agent from behaving destructively, we'd be curtailing an impersonal set of effects conditioned by an uncountable number of conditions. Thus, my acceptance of a pragmatic rationale behind enforcing healthy behavior, but not mis-identifying it as moral. With respect to the legal system, that would mean rehabilitation or, failing that, incarceration for practical reasons, but not punitive reasons.

Why does 'moral agent' demand 'singular entity? Can;t a company behave ethically? Can't an institution be held accountable? Doesn't a society police itself in relation to other societies?

It requires an entity, but that entity needn't be singular in the sense you seem to imply. It requires identity and parts that operate under that identity.

Do you dispute that ethics influence behaviour of individual humans and groups of humans?

[Rum]

Been thinking about this...(see what I did there?)..

Anyway - here's a sort of example to think about.

I walk my dogs twice a day. I have seven or eight walks which take about an hour to do and a couple of shorter ones when the weather is crap (crapper than usual up here).

Sometimes I do consciously think about which one to go on. I might not feel like the ten minute drive to the park or an area of woodland nearby, or a mood might take me to do one or another. Sometimes I don't seem to make a decision at all - at least consciously. And yet every day the walks get done. The 'thinking' behind which route I go is sometimes (apparently) made consciously (but using what criteria I am not sure).

I an only conclude that much of what I think I consciously decide to do is no such thing, but an invention which gives me the illusion that 'I' am in control and 'I' make decisions, which are probably actually made totally subconsciously following all sorts of internal and perhaps at times random processes.

[GrahamH]

We get our recognition of things by repeated exposure. That can be the same thing always present (when we look - subjectivity), or when we encounter many instances of similar things (trees).

Heraclitus' river seems to apply here. When we say that the "same thing" is always here, that's a perceptual illusion. Everything is always changing. Neither the perceived and the perceiver are identical in this instance compared to the previous instance.

Yes, it is consistency of appearance.

Although the details of tree shape and selfness do vary we can't forget what a tree looks like, or what the pattern of 'having subjective experience' is. When the pattern is present we can't help but recognise it.

Would you not agree that the pattern is distinct from any particular that is lumped into that category? Do patterns have independent existence equal to that of perceived things? Plato thought so, but I don't see and have yet to perceive any of the forms he described.

No, the category is defined by its members, and the category boundaries are fuzzy. 'Tree' is not a precise definition.

Recognition of 'self having experience' is the most persistent thing we encounter because it is associated with all events involving attention. That is, whenever we attend to it, it is necessarily there.

People involved in the certainty bias 'encounter persistent truths' that they relate to events involving attention, despite evidence to the contrary. The sense of self doesn't require or evince true selfhood. The sense of self is only evidence for the sense of selfhood, not for selfhood.

I agree. That is what the other topic is about.

Again, destructive behaviour can and should be suppressed for practical reasons, but not moral ones. Without true singular, discrete moral agency, applying moral standards is absurd.

'moral standards' is another category with fuzzy and movable boundaries, as is 'practical reasons'. I do think that people should understand what makes some behaviour acceptable and other behaviour unacceptable. A 'moral code' is practical way to communicate some commonly agreed rules, but any system of law is a poor approach without clear explanation of practical costs and benefits.

[SpeedOfSound]

But that's presupposing that there exists a singular entity that qualifies as a moral agent. If what is commonly presupposed to be a singular entity turns out to be a perceptual illusion and is instead a composite of various brain functions, then selfhood disappears, and as moral agency depends upon the factual truth of selfhood, then moral agency can't obtain. Instead of stopping an agent from behaving destructively, we'd be curtailing an impersonal set of effects conditioned by an uncountable number of conditions. Thus, my acceptance of a pragmatic rationale behind enforcing healthy behavior, but not mis-identifying it as moral. With respect to the legal system, that would mean rehabilitation or, failing that, incarceration for practical reasons, but not punitive reasons.

The singular entity that we imagine is an illusion. This is true of others as well as ourselves. But that's the way we were designed to think and 'be'. We can honor that and frame out judgments in the way we always have.

You can see the idea of a soul or disembodied entity in this kind of thinking. We reduce the actions of an individual to a singular point outside of space/time who has ultimate responsibility for his thoughts and actions.

If we take the other tact and look at the actuality then we can see that this thing we hate, resent, and punish is more in our heads than out there. One might take this as a way to let go of hate and resentment and make more practical choices about punishment. As we should.

But if we find the criminal harmless in his crime for these reasons why should we find those we love worthy? Why is it different?

For me it boils down to choosing my attitude and I choose positively for the least resistance and the least hate. So I knowingly use a double standard.


Hope this is too far a-topic. The second part of your OP did mention moral implications.

[LaMont Cranston]

So far, I have not seen anybody fully address the issue of when we actually experience thoughts, so let me take a shot at that. From what I can tell, we only experience thoughts in present time, and we perceive the past and the future from here and now. In a very real sense, we are aware of our thoughts when we are conscious that we are having that thought.

In a sense, it feels as if we go through life as a consciousness in a flesh and blood suit, and we recognize we are thinking something. Quite obviously, some of these thoughts are physically based (i.e. I've got to take a piss.). We can choose to ignore the thought and think about what we are going to have for dinner or the Big Bang or whatever, but, sooner or later, we are going to take that piss. Once we've taken the piss, we have memory of the experience, but unless something happened to make it more memorable than all of the other pisses we've taken in our life, we probably aren't going to pay much attention to it, so we move on to other thoughts.

I'm not sure that the thread topic is properly worded, or, at the very minimum, it is limited in it's scope. Do we craft/choose our thoughts before we have them?
Is there any way to know that's even possible? Another possibility is that we recognize our thoughts as we experience them, and our ability to have thoughts includes considering past experiences and looking at the possibilities for those things that happen in the future.

If, in present time, I think "I think I'll go get some ice cream later today," I'm having that thought now about a possible future event. I can also know that other things can happen, including I might change my mind or somebody might show up with some ice cream. It does seem that we recognize that we have a thought, and, as large-brained beings, we have the capacity to change our minds, alter course, correct for mistakes and consider the ramifications of our actions. However, we are still doing all of these things in present time.

Happy Easter to All!