The subjective observer is a fictional character

[GrahamH]

So, you're saying that there's a specific physical structure within the brain that correlates with every quality we know about the sun? I'm looking for clarity here, before I proceed to discuss your ideas.

It seems to me that you are reducing each 'thing' and quality that comprises of experience to particular brain structure, or local events, within the brain. Is this essentially correct?

Sort of, but nothing like a 1:1 mapping or a neat little cluster that is easily identified. A recognition of a thing will involve a deep hierarchy of related sub networks. When you see your mother all the networks that respond to the multitude of features and associations related to your knowledge of your mother will also activate.

These sub-networks may not all be locally grouped.

If you know a little about hierarchical data compression it would be useful to think about that. If you look at most of the data in a mpg4 video file you won't find recognisable images of the scene. You won't see any pattern of neurons that represent your mothers face. There will be some that respond to faces and some that respond to the familial relation and some to female and some to, who knows, the smell of pot roast and lavender.

There is some evidence that identity recognition is neurally locatable
See Jenifer Aniston neuron

[SpeedOfSound]

So, you're saying that there's a specific physical structure within the brain that correlates with every quality we know about the sun? I'm looking for clarity here, before I proceed to discuss your ideas.

It seems to me that you are reducing each 'thing' and quality that comprises of experience to particular brain structure, or local events, within the brain. Is this essentially correct?

No. He is not going Fodor on us. He is saying that the sun carves these patterns and these patterns end up in the brain as fuzzy neural nets that represent the qualities of the sun.

Well, I don't see how that is a response in the negative to my question. "Fuzzy neural nets" that represent the qualities of the sun, are essentially physical structures/events.

I'm sure you don't but I think I know where you are going and we will return to this.

[Surendra Darathy]

Well, I don't see how that is a response in the negative to my question. "Fuzzy neural nets" that represent the qualities of the sun, are essentially physical structures/events.

James, that's like saying you understand drainage by looking at a pattern of river channels without any idea that water flows in them. When you talk about neural nets, don't forget about the electricity. Electricity isn't the be-all and end-all of existence, but if you leave out mention of it, we don't really think you understand everything about "physical structures". Brains are physical structures that contain dynamics just as much as river channels are, unless you just want to talk about evolution by looking at fossils, and without connecting it to an understanding of living biology.

What you mainly do in your strawman/spin game is to make statements damaging to your opponents by leaving out stuff that your opponents would not leave out. Essentially, you're requiring your opponents to "tell you everything at once", which is what you most probably mean by a "complete explanation".

Instead, your opponents are giving you a working model which has the potential to add new information to it. That is the basic idea of empirical science. Your resolute determination to stick to a discursive "logico-deductive-semantic" approach to deciding what "mind is" does nothing but rearrange a pile of colored blocks.

What you are defending is not any of the terms you have defined, but the "logico-deductive-semantic" approach of traditional philosophy. ToM has had to leave that behind, because rearranging a finite number of colored blocks only yields a finite number of combinations.

[jamest]

So, you're saying that there's a specific physical structure within the brain that correlates with every quality we know about the sun? I'm looking for clarity here, before I proceed to discuss your ideas.

It seems to me that you are reducing each 'thing' and quality that comprises of experience to particular brain structure, or local events, within the brain. Is this essentially correct?

Sort of, but nothing like a 1:1 mapping or a neat little cluster that is easily identified. A recognition of a thing will involve a deep hierarchy of related sub networks.

Sure - the identity of an entity is fairly complex. But essentially, there would have to be a specific physical correlate to every preceived quality. That's all I need to be clarified in order to progress.
But I have things to do so won't get into this until later today.

[jamest]

When you talk about neural nets, don't forget about the electricity.

I didn't, which is why I was careful to mention 'events'. I'm well aware that electrochemical events occur within the brain.

All I'm trying to establish is whether each perceived physical quality (experience) has a definite physical correlate. It doesn't really matter whether or not that correlate includes electricity. Perhaps all will become clear later today.

[SpeedOfSound]

So, you're saying that there's a specific physical structure within the brain that correlates with every quality we know about the sun? I'm looking for clarity here, before I proceed to discuss your ideas.

It seems to me that you are reducing each 'thing' and quality that comprises of experience to particular brain structure, or local events, within the brain. Is this essentially correct?

Sort of, but nothing like a 1:1 mapping or a neat little cluster that is easily identified. A recognition of a thing will involve a deep hierarchy of related sub networks.

Sure - the identity of an entity is fairly complex. But essentially, there would have to be a specific physical correlate to every preceived quality. That's all I need to be clarified in order to progress.
But I have things to do so won't get into this until later today.

Sure and I will drag your butt back to my posts and impede that progress.

[SpeedOfSound]

Perhaps all will become clear later today.

I hate to point this out but you have said that 63 times just in the time I have known you. My database is down so I probably wont be able to back that up with exact details.

[Surendra Darathy]

All I'm trying to establish is whether each perceived physical quality (experience) has a definite physical correlate. It doesn't really matter whether or not that correlate includes electricity. Perhaps all will become clear later today.

Yes, but let's not gloss over your insistence on something you call "definite physical correlate" in relation to "each perceived physical quality". It will take some patience to unravel the imprecision of your proposition, and the wiggle-room you are thereby trying to make for yourself and your model of subjectivity.

To ascertain the point you think you are trying to make here, it will help to give some examples. Since we cannot give every fucking example that is ever going to be applicable, as far as "each perceived physical quality", we'd better just try to see if you can come up with more precise language for your generalisation.

We will see that your insistence on what looks like a one-to-one mapping of "perceived physical quality" to "definite physical correlate" is asking for neuroscientists to give you a map to a set of neurons and sequence of electrical currents that represent "cat" and another that represent "dog", and then go to "calico cat" and "persian cat" and "chihuahua", and so on, until we get to the perceived aspect of "the way I feel about the calico cat that made a poo in my shoe when I forgot to feed it one evening". The list could be extended, but you get the idea. Eventually we have to get to the difference between "that guy is a communist" and "that other guy is an unreconstructed New Deal Democrat".

In very short order, we will see that you are asking the neuroscientists to bring you back the golden fleece of "one to one" correspondence, whereas, if you had an understanding of neuroscience, you would not even be asking that at this stage. I mean, you can look at poo down at the microscopic level, like a pathologist does under a microscope, to try to see what bug is giving you the trots. Trust the voice of experience.

Because "perceived" looms so large in your lexicon (alliteratively, even), and "perceived" already assumes subjectivity, given its pedigree in philosophy, I don't think we should waste much time on your latest strawman, and ask you to express what you are asking of the neuroscientists with a little more precision. If you want to establish subjectivity, James, it really helps if you don't assume it before beginning your investigation. You don't seem to get this part of "investigation".

The way to get there is for you to name what you would call some personal subjective experience, whether about the sun or about some poo, and tell us where you think the subjective part begins, and the empirical part leaves off. I bet you're not going to go on much about the measured luminosity of the sun, or some special shade of brown called "shit brown"....

Please try to understand that the way you feel about that cat is a fiction. That is where your vaunted "subjectivity" sits down its greasy arse. You can't bend a spoon with it. You can make the story as long as you like, but you cannot make it other than a fiction, by the time you try to write it down. At some point between empirically discovering the poo in your shoe, and combining how you feel about your shoes with how you feel about poo, and how you feel about your cat, and get around to telling us about it, you have a fiction.

You're on into everything you have learned from other people about poo, and shoe, and woo. Stop doing this to yourself, James. Nobody really cares how you feel about poo, as long as you don't like smearing yourself in it and running down the street naked.

The bottom line, of course, is that you are entitled to a fiction you call your "subjective experience", but since you cannot bend any spoons with it, all it turns out to be is a narrative, something you construct. With words. What the scientists will discover is that, while you are composing your fiction, your brain will be a beehive of activity, particularly in the verbal cortex.

So, you're saying that there's a specific physical structure within the brain that correlates with every quality we know about the sun? I'm looking for clarity here, before I proceed to discuss your ideas.

Even including what you saw lying in the sun on the beach in Ibiza, with or without her bikini top on? It all started with sensory data, James, and stuff your parents tried to teach you about girls, much of it "not even wrong", and therefore best left unsaid, consitituting (as it did) unsubstantiated belief. The more you talk about your search for "clarity", the more you're starting to look like the boy who cried "Wolf!".

This is a general pattern with your argument:

Perhaps all will become clear later today.

I hate to point this out but you have said that 63 times just in the time I have known you. My database is down so I probably wont be able to back that up with exact details.

It will all become clear in the fullness of time.

[Kenny Login]

In very short order, we will see that you are asking the neuroscientists to bring you back the golden fleece of "one to one" correspondence, whereas, if you had an understanding of neuroscience, you would not even be asking that at this stage.

If James is doing that, it would indeed be a mistake.

Nobody really cares how you feel about poo, as long as you don't like smearing yourself in it and running down the street naked.

The bottom line, of course, is that you are entitled to a fiction you call your "subjective experience", but since you cannot bend any spoons with it, all it turns out to be is a narrative, something you construct. With words. What the scientists will discover is that, while you are composing your fiction, your brain will be a beehive of activity, particularly in the verbal cortex.

On the contrary, not only do I care passionately about how James feels about poo, many people are interested enough in the fiction to devote rather a lot of personal and professional time to investigating these things. The problem only arises if you equate this fiction with something inherently valueless (e.g causally inert for instance). But, given that current neuro evidence supports connectionist models better than modular (unless, as SoS says, you're Jerry Fodor), you can not help but be concerned with fictitious subjectivity. The narrative is built in, and is rather crucial to proceedings. As far as I know connectionist models are not compatible with epiphenomenalist views such as the one you seem to be implying, but maybe I'm wrong about this and things have moved on.

If the sole criteria for distinguishing fact from fiction comes down to the ability to bend spoons or not, it's certainly a shallower approach than many empiricists devote their time to. And even if all psychological disciplines become successfully reduced to a neurocognitive model, it's a valid discussion to have. But I guess that's personal taste.

[Surendra Darathy]

many people are interested enough in the fiction to devote rather a lot of personal and professional time to investigating these things

Yes, and they're known as "literary critics", Kenny. If you want to be a critic, try to stay on the same page as they are.

you can not help but be concerned with fictitious subjectivity

Do you know what "special pleading" consists of? No? Then stop doing whatever you're doing and learn about it.

As far as I know connectionist models are not compatible with epiphenomenalist views such as the one you seem to be implying, but maybe I'm wrong about this and things have moved on.

One thing is for sure: We know the difference between a taxonomist and a scientist. The former are sometimes known as "stamp collectors".

If the sole criteria for distinguishing fact from fiction comes down to the ability to bend spoons or not, it's certainly a shallower approach than many empiricists devote their time to. And even if all psychological disciplines become successfully reduced to a neurocognitive model, it's a valid discussion to have. But I guess that's personal taste.

Kenny's motto: Equivocation 'R' Us.

[jamest]

We will see that your insistence on what looks like a one-to-one mapping of "perceived physical quality" to "definite physical correlate" is asking for neuroscientists to give you a map to a set of neurons and sequence of electrical currents that represent "cat" and another that represent "dog", and then go to "calico cat" and "persian cat" and "chihuahua", and so on, until we get to the perceived aspect of "the way I feel about the calico cat that made a poo in my shoe when I forgot to feed it one evening". The list could be extended, but you get the idea. Eventually we have to get to the difference between "that guy is a communist" and "that other guy is an unreconstructed New Deal Democrat".

In very short order, we will see that you are asking the neuroscientists to bring you back the golden fleece of "one to one" correspondence, whereas, if you had an understanding of neuroscience, you would not even be asking that at this stage. I mean, you can look at poo down at the microscopic level, like a pathologist does under a microscope, to try to see what bug is giving you the trots. Trust the voice of experience.

To be clear, I'm not asking Graham to provide citations from the neuroscientists to support his claim. I'm simply asking him to describe his theory clearly so that I might find logical problems with his model.

Because "perceived" looms so large in your lexicon (alliteratively, even), and "perceived" already assumes subjectivity, given its pedigree in philosophy, I don't think we should waste much time on your latest strawman, and ask you to express what you are asking of the neuroscientists with a little more precision. If you want to establish subjectivity, James, it really helps if you don't assume it before beginning your investigation. You don't seem to get this part of "investigation".

Okay, let us - for the sake of argument - assume that the qualities usually associated with 'experience' are not actual. After all, I'm here to entertain such theories. Let us consider that 'yellow', for instance, doesn't have a physical correlate... and that 'physical correlations' are just associated with details of some external event. Likewise for each and every experiential quality that we can think of. So, the model we are considering (as I understand it) is one in which numerous localities within some region(s) of the brain correlate with sensed external qualities of the world. For example, there would be a specific physical correlate for the photonic energy (formerly known as 'yellowness') of the sun (likewise for all such external qualities that are reported to the brain via the sense receptors of the body). Now, at any one moment, the brain itself would have to take on the role of 'the individual' in putting together a meaningful 'picture of the world' to facilitate appropriate behaviour within that world. That is, there would have to be a singular 'assessment' of all relevant physical correlates, as a whole. Our reactions to the world are not just automatic - 'we' (commensurate here with the brain itself) often assess each scenario that we are confronted with prior to responding. So, we cannot escape the need for this oft-required singular review of the physical correlates as a whole. Now, with the details of the model in place, we can now assess whether there are any logical flaws within it.

The first problem I see, is that a considered response to a specific event within the world would amount to a considered response to brain states - those numerous localities of physical correlates associated with that event. That is, the brain would really be considering and responding to itself. The problem here, is that the brain would have to associate meaning with each physical correlate associated with any event. That is, the brain would have to know what each physical correlate meant in relation to any event. For instance, the brain would have to know that the physical correlate(s) associated with the photonic energy of the sun, was synonymous with the photonic energy of the sun. It might even assign tags to each correlate, such as 'yellow', to facilitate simpler processing of the information. And since we say that the sun is 'yellow', this would indeed be the case.
So, the question begs, how does the brain assess itself and know what any particular 'physical correlate' means?

Here, the problem is one of semantics - what philosophers of the mind have referred to as intentionality (also known as 'aboutness'). How, for instance, could the brain assess a physical correlate within itself, associated with some external event, and know that it meant the photonic energy associated with the sun ('yellow'). That is, how can the brain know what a localised physical structure/event, within itself, is about (aboutness)? I've thought of a simple way to illustrate the scope of this problem:

Imagine that you are sat in a room and have no idea what is going on outside that room. However, I come into the room and present you with numerous lego structures. I've utilised different structures and colours-of-lego and each singular structure is synonymous with a specific detail of an event happening outside the room. To make things easier for you, I put these structures into groups - one representing sight; one representing sound; one representing smells (we won't bother with taste and touch information). Now, even in eternity, do you think that you could tell me what was going on outside? No, you couldn't, because you wouldn't have a clue what any particular structure was ABOUT, except generally (a sight; a sound; a smell). The problem is, then, that you would need to know what each structure was about in order to tell me what was happening outside. But if somebody doesn't tell you, then you're literally in the dark, forever. That is, a physical structure contains no meaning about anything, other than itself.

So, if we reconsider the brain assessing its own 'lego structures', we come to the same conclusion. That is, the brain assessing its own internal structures as a means to understanding what's going on outside, wouldn't have any clue (other than those structures were of sight; touch; taste; sound; smell) about what those structures actually meant.

This is a big rational problem for anyone harbouring theories similar to the one that Graham has presented - which is why it's been an issue for contemporary philosophers. So, you can't just whitewash it - you actually need to provide a rational solution to that problem. That is, how can the brain really know what any of its internal structures actually correlate to, externally to itself?

This has been a lengthy post, so I will end here and await responses. Further rational problems for such 'models' could be discussed, but I'll leave them for another day. There's enough to consider, here.

[jamest]

Before I hit the sack, I'd like to add something else related to my previous post.

... If the brain is really just responding to its own 'physical correlates' of [a supposed] external [to itself] reality, then an ontology is implied commensurate with materialism - the belief in the reality of material entities separated from one another. So, it's impossible for true 'sceptics' to adhere to philosophies such as empiricism and relativism, whilst harbouring the view that the brain IS responsible for our responses to the world around us. That is, if you hear any self-proclaimed sceptic talking about the brain being responsible for how we behave, then feel free to lynch them.

The thread 'Human, all too human', was full of so-called sceptics that should have been lynched.

[Surendra Darathy]

Okay, let us - for the sake of argument - assume that the qualities usually associated with 'experience' are not actual.

It's not "for the sake of argument", James. This is what we actually have to do in order to figure anything out, unless we want to claim that "assuming what we want to find out" actually discovers anything. The best you can do with that approach is to assume the opposite of what you think is the case, and try to establish a contradiction as a result. That's the logico-deductive framework you are stuck with. Unless you want to go all empirical on us.

After all, I'm here to entertain such theories.

No, I think you're here to spout a lot of rhetoric that tries it make it appear as if you're doing some thinking. Let me explain why I think so:

Let us consider that 'yellow', for instance, doesn't have a physical correlate... and that 'physical correlations' are just associated with details of some external event. Likewise for each and every experiential quality that we can think of. So, the model we are considering (as I understand it) is one in which numerous localities within some region(s) of the brain correlate with sensed external qualities of the world.

Do you see what you did there? I did. You did fine until you got to the end, where you are still promoting the idea that the world consists of "qualities". Either try to entertain the empirical brain model, or go off by yourself and do metaphysics on what the "world consists of", but please don't get them mixed up. The result of such a mixup is your being a complete waste of time for anyone to try to engage you in discourse.

For example, there would be a specific physical correlate for the photonic energy (formerly known as 'yellowness') of the sun (likewise for all such external qualities that are reported to the brain via the sense receptors of the body). Now, at any one moment, the brain itself would have to take on the role of 'the individual' in putting together a meaningful 'picture of the world' to facilitate appropriate behaviour within that world. That is, there would have to be a singular 'assessment' of all relevant physical correlates, as a whole.

Everything you think you are saying about direct experience is something said about a recapitulation of the neural activity that results from interacting with the physical world, including the memory of what was registered in the neural activity, associated memories, and so on. What you call direct experience, including its "qualities" is an embellishment applied some time after the neural activity associated to interacting with the world. You do not have to accept this model of cognition, James, but there is a lot of experimental data on the errors that people make in recollecting what you would call "direct sense experience", and these errors are discovered by means of intersubjective identification of just what interaction with the world the organism is trying to report. That is what is entailed in a "perception" experiment based on a model of cognition in brain and associated sensory activity.

Of course this doesn't happen when you sit there and daydream about your first shag. You don't really know what the fuck to say about that fuck. Well, perhaps you do, but it is not any more in the category of "direct experience", is it?

Our reactions to the world are not just automatic - 'we' (commensurate here with the brain itself) often assess each scenario that we are confronted with prior to responding.

And you're all of a sudden trying to talk about making judgments and applying learning, but that's a subject for another thread, James, and we don't need that sort of derail at this point here.

The first problem I see, is that a considered response to a specific event within the world would amount to a considered response to brain states - those numerous localities of physical correlates associated with that event.

Well, if value judgments and so on are what you really want to discuss, do it in another thread. We have all been under the impression that we were going to discuss whether or not there is a homunculus for direct sensory interaction with the world. Even fractions of a second after an event happens in the world, that event is in the past tense. Try to stay with us on the theory that the brain is what organises sensory data for the organism. Then, later, we can proceed with concepts like learning and memory. And logico-deductive approaches to making a "considered response". The experiments I'm talking about are just trying to establish whether some intersubjectively available data is available to the organism on which we are performing the experiment, and whether it is the brain activity that can best explain why the organism reports receiving the intersubjetively-available data.

That is, the brain would really be considering and responding to itself. The problem here, is that the brain would have to associate meaning with each physical correlate associated with any event. That is, the brain would have to know what each physical correlate meant in relation to any event. For instance, the brain would have to know that the physical correlate(s) associated with the photonic energy of the sun, was synonymous with the photonic energy of the sun. It might even assign tags to each correlate, such as 'yellow', to facilitate simpler processing of the information. And since we say that the sun is 'yellow', this would indeed be the case.

Don't mix up your metaphysical preconceptions with an assessment of the empirical model of brain function. All the stuff you want to say about "sunshine" is reported from memory of sunny days of long ago. As long ago as a few seconds.

So, the question begs, how does the brain assess itself and know what any particular 'physical correlate' means?

Stop assuming your own metaphysical preconceptions for a moment, and your own models of "subjective correlates" and try to follow someone else's model. Just for a few minutes.

Here, the problem is one of semantics - what philosophers of the mind have referred to as intentionality (also known as 'aboutness').

Leave this alone. Just for a few minutes. Try to focus on the stuff the other side is telling you about. It's not time for you to present your own theory yet. You've said so yourself.

How, for instance, could the brain assess a physical correlate within itself, associated with some external event, and know that it meant the photonic energy associated with the sun ('yellow'). That is, how can the brain know what a localised physical structure/event, within itself, is about (aboutness)? I've thought of a simple way to illustrate the scope of this problem:

Imagine that you are sat in a room and have no idea what is going on outside that room. However, I come into the room and present you with numerous lego structures. I've utilised different structures and colours-of-lego and each singular structure is synonymous with a specific detail of an event happening outside the room. To make things easier for you, I put these structures into groups - one representing sight; one representing sound; one representing smells (we won't bother with taste and touch information). Now, even in eternity, do you think that you could tell me what was going on outside? No, you couldn't, because you wouldn't have a clue what any particular structure was ABOUT, except generally (a sight; a sound; a smell). The problem is, then, that you would need to know what each structure was about in order to tell me what was happening outside. But if somebody doesn't tell you, then you're literally in the dark, forever. That is, a physical structure contains no meaning about anything, other than itself.

So, if we reconsider the brain assessing its own 'lego structures', we come to the same conclusion. That is, the brain assessing its own internal structures as a means to understanding what's going on outside, wouldn't have any clue (other than those structures were of sight; touch; taste; sound; smell) about what those structures actually meant.

This is a big rational problem for anyone harbouring theories similar to the one that Graham has presented - which is why it's been an issue for contemporary philosophers. So, you can't just whitewash it - you actually need to provide a rational solution to that problem. That is, how can the brain really know what any of its internal structures actually correlate to, externally to itself?

You're writing here about the brain making a model of its functioning. You say you can't figure out where the "correlates" for "model making" are, but dead men tell no tales, James. Maybe you think the liver is doing it all. We're just entertaining an empirical model of how sensory data gets organized in the organism, not trying to figure out how models get made in the first place. Baby steps, James. But you're all hot to trot on the Big Mysteries of the Universe That Are Somehow Going to Make You Famous When You Figure Them All Out and Publish a Wildly Popular Book on How WOO Rules the Universe.

Fuck it, Jimmy. You're not interested in contemplating the empirical model. You're off expounding your own philosophy again. Fuck it. You're now dead meat in the universe of people I can take seriously.

[Surendra Darathy]

That is, if you hear any self-proclaimed sceptic talking about the brain being responsible for how we behave, then feel free to lynch them.

Oh, you want to go back to quibbling about scepticism. We're not asking you to sign your immortal soul away, Jimmy. We're just trying to get you to follow a model other than your own. Just for a few minutes.

What? Are you worried your spiritual purity might be sullied by actually "understanding" somebody else's world view? Remember, Jimmy, you came to us here at Ratz. You want to take pot shots at rationality? Doing it with irrationality is not the way to begin. But then, that may show you that you are kind of snookered in that department.

It's fine with me if you came here to spew your beliefs all over a public forum. Be happy with the derision you earn. You buttered your bread, now lie in it. You made your own bed, so just eat it.

[LaMont Cranston]

So this is where you guys have been hiding. Did anybody bring the beer? I've been reading some of the first few pages, but after I got to Surendra's third mention of spoonbending, I figured I hadn't missed much...or I'll get caught up later on.

Surendra, it's not that tough to understand the world view of others. It's one thing to understand it; it's another thing entirely to agree that the person knows what they're talking about.

As for "taking pot shots at rationality," I haven't seen that jamest or anybody else is doing that. However, let me be among the first to take pot shots as those self-proclaimed clear and rational thinkers who would have others believe they are more rational than thou. Simply because some rigid thinkers, in all of their wishful thinking, would like to have others believe they are rational doesn't make it so.

From what I've read of Graham's posts, I think that which you are trying to identify as "the subjective observer" is very real, and I'll be happy to start getting into that. But first, somebody pass me a beer and some of those chips and dip...