The subjective observer is a fictional character

[GrahamH]

I am exploring the idea that subjectivity is a representation formed in the brain that models how the person responds to various stimuli.
Jamest suggested I make a topic of it after discussions in On treeness of Oak1, and other things

I have spent decades wondering what the fuck the 'real I' is.
And I do think it is exactly the same awareness, the content and context of awareness have changed, but not the awareness itself.
Awareness is not in time, it is aware of time, but the shackles are not rigid, in my experience.

I don't doubt you have, LI. If you have concluded that subjectivity is subjectivity I can't applaud you for that. A flame is a flame. We could label flames 'The Flame' and claim that every time we light a candle it is the same The Flame that burns. We could label the process of recording sound onto magnetic tape 'The Recording' and say that every time a play button button anywhere is pressed The Recording is there experiencing the sound into memory.

What connects multiple instances of any process such that we can justify calling them continuations of the same thing? I think there are two - the continuity of physical substrate (same body, same candle, same tape recorder) and continuity of information / identity / memory (memory, next instant of combustion initiated by previous moment, continuity of recording in the flux on the tape). Physicality and memory define it as 'the same I'.

If you say it has no mental capacity, I respond without it there is no mental capacity!

I think you said it. You stripped every aspect of mind away and claimed that there was something left, which you call 'I'. You said 'I' does not think, remember etc. The 'I' in your model accounts for no aspect of mind other than this supposed 'observer of experience'. Despite removing mind from the picture you tried to claim that I = mind, which is plainly absurd by normal definition of 'mind'.

What does 'I' do? What effects does it have? Nothing, according to you: -

I think ego responds, awareness observes both the input and output, but is not touched by either.

Without awareness, there is no thinking, experiencing nor knowing. It underpins and facilitates these things.

"Underpins" without touching or being touched? 'Facilitates' rather than does?
Does it make without making and think without thinking? More contradictions?

This knowing aspect of mind must know of an 'I' and there is nothing else that can know that. The 'I' is merely a representation of the system of physical responses within the system. I.E. it is all the brain responding to the world. There is no 'mental' beyond that.

I agree the ego-self is a thought construct. But the ego is observed, we know that because we can observer our own ego. A simple way is to just STOP what ever one is doing and look at oneself doing it. You can observe your body acting, your mind thinking, thoughts poping in, and if you pay attention, you can see your own attention watching these things.

Your mistake is to think that this 'I' is more than a label for the ability of brains to self-reference and notice their own behaviour in the same way they notice the behaviour of rabbits and rivers.

The "pooping in and out" should be a big clue that the 'I' isn't doing anything, but is merely a category label. "The rabbit is eating my lettuce", "The ego is making me do things I don't like", "the observer is watching the sunset". It's all a brain making some sense of the world.

Not so. The mind knows the ego-I. Awareness within the mind allows it to know this.
The mind knows its own thoughts, awareness within it allows it to do this.
Normally our awareness is focussed on our thoughts, our senses, our body.
But the mind is a remarkably flexible thing, it can be trained to look at itself and its own inner workings. It can be trained, and we can be aware of awareness, odd as it sounds.

It doesn't sound odd, just a little mixed up perhaps. 'The Observer' ('I') is a character in a narrative,as is 'Ego'. We can make the narrative more elaborate and it will seem as real as any of it. So Observer of observer is just another character but we suppose it to be identical with what it observes. You could stack awareness of awareness to any depth, but we can only take so much woo. The brain obviously has the capability to respond to what the brain does, which is 'awareness of awareness'.

'I' is a representation, made by the brain, to make the brain comprehensible to itself, by drastic simplification.

Yes, the ego-I is a thought construction. The awareness is not a thought construct, it is that which knows all thought constructs. We can talk of 'awareness' as a word, and this word is a thought construct, or we can 'be aware' in which case awareness is a state of being which allows the construction of thoughts, but the awareness is not a human-thought-construct.

Awareness is response. The brain responds. 'Awareness' is a category used to refer to this responsive ability of brains. There is no call for an observer of awareness, unless you can say what it does and how it does it.

Once we identify our inner reality with that, not these (things) then we change our perspective in a very real way.

Yes, you can extend the fantasy and construct a bigger story. It is ironic that a man who values elimination of Ego wants to place his fictional 'I, maker of experience, essence of the universe' at centre stage. Just because you can imagine it doesn't make it real. Denying what evidence of reality we have doesn't seem like a route to truth.

What if 'The Observer' is a character in a brain story? What if?

You should actually start a thread based on this very question... and defend your own point-of-view, for a change.

I would like to entertain this question and analyse potential flaws in the idea inherent within it. Firstly, I'd like to ask you a question:

If 'subjective experience' is really reducible to brain states that are essentially equivalent to 'data', then why is it that 'the observer' observes something else other than data?
The question is probably vague, so I'll try and explain what I mean. For instance, science essentially tries to reduce what is observed to data, so that it all more-or-less becomes reducible to mathematical statements. But if, as you say, that which is being observed is already precise data, then why doesn't the observer see that?

For example, you might say that the observation of a tree is essentially reducible to the observation of a brain state that is depicting a precise mathematical model of that object. So why don't we see that mathematical model? Why, instead, does the observer observe 'colours'; 'smells'; 'sounds' and 'touches' that culminate in his label of 'a tree'?
Also - and significantly - why does the observer then need to proceed to anylse the details of the sensations in order to construct mathematical models of that tree? According to you, the mathematical data of the tree is already being observed (because that's what you say that the observer is really observing), so this data should be readily available to the observer - he shouldn't have to spend immense amounts of time trying to work out mathematical models of what is being observed, if mathematical models are being observed.

So, there is a problem with saying that the observer is observing brain states depicting mathematical models, since clearly the observer doesn't initially have a clue about any mathematical models. Those are things that he has to work out for himself.

I have other questions, which you might want to address later.

OK, here we go...

[GrahamH]

If 'subjective experience' is really reducible to brain states that are essentially equivalent to 'data', then why is it that 'the observer' observes something else other than data?

What are 'brain states'? Are they 'data' like tables of numbers? Are they like the contents of a computer memory? What are the contents of a computer memory?

I think 'brain states' are the interconnected neurons that grow thoer connections in response to activity, and the the activity itself. The growth patterns of plant roots might be a useful, if inadequate, analogy. The roots grow into the fertile soil and around the stones. The axons linking neurons grow where their activity is effective and wither where it is not. 'Experience' determines the resulting patterns.

I don't think there is an 'observer'. Observation is the physical response between brain and world. 'Data' is an abstract label applied to some such interacting substances. Data is physcal, in brains and computers and the world at large. It is the stuff.

There can be no 'observing data as data'

The question is probably vague, so I'll try and explain what I mean. For instance, science essentially tries to reduce what is observed to data, so that it all more-or-less becomes reducible to mathematical statements. But if, as you say, that which is being observed is already precise data, then why doesn't the observer see that?

What it already is, is physical, and that is how it is 'observed' in interaction.

For example, you might say that the observation of a tree is essentially reducible to the observation of a brain state that is depicting a precise mathematical model of that object.

This is an entirely different concept to the one I am describing. Observation of a tree is the physical response in the brain to a physical causal chain of interactions with the tree. Typically, photons hit the tree and some bounce into the eye which excite some neurons which excite other neurons which wiggle some muscles such that 'Tree' is spoken.

'Data' is a different wiggle used to communicate about these causal chains and responses to them.

So why don't we see that mathematical model?

There is no mathematical model. Maths is a way to communicate about the way stuff behaves.

Why, instead, does the observer observe 'colours'; 'smells'; 'sounds' and 'touches' that culminate in his label of 'a tree'?

I suggest that Qualia are the activation of neural recognisers. A network of neurons, maybe distributed through many brain regions, activates when a pericular pattern of stimuli occurs. That network constitutes a label for a category of concepts (tree, hungry, dangerous, red etc). The activation of the recogniser constitutes a quale and if other recognisers, in attentional pathways, respond to the activation that constitutes noticing the quale, or having the experience.

These activations of neural networks have causal effect which include generation of language to attempt to communicate about these things.

Also - and significantly - why does the observer then need to proceed to analyse the details of the sensations in order to construct mathematical models of that tree? According to you, the mathematical data of the tree is already being observed (because that's what you say that the observer is really observing), so this data should be readily available to the observer - he shouldn't have to spend immense amounts of time trying to work out mathematical models of what is being observed, if mathematical models are being observed.

Bwside the fact that I don't claim any mathematics is involved, it is also evidence to us all that we are blind to our own workings. We don't experience brains, we don't see our neurons light up, we don't realise we unconsciously tell ourselves stories about the world. That we do can be explored.

So, there is a problem with saying that the observer is observing brain states depicting mathematical models, since clearly the observer doesn't initially have a clue about any mathematical models. Those are things that he has to work out for himself.

Yes that would be a problem, but I don;t claim it. The observer is a dualist concept that I don't agree with.

I have other questions, which you might want to address later.

OK.

[jamest]

Thanks for this thread Graham.

If 'subjective experience' is really reducible to brain states that are essentially equivalent to 'data', then why is it that 'the observer' observes something else other than data?

What are 'brain states'? Are they 'data' like tables of numbers? Are they like the contents of a computer memory? What are the contents of a computer memory?

I think 'brain states' are the interconnected neurons that grow thoer connections in response to activity, and the the activity itself. The growth patterns of plant roots might be a useful, if inadequate, analogy. The roots grow into the fertile soil and around the stones. The axons linking neurons grow where their activity is effective and wither where it is not. 'Experience' determines the resulting patterns.

Okay, but I'm not interested in the specific structure of brain states. So I'll by-pass this.

For example, you might say that the observation of a tree is essentially reducible to the observation of a brain state that is depicting a precise mathematical model of that object.

This is an entirely different concept to the one I am describing. Observation of a tree is the physical response in the brain to a physical causal chain of interactions with the tree. Typically, photons hit the tree and some bounce into the eye which excite some neurons which excite other neurons which wiggle some muscles such that 'Tree' is spoken.

There's a universality problem with this theory Graham. If what you said was true, then what was spoken would always be spoken by everyone, all of the time. The issue here isn't one of different languages (though it might have been interesting to pursue such a line-of-thought) - the issue is that what is spoken is often a subjective or erroneous opinion, subject to constant revision. Our understanding is constantly changing, so that the words (and actions) that are produced as a response to any external stimulae, are also constantly changing.
If there is no observer - no 'one' making sense of 'the data' - then (according to your explanation) the words that we utter would be automatic, universal and constant responses to external stimulae, since (we must assume) that the 'internal brain state' associated with any particular external phenomenon, must be consistent with that phenomenon.

Your theory should mean that human discourse and behaviour was entirely predictable, since your theory reduces us more-or-less to automatons whose words and actions are just consequences of brains that are presumably responding to the word in like-fashion. Yet, clearly, human behaviour and discourse are about the most unpredictable things in existence.

[GrahamH]

Thanks for this thread Graham.

If 'subjective experience' is really reducible to brain states that are essentially equivalent to 'data', then why is it that 'the observer' observes something else other than data?

What are 'brain states'? Are they 'data' like tables of numbers? Are they like the contents of a computer memory? What are the contents of a computer memory?

I think 'brain states' are the interconnected neurons that grow thoer connections in response to activity, and the the activity itself. The growth patterns of plant roots might be a useful, if inadequate, analogy. The roots grow into the fertile soil and around the stones. The axons linking neurons grow where their activity is effective and wither where it is not. 'Experience' determines the resulting patterns.

Okay, but I'm not interested in the specific structure of brain states. So I'll by-pass this.

If you wish, but it is at the heart of the issue. It is speculation on the nature of mind, the causal agency of mind what qualia 'really are'.

For example, you might say that the observation of a tree is essentially reducible to the observation of a brain state that is depicting a precise mathematical model of that object.

This is an entirely different concept to the one I am describing. Observation of a tree is the physical response in the brain to a physical causal chain of interactions with the tree. Typically, photons hit the tree and some bounce into the eye which excite some neurons which excite other neurons which wiggle some muscles such that 'Tree' is spoken.

There's a universality problem with this theory Graham. If what you said was true, then what was spoken would always be spoken by everyone, all of the time. The issue here isn't one of different languages (though it might have been interesting to pursue such a line-of-thought) - the issue is that what is spoken is often a subjective or erroneous opinion, subject to constant revision. Our understanding is constantly changing, so that the words (and actions) that are produced as a response to any external stimulae, are also constantly changing.
If there is no observer - no 'one' making sense of 'the data' - then (according to your explanation) the words that we utter would be automatic, universal and constant responses to external stimulae, since (we must assume) that the 'internal brain state' associated with any particular external phenomenon, must be consistent with that phenomenon.

Your theory should mean that human discourse and behaviour was entirely predictable, since your theory reduces us more-or-less to automatons whose words and actions are just consequences of brains that are presumably responding to the word in like-fashion. Yet, clearly, human behaviour and discourse are about the most unpredictable things in existence.

I don't see why you make this claim. Since every brain is unique, the product of a unique set of experiences and growth, and every situation is unique to the individual, then we must expect what we see - differing opinions.

The system is so complex that even if it is entirely deterministic and we could measure its state with good resolution it would not be predictable. We can't even predict the regional weather. How could we predict the exact pattern of raindrops on the pavement at 10:23:09 tomorrow morning? That might be simpler than predicting what someone will say at any moment.

I think your objection can only be based on a mistaken idea that brains are identical, but even if that were the case each individual's situation would be different (unless some mechanism existed to keep all brains precisely in-step).

[Little Idiot]

I dont have time to get involved yet, but I will do so in the next day or so.

Just want to say; lets keep it clean, civil and in a spirit of exchanging ideas, not confrontation. That way were all winners.

Just ignore me, I am just feeling all harmonious at the moment;
Harmony - greater than peace - greater than - strife.

Dont worry, I'll get over it, and its not infectious.

[GrahamH]

I dont have time to get involved yet, but I will do so in the next day or so.

It might be fun.

Peace.

[Surendra Darathy]

What connects multiple instances of any process such that we can justify calling them continuations of the same thing? I think there are two - the continuity of physical substrate (same body, same candle, same tape recorder) and continuity of information / identity / memory (memory, next instant of combustion initiated by previous moment, continuity of recording in the flux on the tape). Physicality and memory define it as 'the same I'.

OK, Graham: This sort of illustrates one of the differences between philosophy and science.

Here, you are playing with the word "same", and trying to extract every quantum of meaning from it that it contains, pretty much in pieces. And you haven't really listed them all yet. I will say the word "continuation" is part of this, as well.

"Multiple instances" is not so bad for me, because it might involve only a simple act of counting, if the act can be called "simple". I don't know yet if it can, so you may have me, there.

The philosophical approach is strictly done, I suppose, from what is pre-defined to be the "human" perspective. After all, it is humans having this conversation, and not bots, as far as anyone will be able to assess.

There's a crossover, though, in your account, from the philosophical to the empirical.

I confess that, as a scientist, I have no means of dealing with this crossover. We've got the "identity" postulate, as we would use it in mathematics, and as jamest would abuse it. If we don't stop before first deciding what a mathematical or logical notion is, and just take it for granted, we may only come up with nonsense. But then, it is just humans making an interpretation of features of the environment, just as any living organism with a neurology is going to do, taken from the empirical perspective.

That we make something more complicated of it, and now have this "subjective experience" to try to talk, about is no evidence that it is not still simply an interpretation of the environment, of the same kind that any organism is going to be performing. It's the reaction/response to the environment that you can map "interpretation" onto. I don't want to use the word "interpretation" in its hermeneutical, text-reading capacity. Call it interpretation, or call it response; the latter is a less-loaded empirical term.

Call and response. Now there's a minefield for you. All of a sudden, we're doing medieval polyphony.

But now: Same. If you go with LI's universe of pure awareness, identity is meaningless, because everything is everything. There's a pure bifurcation between an attempt to metaphysicalise the universe that way, and the way you're doing, partly with the empirical, and partly with the semantic.

You've tried to identify "the subjective" with "a fictional character" (made by your use of "is"). I suppose if pressed, as you are now, you will say that it is nothing but an analogy. Well, that is how to move from the empirical/scientific to the semantic/discursive.

What you end up with is a discursive attempt to refer to two entities without an empirical (i.e. mathematical) identity relation. And that is what I think you mean by subjectivity: You're seeking, in fact, the specific contradiction of the property identity between members of a set of countable entities, i.e., individual humans. You call it "subjective experience", but what I think you mean, and what LI is also trying to say, is the paradoxical "every individual is unique".

The empirical/scientific view of human beings, of course, is not the humanistic/discursive/semantic one, and human beings seen scientifically are completely interchangeable, with minor variations that the medical profession sees to.

I suppose that's enough really to get my ball rolling in this thread. To summarize, I am asserting that the philosophical and discursive/semantic approach to non-identity (here labeled "subjectivity") is a quixotic denial of the empirical. It is my "explanation" of how there comes to be so much woo in the universe of the semantic/discursive.

All the "subject" turns out to be is a denial of its non-existence. There's not much to it, but we have to deal with it. And so some endless conversations evolve between people who shout the denial, and those who try to calm them down.

[jamest]

Okay, but I'm not interested in the specific structure of brain states. So I'll by-pass this.

If you wish, but it is at the heart of the issue. It is speculation on the nature of mind, the causal agency of mind what qualia 'really are'.

Yes, I know it's speculation. But for the sake of argument, I'm going to assume that brain states really are what you say that they are. My strategy is to consider the problems that would arise if such speculation be the case.

There's a universality problem with this theory Graham. If what you said was true, then what was spoken would always be spoken by everyone, all of the time. The issue here isn't one of different languages (though it might have been interesting to pursue such a line-of-thought) - the issue is that what is spoken is often a subjective or erroneous opinion, subject to constant revision. Our understanding is constantly changing, so that the words (and actions) that are produced as a response to any external stimulae, are also constantly changing.
If there is no observer - no 'one' making sense of 'the data' - then (according to your explanation) the words that we utter would be automatic, universal and constant responses to external stimulae, since (we must assume) that the 'internal brain state' associated with any particular external phenomenon, must be consistent with that phenomenon.

Your theory should mean that human discourse and behaviour was entirely predictable, since your theory reduces us more-or-less to automatons whose words and actions are just consequences of brains that are presumably responding to the word in like-fashion. Yet, clearly, human behaviour and discourse are about the most unpredictable things in existence.

I don't see why you make this claim. Since every brain is unique, the product of a unique set of experiences and growth, and every situation unique to the individual, then we must expect what we see, differing opinions.

But you're saying that the internal states of the brain are directly effected by (are products of) the external environment. If we both look at the sun, for example, we should expect to see similar 'growths' within each of our brains that ultimately lead each of us to say "that's the sun". And, for the most part, this kind of universality is apparent. But how does your theory fit in with those individuals who look upwards at the same thing and say "that's God"? We must assume that the brains of all individuals have similar internal responses to specific stimulae, or else the universal laws of physics would be meaningless to us all.

What your theory amounts to, is that it is not 'the individual' that considers and then speaks, but the objects upon which his eyes gaze that ultimately speak. Words are just consequences/products of brain states that are consequences/products of external reality - is what you more-or-less said.
But if the behaviour and discourse that proceeds from an organism are just automatic responses to its environment, then wherein does your theory account for learning and the revising of erroneous opinion? If there is no 'one' to consider (and reconsider) the data, then how do erroneous
words come about, and how are they corrected?

And, it must be asked: how would any organism ever come to utter the words: "I believe in God."?

Beliefs; subjective and diverse emotional responses; erroneous thoughts... all such things speak of 'a one' that considers that which is being observed.

I think your objection can only be based on a mistaken idea that brains are identical, but even if that were the case each individual's situation would be different unless some mechanism existed to keep all brains precisely in-step.

All brains are different, but they respond to the same world and comprehend the same laws-of-physics, enabling meaningful communication. Therefore, the internal states of our brains must all be very similar in response to specific events.

You are overlooking the significance of meaning, here, for the organism itself. That is, there aren't just behavioural and verbal responses to the environment. There are emotional responses to the environment - and the environment does not effect the emotional disposition of an organism. Practically everything we say is guided by desire; intent; purpose; belief. Hence, your theory here, for instance. That is not just a consequence of your brain's response to its environment, any more than my theory about God is just a consequence of my brain's response to the same environment.

There must be something that considers 'the data', Graham. It's the only way to explain the diversity and depth of opinion. There is just no way to account for the traits inherent within diverse opinions, without such a 'one'.

[Surendra Darathy]

There must be something that considers 'the data', Graham. It's the only way to explain the diversity and depth of opinion. There is just no way to account for the traits inherent within diverse opinions, without such a 'one'.

An opinion, James, is just a denial that the same stuff is being examined, in the mathematical sense of "same". That is why science leaves off with opinion and just calls it an observation of the same stuff, and uses instrumentation to reduce the propensity for labeling the observations as "opinions".

The expression of opinions is a flat denial that the differences are "insignificant", without any attempt to prove that the differences are significant. The "opinion" of "subjectivity" is a claim that the personal is signficant, but without providing any details of the significant differences. That's why this conversation never goes anywhere.

An opinion, when supported by evidence, is called an "interpretation of scientific data". Furthermore, an opinion is something that is not brought into the intersubjective space without the use of language. We see all the pitfalls of the semantic/discursive in trying to have a conversation like this one without even trying to define "identity" and "same".

This is how Little Idiot does it:

But the ego is observed, we know that because we can observer our own ego. A simple way is to just STOP what ever one is doing and look at oneself doing it. You can observe your body acting, your mind thinking, thoughts poping in, and if you pay attention, you can see your own attention watching these things.

Here, an opinion is expressed as if it were a fact. Little Idiot here purports to tell me what is going on with a subjectivity we have not yet established. So much for assuming one's conclusions, a staple of the world of woo.

The natural problem of claiming the "ego" can be "observed" is to produce a term you haven't defined without having shown evidence for it. That's a recipe for an infinite amount of nonsense.

[GrahamH]

A thought on how brains are unique.

Consider the mighty oak. If you were to collect many acorn from many oak trees, and plant them in many differing environments, you would not expect to find any two oak trees to be identical. There will be many close similarities, but every tree will be unique. If every leaf were a idea they would all be saying different things but there would be many common themes. Large green leaves might speak of moist earth rich with nutrients. Small leaves might speak of drought and poor soil.

The brain grows to reflect its environment, following a common general plan, but with every branch, twig and leaf, every root unique. Brains, like trees, grow according to growth patterns guided by genes, but the genes do not define the precise structure of an any organism. Everything that grows responds to the environment it lives through.

[Surendra Darathy]

A thought on how brains are unique.

Still, Graham, you are talking about the uniqueness from a perspective where you've already assumed it. No wonder that you can prove that each brain is unique. You haven't even entertained the possibility that they are not. That is already the humanistic perspective, and it diverges from the scientific/empirical as a matter of necessity. It proves nothing. It assumes that every human brain is unique and concludes that every human brain is unique.

This is not to say that I have a real problem with doing this, but it takes us back to what you said to LI in the post you quoted to open this thread:

If you have concluded that subjectivity is subjectivity I can't applaud you for that. A flame is a flame. We could label flames 'The Flame' and claim that every time we light a candle it is the same The Flame that burns. We could label the process of recording sound onto magnetic tape 'The Recording' and say that every time a play button button anywhere is pressed The Recording is there experiencing the sound into memory.

IOW, Graham, if you have concluded that uniqueness is uniqueness, I can't applaud you for it.

The way we prove something in this vein is to assume that all human brains are identical, make some argument, and see if we come up with a proper reductio ad absurdum.

Edit: To be fair, this is a very laborious process, and probably is only worthwhile for academicians. This is the mistake that I have been making with all of you. Arduous labor is not required in what is really only an open internet forum!

[GrahamH]

What connects multiple instances of any process such that we can justify calling them continuations of the same thing? I think there are two - the continuity of physical substrate (same body, same candle, same tape recorder) and continuity of information / identity / memory (memory, next instant of combustion initiated by previous moment, continuity of recording in the flux on the tape). Physicality and memory define it as 'the same I'.

OK, Graham: This sort of illustrates one of the differences between philosophy and science.

Here, you are playing with the word "same", and trying to extract every quantum of meaning from it that it contains, pretty much in pieces. And you haven't really listed them all yet. I will say the word "continuation" is part of this, as well.

"Multiple instances" is not so bad for me, because it might involve only a simple act of counting, if the act can be called "simple". I don't know yet if it can, so you may have me, there.

The philosophical approach is strictly done, I suppose, from what is pre-defined to be the "human" perspective. After all, it is humans having this conversation, and not bots, as far as anyone will be able to assess.

There's a crossover, though, in your account, from the philosophical to the empirical.

I confess that, as a scientist, I have no means of dealing with this crossover. We've got the "identity" postulate, as we would use it in mathematics, and as jamest would abuse it. If we don't stop before first deciding what a mathematical or logical notion is, and just take it for granted, we may only come up with nonsense. But then, it is just humans making an interpretation of features of the environment, just as any living organism with a neurology is going to do, taken from the empirical perspective.

That we make something more complicated of it, and now have this "subjective experience" to try to talk, about is no evidence that it is not still simply an interpretation of the environment, of the same kind that any organism is going to be performing. It's the reaction/response to the environment that you can map "interpretation" onto. I don't want to use the word "interpretation" in its hermeneutical, text-reading capacity. Call it interpretation, or call it response; the latter is a less-loaded empirical term.

Call and response. Now there's a minefield for you. All of a sudden, we're doing medieval polyphony.

But now: Same. If you go with LI's universe of pure awareness, identity is meaningless, because everything is everything. There's a pure bifurcation between an attempt to metaphysicalise the universe that way, and the way you're doing, partly with the empirical, and partly with the semantic.

You've tried to identify "the subjective" with "a fictional character" (made by your use of "is"). I suppose if pressed, as you are now, you will say that it is nothing but an analogy. Well, that is how to move from the empirical/scientific to the semantic/discursive.

What you end up with is a discursive attempt to refer to two entities without an empirical (i.e. mathematical) identity relation. And that is what I think you mean by subjectivity: You're seeking, in fact, the specific contradiction of the property identity between members of a set of countable entities, i.e., individual humans. You call it "subjective experience", but what I think you mean, and what LI is also trying to say, is the paradoxical "every individual is unique".

The empirical/scientific view of human beings, of course, is not the humanistic/discursive/semantic one, and human beings seen scientifically are completely interchangeable, with minor variations that the medical profession sees to.

I suppose that's enough really to get my ball rolling in this thread. To summarize, I am asserting that the philosophical and discursive/semantic approach to non-identity (here labeled "subjectivity") is a quixotic denial of the empirical. It is my "explanation" of how there comes to be so much woo in the universe of the semantic/discursive.

All the "subject" turns out to be is a denial of its non-existence. There's not much to it, but we have to deal with it. And so some endless conversations evolve between people who shout the denial, and those who try to calm them down.

I expect there will be much in this topic you dislike.
However, your contributions are most welcome.

The topic is essentially philosophical with appeals to empiricism. The case for the opposition is purely philosophical: that consciousness exists as some non-physical essence.

I am attempting a philosophical answer to the question 'How can objective objects produce subjective experience?". My answer being that 'subjective experience' is not something experienced by a subjective observer, but something known to a cogitating brain. The certain knowledge can be accounted for and the subject is known about but unreal.

[GrahamH]

A thought on how brains are unique.

Still, Graham, you are talking about the uniqueness from a perspective where you've already assumed it. No wonder that you can prove that each brain is unique. You haven't even entertained the possibility that they are not. That is already the humanistic perspective, and it diverges from the scientific/empirical as a matter of necessity. It proves nothing. It assumes that every human brain is unique and concludes that every human brain is unique.

Neural networks in the brain grow in a branching structure. I don't think there is nearly enough data in the human genome to define every branch and connection.

Every human body is unique. Isn't that self evident, and empirically well established? There would be no purpose to a brain scan if all brains were identical. I feel justified in saying that all brains are physically unique variation on a common theme. Can you say why you think this is not the case?

In addition, neuroscience has established that neurons grow new connections and that this seems to be a reinforcement of active connections. To use another analogy, muscle fibres grow more when stressed.

I don't propose to cite lots of scientific references, since this is more philosophy than science and I'm not even a lay-expert in neuroscience. If anyone who knows about the field can correct any sciency claim I make I will welcome it.

[Surendra Darathy]

The topic is essentially philosophical with appeals to empiricism. The case for the opposition is purely philosophical: that consciousness exists as some non-physical essence.

I am attempting a philosophical answer to the question 'How can objective objects produce subjective experience?". My answer being that 'subjective experience' is not something experienced by a subjective observer, but something known to a cogitating brain. The certain knowledge can be accounted for and the subject is known about but unreal.

The only thing I wouldn't "like" about such a discussion is if it assumes its conclusion and obfuscates the argument to disguise the fact that the conclusion was assumed.

In regard to your comments on each oak tree (or brain) growing to be slightly different, we account for it empirically by indicating how much information is really represented by the genome, and then puffing it up with "nature vs. nurture". Sure, people grow to adults with a range of heights. It's a bell curve.

I'm with you so far, that if you teased apart two individual brains, you would see different patterns of neurons firing. Presto! The two individuals differ in terms of their brain activity. And presto! You get people with different opinions. And long arguments in internet forums.

I have no problem celebrating the fact of differing opinions. You're right about what the woo-heads have done with it, though, and the trick is to have a beer with them.


And then


(Just kidding! This time!)

[Surendra Darathy]

I don't think there is nearly enough data in the human genome to define every branch and connection.

This is a bold claim. What I mean is that it is probably unproveable. It is also not being claimed that what is required for subjectivity is every branch and connection of the human brain. Even my cat is subjective enough to deal with that. My cat and I live together amicably. I talk to him, and he doesn't talk back. If he did, I'd think I was crazy.

I feel justified in saying that all brains are physically unique variation on a common theme. Can you say why you think this is not the case?

No, I agree with you. How is it instantly an argument for "subjectivity", and not just an explanation of "differences of opinion", which are as empirical as the variations among brains?