On treeness of Oak1, and other things

[SpeedOfSound]

Lil'Idiot

Do you find that the world you find yourself in behaves rationally and reasonably just like it is a 4D space/time geometry that behaves in consistent ways as defined by both common sense and science?

I will ask you this over and over again until I get a straight answer so lets' avoid the 10-page shuffle.

It's the same question as is there treeness except of the broadest scope. Treeness can refer to an individual tree or the properties of trees that is necessary to make a generalization. That is there must be something about trees that makes it this damned simple for me to use one word and communicate a concept to people all over the planet.

Now at this stage of discussion it really does not matter whether the tree 'exists' out there, in here, up there, etc. You said it doesn't matter to you whether or not the bus is mental or physical you will damn well jump out of the way in any case.

There is a massive amount of information in our minds and in our libraries that I separate into R1 and R2.

R1 is the common sense stuff that we all have by the time we reach puberty. It helps us pull up our pants and find our mouths.

R2 is the extension by rigorous science to further clarify this information. We use reason and logic and empirical data to do so. Though you must note that I am making no claim yet as to the what or the where of reason and logic.

Treeness has mappings in both R1 and R2. It gets a little dicey in R2. A botanist will have a far different experience of treeness than us pedestrians.

Why is this important? Well. 1. I am claiming that neither R1 or R2 would be any different with ANY metaphysical position or indeed without one. Idealist or realist or cluelessist, the data is there, we all use it, we all agree on it in general, and it is a reality of it's own. ( I use the word reality in it's barest R1 sense )

2. R2 has shown to us that we can be very wrong in R1.

You said:

The appearance of a physical, external world has been shown scientifically to be only an appearance,...

That's actually bullshit with some truth sprinkled in. The bullshit part is in the 'only'. When did they show that and with what set of experiments?

I think what you mean to say is that what we perceive is not always reliably related to what we have reasoned to be real via R1 and R2. You should give me a verdict on this or I will keep asking about it until we both puke.

[SpeedOfSound]

However I would suggest this is no more than a dogma unless all possible enquiry is investigated prior to the assertion.

Here! Here! We can inquire if you actually read my posts, answer my questions, and respond to all of the ideas put forth. I analyze every word of your posts. Unfortunately in unpacking them I find multiple threads of inquiry. Let's try and focus on what I have skimmed to begin with and I promise to get to the rest of the OP.

[Little Idiot]

Lil'Idiot

Do you find that the world you find yourself in behaves rationally and reasonably just like it is a 4D space/time geometry that behaves in consistent ways as defined by both common sense and science?

Indeed I do find it behaves rationally and reasonably, this is because it is a 4D space-time world which is consistent. The observation that it does so does not stand in conflict with it being a mental world, if we accept space-time to be mental in origin.

I will ask you this over and over again until I get a straight answer so lets' avoid the 10-page shuffle.

That’s straight enough for you, isn’t it?
The real question is; can we know that space-time is mental, or can we know that its not mental, the fact that the world is rational is not at issue here.

It's the same question as is there treeness except of the broadest scope. Treeness can refer to an individual tree or the properties of trees that is necessary to make a generalization. That is there must be something about trees that makes it this damned simple for me to use one word and communicate a concept to people all over the planet.

Then clarify the question on treeness; If 'does the word express a property of trees' then yes.
Or do you ask; Is it a property independent of our observations, or is it a label we use to describe and classify trees, does it actually exist as a property of trees or is it a label we create to describe trees, then thats a different thing. What is the actual question?

Now at this stage of discussion it really does not matter whether the tree 'exists' out there, in here, up there, etc. You said it doesn't matter to you whether or not the bus is mental or physical you will damn well jump out of the way in any case.

I would suggest it does not matter on a practical level, jump out of the way before the damn bus hits you.
The distinction of the 'underlying nature' of the experience as being a mental (mind created) experience of a mental world, or a mental representation of a mind-independent external reality (is not a point to be considered before avoiding the bus, but) is a point worth consideration during our free time, after securing lunch for the family. Such consideration needs no more justification than the possibility of improved understanding of the nature of experiences.

There is a massive amount of information in our minds and in our libraries that I separate into R1 and R2.

R1 is the common sense stuff that we all have by the time we reach puberty. It helps us pull up our pants and find our mouths.

R2 is the extension by rigorous science to further clarify this information. We use reason and logic and empirical data to do so. Though you must note that I am making no claim yet as to the what or the where of reason and logic.

Treeness has mappings in both R1 and R2. It gets a little dicey in R2. A botanist will have a far different experience of treeness than us pedestrians.

Why is this important? Well. 1. I am claiming that neither R1 or R2 would be any different with ANY metaphysical position or indeed without one. Idealist or realist or cluelessist, the data is there, we all use it, we all agree on it in general, and it is a reality of it's own. ( I use the word reality in it's barest R1 sense )

2. R2 has shown to us that we can be very wrong in R1.

I agree with your model 'R1 and R2' as you describe, but isnt R1 an understanding or interpretation of the world, and while it is reasonable to say R1 may not change with or without metaphysical position. But it is also reasonable to say it may be changed by our metaphysical view; a religious type could see evidence or even 'proof' of 'God's involvement' every time an event works out well, or 'Satans evil plans' each time things go wrong. R2 however certainally will change dependent on the metaphysical position; the observed data will be the same, but the conclusion drawn from the data may be different. And since R2 consists of conclusions supported by data, R2 is different.

You said:

The appearance of a physical, external world has been shown scientifically to be only an appearance,...

That's actually bullshit with some truth sprinkled in. The bullshit part is in the 'only'. When did they show that and with what set of experiments?

I think what you mean to say is that what we perceive is not always reliably related to what we have reasoned to be real via R1 and R2. You should give me a verdict on this or I will keep asking about it until we both puke.

O.K.
You object to ‘only’ so what’s wrong if I say
“The appearance of a physical, external world has been shown scientifically to be only an appearance known by the mind or brain of the observer”
And go on to say
“The appearance of a physical world outside the body does not mean there is any reliable reason to suggest existence of world external to the mind which observes the physical world”
Justifying this with
“because the experience of the world is a mental event; we each only know the content of our own mind. If we assume this is a representation of a ‘world’ external to our own mind, we also assume we can never know this ‘world’ only our own mental representation of it”

[Little Idiot]

However I would suggest this is no more than a dogma unless all possible enquiry is investigated prior to the assertion.

Here! Here! We can inquire if you actually read my posts, answer my questions, and respond to all of the ideas put forth. I analyze every word of your posts. Unfortunately in unpacking them I find multiple threads of inquiry. Let's try and focus on what I have skimmed to begin with and I promise to get to the rest of the OP.

O.K.
I think I got all the questions you asked in this thread.
I do acept that I missed some in the old thread - no need to go into why - feel free to pull me up and ask over here.

Anyway, heres to hoping for a civil discussion.

[SpeedOfSound]

It's the same question as is there treeness except of the broadest scope. Treeness can refer to an individual tree or the properties of trees that is necessary to make a generalization. That is there must be something about trees that makes it this damned simple for me to use one word and communicate a concept to people all over the planet.

Then clarify the question on treeness; If 'does the word express a property of trees' then yes.

That is the question and you gave an answer. There is treeness. A property of trees that allows us to recognize them and communicate about them.

Very good and very straight on the first answers.

[Little Idiot]

It's the same question as is there treeness except of the broadest scope. Treeness can refer to an individual tree or the properties of trees that is necessary to make a generalization. That is there must be something about trees that makes it this damned simple for me to use one word and communicate a concept to people all over the planet.

Then clarify the question on treeness; If 'does the word express a property of trees' then yes.

That is the question and you gave an answer. There is treeness. A property of trees that allows us to recognize them and communicate about them.

Very good and very straight on the first answers.

Phew'
Do I get a prize after 10 straight answers?

[SpeedOfSound]

There is a massive amount of information in our minds and in our libraries that I separate into R1 and R2.

R1 is the common sense stuff that we all have by the time we reach puberty. It helps us pull up our pants and find our mouths.

R2 is the extension by rigorous science to further clarify this information. We use reason and logic and empirical data to do so. Though you must note that I am making no claim yet as to the what or the where of reason and logic.

Treeness has mappings in both R1 and R2. It gets a little dicey in R2. A botanist will have a far different experience of treeness than us pedestrians.

Why is this important? Well. 1. I am claiming that neither R1 or R2 would be any different with ANY metaphysical position or indeed without one. Idealist or realist or cluelessist, the data is there, we all use it, we all agree on it in general, and it is a reality of it's own. ( I use the word reality in it's barest R1 sense )

2. R2 has shown to us that we can be very wrong in R1.

I agree with your model 'R1 and R2' as you describe, but isnt R1 an understanding or interpretation of the world, and while it is reasonable to say R1 may not change with or without metaphysical position. But it is also reasonable to say it may be changed by our metaphysical view; a religious type could see evidence or even 'proof' of 'God's involvement' every time an event works out well, or 'Satans evil plans' each time things go wrong.

Lets' deal with R1 first. No it is not an interpretation of the physical 4D world. It could be called an understanding but the understanding ends at how things work. It can get a little foggy here but by definition I limit the scope of R1 to common sense knowledge about the behavior of the physical. Things such as knowing that if a cat climbs a tree it does not climb down as a dog or if the cat runs behind the tree the cat that comes out the other side is the same cat.

We can know these things without interpretation or any deep understanding of causation. I know I can't run through a tree. I call it solid in R1. I don't know about molecular forces in R1.

[SpeedOfSound]

Very good and very straight on the first answers.

Phew'
Do I get a prize after 10 straight answers?

Maybe. The prize is that you will sober up philosophically.

[Little Idiot]

There is a massive amount of information in our minds and in our libraries that I separate into R1 and R2.

R1 is the common sense stuff that we all have by the time we reach puberty. It helps us pull up our pants and find our mouths.

R2 is the extension by rigorous science to further clarify this information. We use reason and logic and empirical data to do so. Though you must note that I am making no claim yet as to the what or the where of reason and logic.

Treeness has mappings in both R1 and R2. It gets a little dicey in R2. A botanist will have a far different experience of treeness than us pedestrians.

Why is this important? Well. 1. I am claiming that neither R1 or R2 would be any different with ANY metaphysical position or indeed without one. Idealist or realist or cluelessist, the data is there, we all use it, we all agree on it in general, and it is a reality of it's own. ( I use the word reality in it's barest R1 sense )

2. R2 has shown to us that we can be very wrong in R1.

I agree with your model 'R1 and R2' as you describe, but isnt R1 an understanding or interpretation of the world, and while it is reasonable to say R1 may not change with or without metaphysical position. But it is also reasonable to say it may be changed by our metaphysical view; a religious type could see evidence or even 'proof' of 'God's involvement' every time an event works out well, or 'Satans evil plans' each time things go wrong.

Lets' deal with R1 first. No it is not an interpretation of the physical 4D world. It could be called an understanding but the understanding ends at how things work. It can get a little foggy here but by definition I limit the scope of R1 to common sense knowledge about the behavior of the physical. Things such as knowing that if a cat climbs a tree it does not climb down as a dog or if the cat runs behind the tree the cat that comes out the other side is the same cat.

We can know these things without interpretation or any deep understanding of causation. I know I can't run through a tree. I call it solid in R1. I don't know about molecular forces in R1.

So, in R1, could our hypothetical religious simplton say 'I won the lottery because God loves me' and 'I prayed that I would win, look what happened! therefore prayer works, Jesus lives and God is!'
Wouldnt this be R1 understanding? He thinks things are as they are because "it pleases God that they are like this, QED."
It seems to him a reasonable explaination of how the world works, based on his metaphysics (God is) but if he changes his mind (when the wife leaves him and the money is finished, he gives up on God, who decided to fuck with him - the bastard!) when his metaphysics changes his R1 changes - now his experience suports his new metaphysics in his opinion and now "things work as they do because its a godless loveless bitch of a world".

[Little Idiot]

Very good and very straight on the first answers.

Phew'
Do I get a prize after 10 straight answers?

Maybe. The prize is that you will sober up philosophically.

No more metaphysical hash cookies?

[SpeedOfSound]

So, in R1, could our hypothetical religious simplton say 'I won the lottery because God loves me' and 'I prayed that I would win, look what happened! therefore prayer works, Jesus lives and God is!'
Wouldnt this be R1 understanding? He thinks things are as they are because "it pleases God that they are like this, QED."
It seems to him a reasonable explaination of how the world works, based on his metaphysics (God is) but if he changes his mind (when the wife leaves him and the money is finished, he gives up on God, who decided to fuck with him - the bastard!) when his metaphysics changes his R1 changes - now his experience suports his new metaphysics in his opinion and now "things work as they do because its a godless loveless bitch of a world".

The problem starts with 'because' in the first line. R1 is the set of simple things that we all know about how things behave. Not why they behave. Beliefs beyond that are in a different realm. I think I was calling that S1.

R1 knowledge would not tell him why he won, only how to dial the phone to claim his prize.

Again. This is my definition. Let me tighten it up a little.

R1 is a subset of R2 and compatible with R2. So god giving out lotto tickets isn't going to be in there.

Maybe this will work too.

R1 is how things work not why.

[Little Idiot]

So, in R1, could our hypothetical religious simplton say 'I won the lottery because God loves me' and 'I prayed that I would win, look what happened! therefore prayer works, Jesus lives and God is!'
Wouldnt this be R1 understanding? He thinks things are as they are because "it pleases God that they are like this, QED."
It seems to him a reasonable explaination of how the world works, based on his metaphysics (God is) but if he changes his mind (when the wife leaves him and the money is finished, he gives up on God, who decided to fuck with him - the bastard!) when his metaphysics changes his R1 changes - now his experience suports his new metaphysics in his opinion and now "things work as they do because its a godless loveless bitch of a world".

The problem starts with 'because' in the first line. R1 is the set of simple things that we all know about how things behave. Not why they behave. Beliefs beyond that are in a different realm. I think I was calling that S1.

R1 knowledge would not tell him why he won, only how to dial the phone to claim his prize.

Again. This is my definition. Let me tighten it up a little.

R1 is a subset of R2 and compatible with R2. So god giving out lotto tickets isn't going to be in there.

Maybe this will work too.

R1 is how things work not why.

O.K. having figured out that R1 is how things work, not why, then we can go on.
I agree that 'how things work,' R1, does not depend on a metaphysical position or tha lack of one.

[Kenny Login]

R1 is how things work not why.

O.K. having figured out that R1 is how things work, not why, then we can go on.
I agree that 'how things work,' R1, does not depend on a metaphysical position or tha lack of one.

Hmmm..... I would question that. The categories for both R1 and R2 seem a little restrictive to me, in terms of an epistemological picture. At the very least, I would suggest R1* and R2*.

P.S. Did I miss anything important in the intermission? ;-)

[Little Idiot]

R1 is how things work not why.

O.K. having figured out that R1 is how things work, not why, then we can go on.
I agree that 'how things work,' R1, does not depend on a metaphysical position or tha lack of one.

Hmmm..... I would question that. The categories for both R1 and R2 seem a little restrictive to me, in terms of an epistemological picture. At the very least, I would suggest R1* and R2*.

P.S. Did I miss anything important in the intermission? ;-)

Hi Kenny, welcome.
I agree that they are restrictive definitions, but lets see what SoS has in mind for them. After all he's defining them in this way for a purpose, I assume.

I dont think you missed much in any intermission which may or may not have hypothetically occured <cough, I am not going to comment, cough>, read the new metaphysics as an error if you want an update.

[SpeedOfSound]

R1 is how things work not why.

O.K. having figured out that R1 is how things work, not why, then we can go on.
I agree that 'how things work,' R1, does not depend on a metaphysical position or tha lack of one.

Hmmm..... I would question that. The categories for both R1 and R2 seem a little restrictive to me, in terms of an epistemological picture. At the very least, I would suggest R1* and R2*.

P.S. Did I miss anything important in the intermission? ;-)

Yeah I think I went too far with eliminating the why things work but I'm not sure. Seems we could ask why the barn is down and answer because of the tornado.


What do you mean with the *?