Is there such a thing as objective morality?

[starr]

To try to say that "objective morality" means the same as "absolute morality" seems pretty ridiculous to me.

I've just quoted the aspects of the definition that I think are most relevant to my assertion that 'objective morality' in a philosophical sense is the same as 'absolute morality'.

You say morals are purely subjective. I say no, there's a way to judge them objectively. So then you come back with objective means the same as absolute and morals aren't absolute so therefore... what exactly?

I don't think you understand. I have not just 'come back with' objective means the same as absolute. Right from the start of this thread (or I should say, even before the start of this thread) I have been thinking of 'objective morality' as meaning the same thing as 'absolute morality'. In a philosophical discussion (as I understand it) that is how the question of objective vs subjective morality is generally discussed. I'm honestly not just throwing it in there at the last minute to score points against you or to piss you off or to 'win' an argument.

The 'object' of perception or thought is absolutely pure in its independence from subjective perceptions. Thus, objective morality needs to exist independently from our subjective perceptions. In your case you are subjectively deciding that 'an evolutionary viewpoint in the environment that it's in' is the best 'objective' way to compare moral values.

Where did I say that an evolutionary viewpoint is the best way to judge moral values? The answer is that I didn't, and your argument is pure strawman. All I have said, which I will repeat again, is that there is a way to objectively judge morals, thus they are not purely subjective.

I'm sorry I misunderstood you as I did think you were advocating the evolutionary criterion as being the best way but I now accept that is not your argument. However, whether or not an evolutionary viewpoint is the best way to judge moral values is actually completely irrelevant to my argument and as such my argument is not pure strawman.


I'll restate:
The 'object' of perception or thought is absolutely pure in its independence from subjective perceptions. Thus, objective morality needs to exist independently from our subjective perceptions. It does not matter whether or not the chosen 'way' is the 'best way', if somebody subjectively chooses 'a way to objectively judge morals' then the ultimate judgement is still subjective in an absolute sense.

Do you understand what I'm trying to say? Perhaps I'm not being clear enough?

[Drewish]

gooseboy,

I think it's important to denote the difference between subjective and situational here. To say that the morally correct decision is relative to the specific details of one's situation does not imply that that morality is subjective. Though I'm not quite sure if you are advocating for situational dependent morality or not (though it appears so since the morality you're proposing seems to be based on outcome rather than being deontological.)

[Xamonas Chegwé]

hehehe, FBM I was hoping to get around to that one, too. Perhaps later, though ...

if morals can evolve, they are not fixed and objective.

Try this, XC: if apes can evolve, they are not fixed and objective.

See the problem with that? Obviously genetic evolution implies not fixed ... but objective?

This is where it's important to make a distinction between genetic evolution and memetic evolution.

No, I don't see the problem. Apes are not fixed. Like every other species on the planet, they are evolving - generation by generation - mainly simple things like resistances to new strains of disease, etc. Given enough time (and assuming we don't kill them all off first) there may be whole new species of apes - many of which we maybe wouldn't initially recognise as apes - or maybe there won't be any apes at all because something else will have out-competed and replaced them.

Agreed. Perhaps if you read what I wrote again, particularly the bolded part, you'll see that's not the point I was making.

Tell me what is objective about an ape?

That's the point of contention I wanted to highlight - the 'if it evolves it's not objective' part. When it comes to genetic inheritance I don't agree with you that because it evolves it's not objective. If it exists in any form (evolving or static) independently and regardless of our subjective awareness of it, it objectively exists. Apes fit that criteria. Concepts (memes) such as morals, though, don't objectively exist because they exist only through our subjective awareness of behaviours. Behaviours, not morals. There's that distinction again, for those who keep missing it.

Plus - and it's an important plus - the proposed genetic basis for morality is a physical characteristic, not an entire superfamily! The two are not at all comparable.

The genetic basis (objective) for the concept (subjective) of morality.

My standpoint all along has been that, whereas there may be a genetic basis for some aspects of morality, this does not make it objective.

there may be a genetic basis (objective) for some behaviours that our concept (subjective) of morality applies values (obviously, again, subjective) to.

Objective morality, as I understand it, means that some (undefined) things are absolutely right or wrong, without recourse to individual opinion. All any kind of evolved, inherited morality would mean would be that individuals have arrived at their individual opinions of right or wrong through natural selection but they are still individual opinions. Even if every member of the human race was born with the same, evolved, individual opinions, that would still not make those opinion objectively true. A chance mutation could result in a person being born that had a different set of morals that somehow meant that their chances of survival and reproduction were increased at any time.

Or decreased. Tangental aside: People with autism may be one example of humans who could be considered 'amoral' and who would likely not survive without external support (but in their case that lack of survival skill would not be due to amorality, but other factors related to autism).

I disagree that 'ape' is objective. It is a purely subjective classification of a certain group of animals - an arbitrary subdivision of primates, which are themselves an arbitrary subdivision of mammals, etc... Individual apes are certainly objective, in as much as they are individual animals, but the concept of apehood is not. In fact, the concept 'ape' is every bit as subjective as the concept 'moral', or 'immoral' to my mind. It might be a little easier to define as it is based upon physical characteristics and not metaphysics, but it is still a concept, not an objective thing. (Having said that, I was at fault when I asked, "Tell me what is objective about an ape?" I should have said, "Tell me what is objective about apes?")

[charlou]

To try to say that "objective morality" means the same as "absolute morality" seems pretty ridiculous to me.

I've just quoted the aspects of the definition that I think are most relevant to my assertion that 'objective morality' in a philosophical sense is the same as 'absolute morality'.

You say morals are purely subjective. I say no, there's a way to judge them objectively. So then you come back with objective means the same as absolute and morals aren't absolute so therefore... what exactly?

The 'object' of perception or thought is absolutely pure in its independence from subjective perceptions. Thus, objective morality needs to exist independently from our subjective perceptions. In your case you are subjectively deciding that 'an evolutionary viewpoint in the environment that it's in' is the best 'objective' way to compare moral values.

Where did I say that an evolutionary viewpoint is the best way to judge moral values? The answer is that I didn't, and your argument is pure strawman. All I have said, which I will repeat again, is that there is a way to objectively judge morals, thus they are not purely subjective.

(My emphasis)

Can you tell us what that way is?

Sure. From how well they replicate. (Note this is not the same as how 'good' or 'bad' one might subjectively think a moral is. All I am saying is some morals can be objectively measured to replicate better than others)

For example, the 'moral' of kill all your family and then yourself would never survive in any society. The 'moral' of be good to your wife might. Thus from the point of view of how well the moral survives (or the genes or memes that encode the moral survive if you want to look at it that way) 'be good to your wife' is a better moral than 'kill all your family and then yourself'.

From this I would predict that in no cultures anywhere on any planet would killing all your family and then yourself be considered moral, but I would expect that there's a chance that being good to your wife may be considered moral in some cultures.

There was a time when, for the majority of people, homosexual behaviour was considered immoral. In some cultures it is still a majority view. This an irrational view of homosexual behaviour. Even though homosexual behaviour means it's not possible to procreate and pass along genetic material to a new generation, there's no rational reason to consider homosexual behaviour as a moral issue, ie good or bad.

People who have a moral aversion to homosexual behaviour feel it is an instinctive or 'gut' reaction, but how does that account for the increasing (even total) acceptance of homosexual behaviour among some cultures, with no such perceived symptoms of instinctive or 'gut' aversion? The more we're exposed to a behaviour as normal and/or acceptable among our peers, the less likely we are to respond adversely to it. This indicates aversion and acceptance are encultured, and not instinctive/genetically inherited.

The same might very well be the case with incest, I think.

[FBM]

If a certain behavior were to be hardwired into your genes, you wouldn't be morally culpable. It wouldn't be a moral issue at all, it'd be a medical one. You can't be held morally responsible for something that you didn't choose.

Yes, I see your point, but I'm not sure it will hold up under scrutiny. Let me do some reading and get back to you on this.

OK, I've thought about it and am ready to answer...

Seems to me that if certain genetically-encoded behavior enhances survivability, the genes for it will eventually dominate the population. This is a statistical matter, not a moral one. It would be an error to assign a teleological motive behind genetic behavior. Genes aren't consciously choosing moral behavior; they simply mutate and the environment co-determines which mutations enhance survivability. No volitional agent, no teleology, no moral issue at all. If survival of the genes were a moral issue, failing to produce offspring would be immoral. If individual survival were the moral issue, then dying would be immoral.

[charlou]

Individual apes are certainly objective, in as much as they are individual animals,

This is exactly what I meant. They exist objectively, whether we are aware of them or not, whether we classify them or not. They're subject to evolution so they're not fixed, but they still exist objectively. That's the point of contention I have with your statement, "if morals can evolve, they are not fixed and objective", bearing in mind you were discussing this from a perspective of if morals have a genetic basis. I'm saying anything that evolves genetically exists objectively even though it isn't fixed. I also explained why I don't include memetic concepts such as 'morals' in that.

[Xamonas Chegwé]

To try to say that "objective morality" means the same as "absolute morality" seems pretty ridiculous to me.

I've just quoted the aspects of the definition that I think are most relevant to my assertion that 'objective morality' in a philosophical sense is the same as 'absolute morality'.

You say morals are purely subjective. I say no, there's a way to judge them objectively. So then you come back with objective means the same as absolute and morals aren't absolute so therefore... what exactly?

The 'object' of perception or thought is absolutely pure in its independence from subjective perceptions. Thus, objective morality needs to exist independently from our subjective perceptions. In your case you are subjectively deciding that 'an evolutionary viewpoint in the environment that it's in' is the best 'objective' way to compare moral values.

Where did I say that an evolutionary viewpoint is the best way to judge moral values? The answer is that I didn't, and your argument is pure strawman. All I have said, which I will repeat again, is that there is a way to objectively judge morals, thus they are not purely subjective.

(My emphasis)

Can you tell us what that way is?

Sure. From how well they replicate. (Note this is not the same as how 'good' or 'bad' one might subjectively think a moral is. All I am saying is some morals can be objectively measured to replicate better than others)

For example, the 'moral' of kill all your family and then yourself would never survive in any society. The 'moral' of be good to your wife might. Thus from the point of view of how well the moral survives (or the genes or memes that encode the moral survive if you want to look at it that way) 'be good to your wife' is a better moral than 'kill all your family and then yourself'.

From this I would predict that in no cultures anywhere on any planet would killing all your family and then yourself be considered moral, but I would expect that there's a chance that being good to your wife may be considered moral in some cultures.

This would only hold though if there were a genetic basis for morals. Otherwise, the morality could not be inherited. Obviously, any gene that produced an expressed phenotype of suicidal psychopathy would probably be at a disadvantage in being carried forward - but I would be very surprised to learn of a genetic link to such cases.

You are talking about behaviours here as well. Morals are our perceptions of our potential behaviours as good or bad, not those behaviours themselves. It would be perfectly possible for someone to hold the opinion that murdering his family and then killing himself was not wrong but still never to carry out the act. Just as I don't consider homosexuality to be wrong but I would be unlikely to shag a bloke.

[charlou]

If a certain behavior were to be hardwired into your genes, you wouldn't be morally culpable. It wouldn't be a moral issue at all, it'd be a medical one. You can't be held morally responsible for something that you didn't choose.

Yes, I see your point, but I'm not sure it will hold up under scrutiny. Let me do some reading and get back to you on this.

OK, I've thought about it and am ready to answer...

Seems to me that if certain genetically-encoded behavior enhances survivability, the genes for it will eventually dominate the population. This is a statistical matter, not a moral one. It would be an error to assign a teleological motive behind genetic behavior. Genes aren't consciously choosing moral behavior; they simply mutate and the environment co-determines which mutations enhance survivability. No volitional agent, no teleology, no moral issue at all. If survival of the genes were a moral issue, failing to produce offspring would be immoral. If individual survival were the moral issue, then dying would be immoral.

Ayep, succinctly put.

It's unnecessary to note here that religious concepts apply value to both procreation and death, and absolute moral value at that ... but note it I will

[Xamonas Chegwé]

Individual apes are certainly objective, in as much as they are individual animals,

This is exactly what I meant. They exist objectively, whether we are aware of them or not, whether we classify them or not. They're subject to evolution so they're not fixed, but they still exist objectively. That's the point of contention I have with your statement, "if morals can evolve, they are not fixed and objective", bearing in mind you were discussing this from a perspective of if morals have a genetic basis. I'm saying anything that evolves genetically exists objectively even though it isn't fixed. I also explained why I don't include memetic concepts such as 'morals' in that.

Individual apes cannot evolve. Their genotype and phenotype are fixed. They are individuals. Apes as a whole can evolve but in so doing, will not necessarily always be apes. There could come a time, as there certainly was when the ancestors of apes where approaching apehood, when it becomes increasingly difficult to categorise individual animals as ape or not-ape. This is why I say that 'ape' is not an objective thing - it is an arbitrary definition that happens to fit a specific group of animals rather well at the moment.

[charlou]

If a certain behavior were to be hardwired into your genes, you wouldn't be morally culpable. It wouldn't be a moral issue at all, it'd be a medical one. You can't be held morally responsible for something that you didn't choose.

This is true.

I think our sentience, our self awareness and our awareness of the concept of what is desirable and acceptable among our peers is what informs our ability to behave according to cultural mores (morals). We need time as developing humans (developing from infants into adulthood) to experience the things that will inform our ability to behave according to cultural mores; things such as positive and negative cultural reinforcement, whether overt physically and verbalised cues, or more subtle subconsciously picked up cues. We also need time on a case by case basis to consider our options. Impulsive behaviour is not always socially deemed morally acceptable behaviour. Considered behaviour is not always socially deemed morally acceptable, either.

[FBM]

If a certain behavior were to be hardwired into your genes, you wouldn't be morally culpable. It wouldn't be a moral issue at all, it'd be a medical one. You can't be held morally responsible for something that you didn't choose.

This is true.

I think our sentience, our self awareness and our awareness of the concept of what is desirable and acceptable among our peers is what informs our ability to behave according to cultural mores (morals). We need time as developing humans (developing from infants into adulthood) to experience the things that will inform our ability to behave according to cultural mores; things such as positive and negative cultural reinforcement, whether overt physically and verbalised cues, or more subtle subconsciously picked up cues. We also need time on a case by case basis to consider our options. Impulsive behaviour is not always socially deemed morally acceptable behaviour. Considered behaviour is not always socially deemed morally acceptable, either.

Hmmm. What sort of morality would you expect to find in the hypothetical (and sometimes real) child raised by wolves, or other wild animals?

[gooseboy]

To try to say that "objective morality" means the same as "absolute morality" seems pretty ridiculous to me.

I've just quoted the aspects of the definition that I think are most relevant to my assertion that 'objective morality' in a philosophical sense is the same as 'absolute morality'.

You say morals are purely subjective. I say no, there's a way to judge them objectively. So then you come back with objective means the same as absolute and morals aren't absolute so therefore... what exactly?

I don't think you understand. I have not just 'come back with' objective means the same as absolute. Right from the start of this thread (or I should say, even before the start of this thread) I have been thinking of 'objective morality' as meaning the same thing as 'absolute morality'. In a philosophical discussion (as I understand it) that is how the question of objective vs subjective morality is generally discussed. I'm honestly not just throwing it in there at the last minute to score points against you or to piss you off or to 'win' an argument.

How can 'objective morality' mean the same thing as 'absolute morality' when it is possible that morals are objective (or at least partly objective) but are not absolute? I would hazard a guess that you are used to arguing with theists who believe in both absolute and objective morality. But there is no dichotomy between subjective and absolute, so you can have morals that aren't subjective but also aren't absolute.

The 'object' of perception or thought is absolutely pure in its independence from subjective perceptions. Thus, objective morality needs to exist independently from our subjective perceptions. In your case you are subjectively deciding that 'an evolutionary viewpoint in the environment that it's in' is the best 'objective' way to compare moral values.

Where did I say that an evolutionary viewpoint is the best way to judge moral values? The answer is that I didn't, and your argument is pure strawman. All I have said, which I will repeat again, is that there is a way to objectively judge morals, thus they are not purely subjective.

I'm sorry I misunderstood you as I did think you were advocating the evolutionary criterion as being the best way but I now accept that is not your argument. However, whether or not an evolutionary viewpoint is the best way to judge moral values is actually completely irrelevant to my argument and as such my argument is not pure strawman.


I'll restate:
The 'object' of perception or thought is absolutely pure in its independence from subjective perceptions. Thus, objective morality needs to exist independently from our subjective perceptions. It does not matter whether or not the chosen 'way' is the 'best way', if somebody subjectively chooses 'a way to objectively judge morals' then the ultimate judgement is still subjective in an absolute sense.

Do you understand what I'm trying to say? Perhaps I'm not being clear enough?

I don't understand it at all. I have never chosen a way to objectively judge morals, all I have done is stated that there is a way that at least some morals can be objectively compared. You can either agree with this or not. If you do agree then it follows that not all morals are purely subjective.

[charlou]

Individual apes are certainly objective, in as much as they are individual animals,

This is exactly what I meant. They exist objectively, whether we are aware of them or not, whether we classify them or not. They're subject to evolution so they're not fixed, but they still exist objectively. That's the point of contention I have with your statement, "if morals can evolve, they are not fixed and objective", bearing in mind you were discussing this from a perspective of if morals have a genetic basis. I'm saying anything that evolves genetically exists objectively even though it isn't fixed. I also explained why I don't include memetic concepts such as 'morals' in that.

Individual apes cannot evolve. Their genotype and phenotype are fixed. They are individuals. Apes as a whole can evolve but in so doing, will not necessarily always be apes.

Yes. Even so, they exist objectively, even though their species are subject to evolution. They don't only exist as concepts of human awareness. Anyone who thinks that's the case is engaging in anthropocentric bias.

Even extinct species existed objectively (that is regardless of our subjective awareness/opinion about them. Even if we never found evidence such as fossils for the existence of specific extinct species and were therefore unaware of their existence those species would still have existed objectively. There could be extinct species we have not stumbled across any evidence for, yet they would still have existed objectively. Species are still being discovered that we were unaware of until their discovery. They existed objectively regardless of our ignorance (lack of knowledge) of their existence.

[gooseboy]

gooseboy,

I think it's important to denote the difference between subjective and situational here. To say that the morally correct decision is relative to the specific details of one's situation does not imply that that morality is subjective. Though I'm not quite sure if you are advocating for situational dependent morality or not (though it appears so since the morality you're proposing seems to be based on outcome rather than being deontological.)

I agree with you on this point, I think. Really, the only argument I am trying to make here is whether or not morals are purely subjective. (You may have noticed that I think they're not. ) As for the broader context of objective vs subjective morals I'm still a bit undecided, although I do believe that at least some morals are subjective (such as the allowable amount of skin to show when walking down the street).

[gooseboy]

This would only hold though if there were a genetic basis for morals. Otherwise, the morality could not be inherited. Obviously, any gene that produced an expressed phenotype of suicidal psychopathy would probably be at a disadvantage in being carried forward - but I would be very surprised to learn of a genetic link to such cases.

Did you read the reference I gave you in the God Delusion? If not, here it is again, on page 214 there is a heading Does our moral sense have a Darwinian origin? Also, an aversion to incest seems to be inbuilt. If this were not the case then people would need to be taught that incest is wrong or they would not think it wrong. I see no evidence that (at least the vast majority of) people need to be taught that incest is wrong. (And just to be completely clear, I am not saying that incest is wrong, just that most people think it is wrong, and this seems to be inbuilt.)

You are talking about behaviours here as well. Morals are our perceptions of our potential behaviours as good or bad, not those behaviours themselves. It would be perfectly possible for someone to hold the opinion that murdering his family and then killing himself was not wrong but still never to carry out the act. Just as I don't consider homosexuality to be wrong but I would be unlikely to shag a bloke.

Maybe I don't understand what you're trying to say here. Are you proposing that there's no causal link between morals and behaviours? Do you really think that someone who thinks, say, that murder is moral is no more likely to murder than someone who thinks that it's immoral (everything else being equal of course)?