Is there such a thing as objective morality?

[Drewish]

I think I need to clarify what I'm saying. I am not saying that human beings can grasp all aspects of morality objectively. Indeed we still haven't grasped much of reality yet. My view of a table is different from your view of the table. My assertion is not that any one person's individual morality is objective. I am claiming that there are objective rules that determine what is right and what is wrong that we all then can only apply subjectively based our own limited knowledge and perception of the world. Even if we cannot determine what all of those rules are, the mere fact of there being any rules at all would dictate that some moralities are invalid, and that therefore some things about morality could be objectively known. I predicate this on the ASSUMPTION that metaphysics is absolute crap. If metaphysics is allowed, then nobody can say anything about anything for certain and postmodernism is the only logical solution. However if morality is confined to existing purely inside this universe, then by that very fact it is subject to the same rules and laws that govern reality.

[FBM]

andrew, you keep using that word 'metaphysics'. I do not think that word means what you think it means.

Metaphysics investigates principles of reality transcending those of any particular science. Cosmology and ontology are traditional branches of metaphysics. It is concerned with explaining the fundamental nature of being and the world.[1] Someone who studies metaphysics would be called either a "metaphysician"[2] or a "metaphysicist".[3]

The word derives from the Greek words μετά (metá) (meaning "beyond" or "after") and φυσικά (physiká) (meaning "physical"), "physical" referring to those works on matter by Aristotle in antiquity. The prefix meta- ("beyond") was attached to the chapters in Aristotle's work that physically followed after the chapters on "physics", in posthumously edited collections. Aristotle himself did not call these works Metaphysics. Aristotle called some of the subjects treated there "first philosophy".

A central branch of metaphysics is ontology, the investigation into what types of things there are in the world and what relations these things bear to one another. The metaphysician also attempts to clarify the notions by which people understand the world, including existence, objecthood, property, space, time, causality, and possibility...

http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Metaphysics

By asserting an objective basis for morality, you're asserting the existence of objective facts that are independent of an individual's perception. This is an ontological statement about the nature of reality apart from its physical constituents. It's metaphysics. See also "The Metaphysics of Morals": http://philosophy.eserver.org/kant/intr ... morals.txt

[Drewish]

Metaphysics investigates principles of reality transcending those of any particular science.

Nope that's exactly what I thought it meant, and it is crap. The war against metaphysics is precisely what the secular movement is all about! So long as we are willing to say that you can found your philosophy on an assertion that is not testable by its very nature of being outside of science (Such as *ahem* God) then you can believe whatever the hell you want. That's why philosophies that are based on metaphysics must not be accepted as valid, otherwise theists have a valid logically defensible argument for presenting their bat-shit-crazy religion as being equivalent to any other morality suggested.

[starr]

Here's where we differ. I am not saying that human beings can grasp all aspects of morality objectively. Indeed we can not grasp even reality objectively. My view of a table is different from your view of the table. My assertion is not that any one person's individual morality is objective. I am claiming that there are objective rules that determine what is right and what is wrong, and even if we cannot determine what all of those rules are, the mere fact that there are any rules at all dictates that some moralities are invalid, and that therefore some things about morality can be objectively known. I predicate this on the ASSUMPTION that metaphysics is absolute crap. If metaphysics is allowed, then nobody can say anything about anything for certain and postmodernism is the only logical solution. However if morality is confined to existing purely inside this universe, then by that very fact it is subject to the same rules and laws that govern reality.

OK. I think I understand where you are coming from more clearly now and where our primary disagreement is. The sentence I've highlighted in green in your post is the crux of the disagreement I think.

I don't want to put words into your mouth but in order to discuss this with you I need to fully understand your position. From what you've said above, my interpretation of your position is:

1. The are rules that determine what is right and what is wrong.
2. These rules exist in the world independently from the human mind. That means that if no human minds existed, that these rules would still exist.
3. Humans may or may not be able to determine what all of these rules are.
4. Because of the existence of these objective rules, we can conclude that some moralities are invalid and that some things about morality can be objectively known.


Please correct me if I have misinterpreted your position.


In response to my interpretation of your position:
I think that any rules people use to determine what is right and what is wrong are entirely subjective. These rules do not exist independently from the human mind, they are a contruct invented by the human mind. For a set of objective rules to exist independently of the human mind they need to be composed of physical matter. I don't believe in anything supernatural and what you are describing in terms of objective rules seem to be a supernatural construct to me.

Therfore, even though I have some very strong moral opinions, I realise that my moral opinions are subjective and that all moral opinions are subjective. That doesn't mean that I don't have morals or that I don't care about morals. It just means that I realise humans determine both individually and as a society what their morals are. The origin is the human mind rather than some supernatural telepathically absorbed 'rules'. We make the rules, they don't exist independently from us.

[gooseboy]

Morality is wholly dependent on human thought and feelings. It is therefore subjective.

Can you reference any studies that support that? Did morality not evolve in humans, and as such would it not be based (at very least in part) on what helps genes survive? IE for a particular set of morals to survive they would need to be useful to the individual. Wouldn't this make (at least some) morals not subjective?

Some people choose their morals with little thought, they just accept what their parents teach them.

Do people choose their morals? Do you then dispute John Mikhail's results (which have been tested on more than 200,000 individuals according to wiki) for the Trolley problem?

(Note, I don't doubt that some 'morals' are 'chosen' or are societal, but I find it hard to believe that all morality is subjective.)

[Drewish]

1. The are rules that determine what is right and what is wrong.
2. These rules exist in the world independently from the human mind. That means that if no human minds existed, that these rules would still exist.
3. Humans may or may not be able to determine what all of these rules are.
4. Because of the existence of these objective rules, we can conclude that some moralities are invalid and that some things about morality can be objectively known.

Please correct me if I have misinterpreted your position.

Clarification on #1. I'm stating that because morality is confined to existing within the universe that it must obey all the laws that apply to reality, and that that is why morality has rules.

For a set of objective rules to exist independently of the human mind they need to be composed of physical matter. I don't believe in anything supernatural and what you are describing in terms of objective rules seem to be a supernatural construct to me.

I think my clarification should clear that up.

[Trolldor]

Morality has to have rules... that depends on what angle you take. They have biological rules, there has to be some level of consciousness to form morality, but there are no rules as to what form that morality takes. You have yet to explain how 'morality' is an objective system, rather than an objective construct with a subjective system.

[FBM]

Metaphysics investigates principles of reality transcending those of any particular science.

Nope that's exactly what I thought it meant, and it is crap. The war against metaphysics is precisely what the secular movement is all about! So long as we are willing to say that you can found your philosophy on an assertion that is not testable by its very nature of being outside of science (Such as *ahem* God) then you can believe whatever the hell you want. That's why philosophies that are based on metaphysics must not be accepted as valid, otherwise theists have a valid logically defensible argument for presenting their bat-shit-crazy religion as being equivalent to any other morality suggested.

"...any particular science." Not any science. That phrase means that it draws indiscriminately from whichever branch of science offers the most advanced knowledge. It seems to me that you've somehow equated 'metaphysics' with unbounded speculation and wishful thinking. You obviously didn't take the time to read carefully what I posted and linked to. (selection bias?) It is through metaphysical enquiry and investigation that we've arrived at the conclusion that there is no god. If we only had science, we wouldn't be able to make that statement with confidence. Why? Because the absence of a god isn't empirically-based data. IOW, we can't experience or test for the absence of a creator-god. By deriving certain metaphysical principles from that data, however, we can adopt the reasonable metaphysical position that there is a very low probability of a creator-god, and you apparently share this metaphysical position. Please check on your definition of metaphysics. It doesn't seem to match the definition used by scholars.

I'm not surprised that you don't believe me; I'm just another annoying, know-it-all twat on the Internet. OK, I do have a degree in Philosophy, so I could claim a little authority on the topics of ethics, morality, metaphysics, logic, ontology, epistemology, etc, but I won't. Since you won't believe or even seriously consider the accuracy of the information I've provided (selection bias?), how about considering the words of a prominent theoretical physicist on whether or not metaphysics means what you think it means?:

Every scientific approach rests upon the strong metaphysical belief that in the universe we encounter Logos.

http://diacentro.physics.auth.gr/rtalks ... idis01.doc

If metaphysics were so antithetical to science, as you erroneously perceive it to be, it would be quite odd for a physicist to make such a statement, wouldn't it? Please be more careful about your word choice. It causes a lot of unnecessary derails when your definitions don't match the rest of ours.

[starr]

Morality is wholly dependent on human thought and feelings. It is therefore subjective.

Can you reference any studies that support that? Did morality not evolve in humans, and as such would it not be based (at very least in part) on what helps genes survive? IE for a particular set of morals to survive they would need to be useful to the individual. Wouldn't this make (at least some) morals not subjective?

It is likely that the capacity for morality evolved in humans, just like the capacity for advanced reasoning evolved. However, it is highly unlikely that any particular set of morals evolved . Also, just because a gene or a set of genes survive during the evolutionary process does not necessarily mean they are useful to the individual. Sometimes a gene survives, not because it is useful per se, but because it is linked with a 'useful' gene and goes along for the ride (to put it in a simplistic way). It does not follow logically that just because a particular gene has survived that it is necessarily useful to the individual.

Some people choose their morals with little thought, they just accept what their parents teach them.

Do people choose their morals? Do you then dispute John Mikhail's results (which have been tested on more than 200,000 individuals according to wiki) for the Trolley problem?

(Note, I don't doubt that some 'morals' are 'chosen' or are societal, but I find it hard to believe that all morality is subjective.)

I looked up some information about Mikhails theory and have quoted some information I found below. The part I've highlighted in green is particularly pertinent. The research is theorising that we have evolved a part of our brain that is set up to develop morals. There is still a lack of evidence to support this theory, I have no opinion on whether or not they will find enough evidence to support it. From what I've read, there does not seem to be anything in the theory to support the notion that we have evolved any particular set of morals or moral rules. Unless there's something you're aware of that I've missed?

When I say 'chosen' I don't necessarily mean in the sense that you choose what to have on your sandwich for lunch. Perhaps using the word 'accept' their morals based on what society teaches them would be a better choice of words. The choosing I referred to is in the acceptance without question of the moral code they are taught. Other people question everything about the morals they are taught. Hence the subjectivity.


http://www.law.georgetown.edu/news/docu ... user-2.pdf

Hauser begins the book with a bold theoretical claim: “we evolved a moral instinct, a capacity that naturally grows within each child, designed to generate rapid judgments about what is morally right or wrong based on an unconscious grammar of action.” Of course, the author does not believe that we are born with specific moral rules (e.g., “do not cheat on your spouse”), because this would not explain why different cultures have created different moral systems. Rather, his theory draws from an analogy to linguistics. In the 1950s, the MIT linguist Noam Chomsky began developing the view that humans possess a “language organ” that contains a universal grammar. This grammar, in Chomsky’s explanation, consists of universal syntactical rules and parameters that encode differences among languages. Learning the syntax of a specific language mainly involves setting the parameters of the universal grammar to the language-specific values. Using this theory as a blueprint for his own account, Hauser argues that we are endowed with an abstract universal moral grammar with parameters that encode cultural differences. [This argument has also been developed by John Mikhail in his doctoral dissertation (1)
and a forthcoming book (2).] The moral grammar along with a variety of cognitive competencies
underlies our morality.

Unfortunately, Hauser never explains what the rules and parameters of the moral grammar precisely look like. Findings that show that different cultures generate
similar intuitions (as in the trolley problems above) are viewed as evidence for universal rules, whereas other studies showing huge cultural differences are interpreted as evidence for the role of parameters. This flexibility of the theory makes it hard to envision what could constitute a strict empirical test of the theory.

Indeed, many of the empirical studies that Hauser discusses could even be taken as evidence against the moral grammar view. The book is full of examples showing that different cultures have different notions of fairness. In most cultures harming other people is prohibited, but in some cultures female family members may be killed when they are suspected to be unchaste. Some societies allow their members to brutally kill the children of neighbor-ing tribes or to torture crime suspects. In the chapter on the trolley problem, Hauser argues that an abstract rule explaining our intuitions could be that harming people can be justified when the harmful act is not intended, but is rather a bad side effect of an act with good intentions. Again there are counterexamples: Some people feel that it is okay to hurt somebody’s leg to save a life or that a physician should be held accountable for bad side effects that he did not intend. Hauser would probably argue that these are all parametric variations, but if so it is then hard to discern the underlying common abstract moral rule.

Although Hauser is not shy about his theoretical preferences, he presents alternative theories in a fair manner. One plausible alternative postulates cultural learning
mechanisms (3) that draw on various general capacities, such as our abilities to understand other people as intentional agents and to imitate them—to mention just two of the capacities whose existence in children and some animals Hauser eloquently describes. Moral judgments need not be based entirely on reflective applications of explicit rules. They may draw on unconscious analogical reasoning, simple heuristics, and gut feelings. General cognitive mechanisms, such as attention, may also influence our judgments. For example, different causal representations of similar situations may highlight different aspects of the moral dilemmas (4).

Some of these components may be in part innate, although they need not necessarily be specific to the moral domain. Constraints on moral systems may also have historically developed as a result of cultural evolution. For example, it is hard to imagine a society that would survive if it created a moral system that punishes cooperation. Thus, there is certainly a place for both nature and nurture, and Hauser and his critics would agree that various competencies that are not specific to morality play an important role. Where they part company is on whether a dedicated cognitive system devoted to a moral grammar is also required (5, 6).

Regardless of how convincing Hauser’s theory eventually proves, its boldness turns reading Moral Minds into a suspenseful experience. Near the end, Hauser reveals that he does not expect a definitive resolution soon and that he considers his theory a framework for future research rather than a summary of a finished project: “By leaning on the linguistic analogy, however, we open the door to these questions, and wait for the relevant theoretical insights and observations.”

[FBM]

Morality is wholly dependent on human thought and feelings. It is therefore subjective.

Can you reference any studies that support that? Did morality not evolve in humans, and as such would it not be based (at very least in part) on what helps genes survive? IE for a particular set of morals to survive they would need to be useful to the individual. Wouldn't this make (at least some) morals not subjective?

I know you weren't addressing me, so I hope you don't mind if I add a thought here.

We already have a very powerful concept that describes changes in the genes of populations in the struggle for survival of the species. Trying to use it in the way you suggest is a misapplication of the theory very much like that of Social Darwinism http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Social_Darwinism, which isn't Darwinism at all, and which Darwin rejected. Memetics (http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Memetics) may be more along the lines of what you're describing. I may have misunderstood what you meant, so forgive me if that's the case.

[starr]

Morality is wholly dependent on human thought and feelings. It is therefore subjective.

Can you reference any studies that support that? Did morality not evolve in humans, and as such would it not be based (at very least in part) on what helps genes survive? IE for a particular set of morals to survive they would need to be useful to the individual. Wouldn't this make (at least some) morals not subjective?

I know you weren't addressing me, so I hope you don't mind if I add a thought here.

We already have a very powerful concept that describes changes in the genes of populations in the struggle for survival of the species. Trying to use it in the way you suggest is a misapplication of the theory very much like that of Social Darwinism http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Social_Darwinism, which isn't Darwinism at all, and which Darwin rejected. Memetics (http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Memetics) may be more along the lines of what you're describing. I may have misunderstood what you meant, so forgive me if that's the case.

I was thinking about saying something about memes but must have forgotten to actually do it . Thanks for adding that MBF.

[FBM]

I was thinking about saying something about memes but must have forgotten to actually do it . Thanks for adding that MBF.

[gooseboy]

Morality is wholly dependent on human thought and feelings. It is therefore subjective.

Can you reference any studies that support that? Did morality not evolve in humans, and as such would it not be based (at very least in part) on what helps genes survive? IE for a particular set of morals to survive they would need to be useful to the individual. Wouldn't this make (at least some) morals not subjective?

I know you weren't addressing me, so I hope you don't mind if I add a thought here.

We already have a very powerful concept that describes changes in the genes of populations in the struggle for survival of the species. Trying to use it in the way you suggest is a misapplication of the theory very much like that of Social Darwinism http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Social_Darwinism, which isn't Darwinism at all, and which Darwin rejected. Memetics (http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Memetics) may be more along the lines of what you're describing. I may have misunderstood what you meant, so forgive me if that's the case.

No probs about adding your thoughts. I don't know if what I said is like Social Darwinism - I was merely saying that morals must be useful to the individual (not to society) for them to survive. Is this incorrect?

It is likely that the capacity for morality evolved in humans, just like the capacity for advanced reasoning evolved.

Agreed - and in order to do so they would have to be useful to the individual.

I don't doubt that many morals are taught. But the trolley problem is interesting. Quoting from wiki:

The trolley problem was first imported into cognitive science from philosophy in a systematic way by John Mikhail[7], who began testing trolley problems on different groups of people, including children and people from non-Western cultures, when he was a visiting graduate student in MIT’s Department of Brain and Cognitive Sciences. Mikhail hypothesized that factors such as gender, age, education level, and cultural background would have little influence on the judgments people make, in part because those judgments are generated by an unconscious “moral grammar” that is analogous in some respects to the unconscious linguistic grammars that support ordinary language use.[8] Preliminary results pointed in that direction, and Mikhail’s initial findings have been confirmed and expanded to more than 200,000 individuals from over 100 countries.

(My bolds)

It appears to Mikhail that some moral structure (or grammar as he calls it) is ingrained in people regardless of their culture. This, I have little doubt, must have evolved because it is useful to the individual (I think that saying it may have come along as a free ride is a bit of a cop out). Would this not imply that this moral structure/grammar objectively better than other moral structures/grammars that didn't survive evolution?

[FBM]

No probs about adding your thoughts. I don't know if what I said is like Social Darwinism - I was merely saying that morals must be useful to the individual (not to society) for them to survive. Is this incorrect?

Hmm. Good question. Do immoral people procreate at a lesser rate than moral people? If I look around me, I'm not sure about that. But if it were true, then adhering to a society's morals would not depend on exactly what those morals were. The only thing that would matter was that the individual conformed to whatever moral the general population espoused. That lends weight to the relativity/subjective nature of morality.

The same individual transplanted into a different society could very well be persecuted for adhering to the morals of his/her parent society. This is what happens in many clashes of cultures, for example, the ongoing Muslim/Judeo-Christian clash. Also, choosing a different set of morals while living within one's parent society would also invite persecution. Now, the individual who rejects the parent society's morals (acting immorally by the parent society's moral code) may very well be acting morally by our current moral standards. A Nazi giving aid to Jews during WWII, for example.

That approach doesn't seem to add any weight to the argument for objective morality. I'd be glad to hear any objections to this, tho.

[gooseboy]

@MBF - I don't doubt that many or most morals are subjective - certainly in the cases of culture clashes the morals appear to be fairly subjective. The only point that I was trying to make was that some moral values are better at replicating themselves (through genes) than others, and I base this mostly on the trolley problem (which, insistently, I first read in one of Richard Dawkins' books (probably the god delusion) where he's discussing morals). The trolley problem seems to indicate that people have some intrinsic moral structure that isn't taught that governs how they will decide in which direction to send a trolley given the consequences of their actions. Thus if these morals are better at replicating themselves than other morals then I'm asking isn't there an objective basis for at least some morals.

To give another (fairly stupid) example. If it was considered moral for a mother to eat her children on their 2nd birthday, then it would be pretty obvious this would be a huge disadvantage to the mother. Likely the genes of anyone who thought the eating of their children was moral would not replicate too well. Can we therefore say objectively that eating your children on their second birthday isn't moral? Or at least say that there is an objective basis for us to think that eating our own children isn't moral?