Determinism and free will

[pErvinalia]

No. Try for a less lame reductio ad absurdum

Why not? It fits the definition perfectly.

[Scott1328]

Who is attempting refute determinism? It is you have failed to demonstrate how determinism rules out free will

As the OP of this thread argued, I'm saying that a combination of chaos (extreme sensitivity to initial conditions) plus quantum mechanics (uncertainties in initial positions/momenta) means that the extreme, Lagrangian version of determinism cannot stand. Not even a being with infinite perception and computational power (who cannot exist anyway) could, by "knowing" the exact positions & momenta of every particle in the universe at some point in time, compute future states to perfection. If real determinism is anything, it is that; an idealised declaration of an unrealisable mathematical perfection in a real, stochastic universe.

This lack of full determinism means that the classical objection to free will disappears. I concede that a lack of determinism is not necessary to allow for Dennett's version, which I think is a pragmatically useful way to encompass the idea of ethical choices by reasonably autonomous agents.

So what you are really arguing is that determinism and indeterminism are indistinguishable in the universe we actually observe. To argue for either one is the nothing more than metaphysical wankery. And to further argue that either position supports or refutes free will is even more self-indulgent wankery.

Yes I agree with what you are arguing for.

[Scott1328]

No. Try for a less lame reductio ad absurdum

Why not? It fits the definition perfectly.

Not even close. Try harder.

[pErvinalia]

Again, why is it not close? Just saying so isn't a cogent rebuttal.

[Scott1328]

I am sorry, I was putting effort into my responses commensurate to the effort you put into your "objection"

Your auto-correct on your phone could not be construed to be an agent under any resonable definition of the term.

[JimC]

I am sorry, I was putting effort into my responses commensurate to the effort you put into your "objection"

Your auto-correct on your phone could not be construed to be an agent under any resonable definition of the term.

Compared to a rock, it is an agent, but a very, very minimal agent. Dennett's main point is that "agency", correlating to a certain extent with freedom to act, comes in degrees, either in living things or our software creations. Non-living objects have zero agency. A chimp has a much higher level of agency than a jellyfish, and a bot roaming the internet has a higher degree of agency than the auto-correct program.

[JimC]

In a similar vein, I suggest that determinism is not all or nothing, but also comes in degrees. I have already given arguments to the effect that full determinism, where every part of the entire universe is completely determined, in the sense of Lagrange, is ruled out by a combination of chaos theory and quantum effects. This is not to say that significant chunks of the universe are not heavily determined; planetary motion (ignoring occasional chaotic perturbations from foreign bodies) is highly determined. Given the state of the solar system at a certain time, to a certain level of accuracy, one can confidently predict a state a long way into the future, to a similar level of accuracy.

In the living world, the trajectories of some living things are fairly highly determined. For someone who knows a lot about the growth rate of lichens, given a particular lichen with diameter x on a rock, one can fairly confidently predict its future diameter in y years time, barring accidents. For humans, the life events in a long term prisoner in a jail with fixed routines can also be predicted, at least with more chance of being correct than a free citizen's life trajectory. The higher degree to which an organism is determined, the lower the possible degrees of freedom of both action, and very probably, cognition.

[pErvinalia]

I am sorry, I was putting effort into my responses commensurate to the effort you put into your "objection"

Your auto-correct on your phone could not be construed to be an agent under any resonable definition of the term.

Definitions
from The American Heritage® Dictionary of the English Language, 4th Edition

n. One that acts or has the power or authority to act.
n. One empowered to act for or represent another: an author's agent; an insurance agent.
n. A means by which something is done or caused; instrument.
n. A force or substance that causes a change: a chemical agent; an infectious agent.

How does it not fit that definition?

[pErvinalia]

I am sorry, I was putting effort into my responses commensurate to the effort you put into your "objection"

Your auto-correct on your phone could not be construed to be an agent under any resonable definition of the term.

Compared to a rock, it is an agent, but a very, very minimal agent. Dennett's main point is that "agency", correlating to a certain extent with freedom to act, comes in degrees, either in living things or our software creations. Non-living objects have zero agency. A chimp has a much higher level of agency than a jellyfish, and a bot roaming the internet has a higher degree of agency than the auto-correct program.

Yep. I think Scott is just realising the absurdity of defining free will that way. What's the point of the concept of free will if it can apply to software? It's been reduced to a meaningless absurdity.

[JimC]

I am sorry, I was putting effort into my responses commensurate to the effort you put into your "objection"

Your auto-correct on your phone could not be construed to be an agent under any resonable definition of the term.

Compared to a rock, it is an agent, but a very, very minimal agent. Dennett's main point is that "agency", correlating to a certain extent with freedom to act, comes in degrees, either in living things or our software creations. Non-living objects have zero agency. A chimp has a much higher level of agency than a jellyfish, and a bot roaming the internet has a higher degree of agency than the auto-correct program.

Yep. I think Scott is just realising the absurdity of defining free will that way. What's the point of the concept of free will if it can apply to software? It's been reduced to a meaningless absurdity.

It's because Dennett asserts (and I generally agree with him) is that the original concept of free will was a totally binary thing. Either we had it completely, or we didn't have a trace of it. Examining this concept, hundreds of years of philosophising could not give us an answer; put in such terms, it is an unanswerable question. So, he re-formulates the concept as a variable quantity, and uses an evolutionary (both biological and cultural) approach to examine how it might vary, either for different organisms, or for humans in different political conditions or mental states.

And, perhaps today's software has a low degree of agency, and little of Dennett's free will, but if we end up seeing a true AI emerge, then who knows?

[Scott1328]

I am sorry, I was putting effort into my responses commensurate to the effort you put into your "objection"

Your auto-correct on your phone could not be construed to be an agent under any resonable definition of the term.

Compared to a rock, it is an agent, but a very, very minimal agent. Dennett's main point is that "agency", correlating to a certain extent with freedom to act, comes in degrees, either in living things or our software creations. Non-living objects have zero agency. A chimp has a much higher level of agency than a jellyfish, and a bot roaming the internet has a higher degree of agency than the auto-correct program.

Yep. I think Scott is just realising the absurdity of defining free will that way. What's the point of the concept of free will if it can apply to software? It's been reduced to a meaningless absurdity.

Not absurd at all. It is your own prejudice that presumes to think that "software" cannot have free will. you argue like a dualist.

[pErvinalia]

How does dualism come into what I'm saying? I'm about as anti-dualist as you'll find, as can be evidenced from what I've written in this thread. Nothing has free will, not least software.

You still haven't answered why it's absurd to claim that predictive text is free will under your definition. Indeed, your post above seems to contradict your earlier claim of absurdity.

[Scott1328]

Free will exists under the definition Dennett gave. Your silly little counter example doesn't refute that. It merely helps to demonstrate the Free Will exists along spectrum, as Jim C pointed out.

"But that's not true free will!" You say?

The compatibilist free will Dennett posits has the properties that one commonly attributes to free will without the woo laden baggage. Moral Responsibility being the most important of these.

[JimC]

I think that the reaction against free will by many non-religious people with a scientific viewpoint is because free will itself (the classic version) has long been associated with either religious ideas (god "giving" us free will so we are free to choose between good and evil) or by other rather mystical versions of quantum phenomena (not mine, I hasten to add...)
And I am also fairly sure that many of our choices, decisions and actions are indeed the result of the usual combination of genetics, up-bringing and all our life experiences to date. There is no getting away from that. However, the absolutist "no free will" position seems to take great delight in painting us as robots, whose lives unfold in an inevitable, Lagrangian fashion, as they sneer at our pathetic fantasy that somehow we are in charge...
And I certainly reject, as does Dennett, the Cartesian duality of some form of permanent self, whether non-material or otherwise, sitting somewhere in the brain anxiously pulling levers and turning dials to control the hunk of meat it is trapped within. The conscious self is a useful illusion, something that has evolved within human cognitive structures to allow individuals to more cannily act as clever agents in a competitive world. The neural reality is a shifting swirl of dynamic patterns, level upon level of finely tuned complexity, but with no self other than a fine conceit...
In some ways, what is important is to adopt a stance which allows a better appreciation of the way the behaviour of humans shifts and adjusts so cleverly as we negotiate a very tricky world of other clever agents. I find the general stance of Dennett, which is soundly based on a naturalistic and evolutionary perspective, a useful adjunct to thinking. His version of individuals as agents with important choices they can make is one that allows the possibility of social change more readily than the fatalism implied by a total rejection of free will in any form.

[pErvinalia]

Free will exists under the definition Dennett gave. Your silly little counter example doesn't refute that.

It's not supposed to refute it. It's pointing out how absurd the definition is.