Coito ergo sum wrote:Hermit wrote:Coito ergo sum wrote:Your theory is that the Russians could have lost Stalingrad AND lost Moscow, and it would have had little effect on the war?
Yes, they could have and they would have won in the long run. Without US assistance it would just have taken longer. When the Third Reich attacked, the Soviet Union moved the bulk of its manufacturing facilities to the east of the Urals. They also made up for the inferior quality of their tanks by building them at a multiple quantity that the Germans could produce theirs. Not only that, but while the German tanks stayed out of action once struck, the Russians moved in on their damaged units, and by swapping components between them, had many of the ones apparently knocked out the previous day back in action the next morning. Sometimes they thus reactivated as many as two thirds of the previous day's losses.
Also, don't forget that Napoleon was forced to retreat
after he occupied Moscow.
Well, this is in the realm of speculation, of course, but just because they moved their manufacturing east of the Urals doesn't mean that the Germans wouldn't be able to easily attack that manufacturing, once they had sewn up Western Russia. It seems very likely, to me, that the Germans, having wiped out the Russians in Stalingrad and in Moscow would have (a) demoralized the Russian people, and (b) have nothing stopping them from bombing the fuck out of the Russian manufacturing east of the Urals.
I think your theory is based on the notion that the Germans wouldn't be able to get at the manufacturing base east of the Urals even after they took western Russia.
It's a matter of resources and logistics. The Third Reich had not enough of either. Hitler's mistake was to think he'd be able to repeat his victory through Blitzkrieg in western Europe on a grander scale in the east. He is quoted as saying that Russia was like a house of cards: one kick and it will collapse like one. That is why he never thought to consider either resources or logistics. That's why he sent his army into Russia late in June without any provisions for winter. He expected to have won well before then.
It's a pity that Hitler never did his homework regarding manufacturing capacity and supply-chains. Had he done so, he may have come to the sobering conclusion that Operation Barbarossa was ill-conceived and bound to fail. Alas, he did not. The results were tragic for all concerned.
During the summer and autumn the German columns got bogged in mud. In winter, the Soviets took advantage of their expertise in moving swiftly over ice and snow went on the counter-attack. Meanwhile, demand had already outstripped the logistical lines' capacity to supply necessities. More German soldiers died from the lack of overcoats, thick socks and pullovers that winter than from actual fighting. And then the counter-attacks became more serious. They were no longer concerned with slowing the German armies' advance - they now aimed to drive them back and destroy them. Not only did the Russian military loose the most soldiers of any allied force during that war, but it also inflicted the most damage, using Soviet personnel and Soviet raw materials that were used to build Soviet designed tanks and other weapons. Between 1941 and 1944 95% of German soldiers who died, died on the eastern front.
No, Hitler had a snowflake's chance in hell of conquering anything east of the Ural Mountains. US assistance did not stop him. It just accelerated the advent of the third Reich's demise. Neither the German manufacturing capacity nor German technological superiority were ever going to beat the vast expanses of the Soviet Union, even if the US had refused financial, material and its belated military aid altogether.