BM Brain Theory vs. Neuroscience

[Little Idiot]

When you can account for your own use of the term "physical", we may have something more to talk about.

Beyond the fact that the physical environment is a fact of our experience, what other account could I need?

We do experience it, therefore I am able to use the term and think about it. Whats more, I would be fairly silly not to do so, IMO.

Are we done now?

[Little Idiot]

My whole position is how the mental appears as the physical, that the physical is external to the body, but not eternal to the mind.

Which puts you immediately and firmly in dualistic mode.

So you keep asserting; duality between what and what?

I'll try again.

A. You accept a physical reality and all of R2 (except NS). You call it the PW.

Wrong already; I accept NS except where it tries to build on the materialistic assumption that there is a physical cause for consciousness. I even accept that it is correct for NS to look for this physical cause, I just point out it will not be found, because it doesnt exist.

B. YOU create a dichotomy between the physical and the mental. This part is tricky.

Consider intergers, I create a similar dichotomy between physical and mental as exists between odd numbers and whole numbers. Every odd is also a whole number, but not every interger is an odd number. Every physical thing is also a mental thing, but not all thoughts are physical things.

C. You have created a dualism by separating the mind from the physical world.

Only if I have created a dualism by separating odds as a subset of intergers. Which is silly; they are all numbers - odds are a subset of intergers.
Just so, I have no duality between physical and mental, as they are all mental. Physical is a subset of mental.

The tricky part is that you assign a deeper level of reality to both the mental and the physical and then you deny the physical as existing.

Do you listen to any thing I say. I do not, have never said or implied that I deny the physical.
I frequently deny having denied it, I frequently say its a form of reality.
Look;
The physical is a form of reality. I do not deny that it exists, I assert it does exist. I even say its a form of the (hypothetical) changeless reality.

[SpeedOfSound]

Consider intergers, I create a similar dichotomy between physical and mental as exists between odd numbers and whole numbers. Every odd is also a whole number, but not every interger is an odd number. Every physical thing is also a mental thing, but not all thoughts are physical things.

Excellent! Then you are saying that, like for the subsets of numbers, that the mental is just a different set of physical elements and interactions.

Just fucking with you.

Can you prove your assertion? Or even define mental thing?

Every physical thing is also a mental thing, but not all thoughts are physical things.

[GrahamH]

What are brains for, LI? Why does prodding them and slicing them and infusing the with particular molecules change the experienced world and the 'mental' of the subject?

[SpeedOfSound]

Like I said LI. You are never going to actually get the dualism thing. You can't even read my posts and respond to them. Not really. You just seize a couple of things and word salad around them then it's all okay in your brain.

[jamest]

What are brains for, LI? Why does prodding them and slicing them and infusing the with particular molecules change the experienced world and the 'mental' of the subject?

You know, if we could extinguish the experienced sun, there'd be no light upon the experienced earth. Do you think that such an act would prove that the experienced sun was the cause of the experience of light?

Let me ask you another question. Do you think that experienced brains are the cause of experience?

[GrahamH]

What are brains for, LI? Why does prodding them and slicing them and infusing the with particular molecules change the experienced world and the 'mental' of the subject?

You know, if we could extinguish the experienced sun, there'd be no light upon the experienced earth. Do you think that such an act would prove that the experienced sun was the cause of the experience of light?

Let me ask you another question. Do you think that experienced brains are the cause of experience?

The question remains - what are brains for? Why does prodding them and slicing them and infusing the with particular molecules change the experienced world and the 'mental' of the subject?

[jamest]

What are brains for, LI? Why does prodding them and slicing them and infusing the with particular molecules change the experienced world and the 'mental' of the subject?

You know, if we could extinguish the experienced sun, there'd be no light upon the experienced earth. Do you think that such an act would prove that the experienced sun was the cause of the experience of light?

Let me ask you another question. Do you think that experienced brains are the cause of experience?

The question remains - what are brains for? Why does prodding them and slicing them and infusing the with particular molecules change the experienced world and the 'mental' of the subject?

The question remains - what is the experienced sun for? Why would extinguishing it change the experienced world and the mental of the subject (who will now proceed to die)?

There is an obvious relationship between all experienced things. But to claim that any of them are actual causal agents, as opposed to apparent causal agaents, is actually irrational. An experienced entity cannot be the cause of experience. So, whatever an experienced brain is for, it certainly does not cause experience.

You must be talking about real brains, then.

[GrahamH]

What are brains for, LI? Why does prodding them and slicing them and infusing the with particular molecules change the experienced world and the 'mental' of the subject?

You know, if we could extinguish the experienced sun, there'd be no light upon the experienced earth. Do you think that such an act would prove that the experienced sun was the cause of the experience of light?

Let me ask you another question. Do you think that experienced brains are the cause of experience?

The question remains - what are brains for? Why does prodding them and slicing them and infusing the with particular molecules change the experienced world and the 'mental' of the subject?

The question remains - what is the experienced sun for? Why would extinguishing it change the experienced world and the mental of the subject (who will now proceed to die)?

There is an obvious relationship between all experienced things. But to claim that any of them are actual causal agents, as opposed to apparent causal agaents, is actually irrational. An experienced entity cannot be the cause of experience. So, whatever an experienced brain is for, it certainly does not cause experience.

You must be talking about real brains, then.

If you prefer, why do we experience brains via neuroscience when they are not personally experienceable?

I can experience my eyes and you could argue they play a role in the experience of sight. The same applies for various parts of the body, although there is no obvious reason why we should be so mechanical if the objective is experience, rather than function.

I can't experience my brain. If it plays no part in my experiencing what I can experience why do I have a brain?

Why is there any correlation between a lump of meat and the mind?

[jamest]

I can experience my eyes and you could argue they play a role in the experience of sight. The same applies for various parts of the body, although there is no obvious reason why we should be so mechanical if the objective is experience, rather than function.

I can't experience my brain. If it plays no part in my experiencing what I can experience why do I have a brain?

There's no doubt that experience is designed to yield the appearance of objects with causal influence. The thing is, that the only thing with any causal potency - regards experience - is the creator of that experience. The experienced sun does not cause the experience of light, for instance. Indeed, it is the experience of light and heat that gives the impression of 'sun'. That is, the sensations cause all impressions of things - impressions of things don't cause sensations.

The question "why does it appear that I have a brain that appears to cause experience?" is the same as asking "why is there the appearance of a sun which appears to cause heat and light?". The questions have one of two possible answers:

1) The appearance of the world correlates with some reality that exists externally and independently to that appearance.

2) The creator of experience (which is not commensurate with the reality mentioned in '1') has an agenda that requires that we believe(d) 'we' were in and of the world.

Why is there any correlation between a lump of meat and the mind?

For the same reason that there would have to be a correlation between sun and light - 'the world' is dependent upon correlations.

[colubridae]

There's no doubt that experience is designed to yield the appearance of objects with causal influence.

Oops axiom not based in reality...

Now I seem to recall someone not liking that kind of logic.

Now who could it be?

[jamest]

There's no doubt that experience is designed to yield the appearance of objects with causal influence.

Oops axiom not based in reality...

Now I seem to recall someone not liking that kind of logic.

Now who could it be?

Whoops, forgot that 'design' is a dirty word in these parts. Perhaps I should have said 'manufactured' instead.

[GrahamH]

I can experience my eyes and you could argue they play a role in the experience of sight. The same applies for various parts of the body, although there is no obvious reason why we should be so mechanical if the objective is experience, rather than function.

I can't experience my brain. If it plays no part in my experiencing what I can experience why do I have a brain?

There's no doubt that experience is designed to yield the appearance of objects with causal influence. The thing is, that the only thing with any causal potency - regards experience - is the creator of that experience. The experienced sun does not cause the experience of light, for instance. Indeed, it is the experience of light and heat that gives the impression of 'sun'. That is, the sensations cause all impressions of things - impressions of things don't cause sensations.

The question "why does it appear that I have a brain that appears to cause experience?" is the same as asking "why is there the appearance of a sun which appears to cause heat and light?". The questions have one of two possible answers:

1) The appearance of the world correlates with some reality that exists externally and independently to that appearance.

2) The creator of experience (which is not commensurate with the reality mentioned in '1') has an agenda that requires that we believe(d) 'we' were in and of the world.

Why is there any correlation between a lump of meat and the mind?

For the same reason that there would have to be a correlation between sun and light - 'the world' is dependent upon correlations.

Thank you, and answer of sorts.

The vital difference between the sun and a brain is that the sun is integral to many experiences, but a brain plays no such role, except in the tiny fields of neuroscience and pathology. Who ever experiences a brain? What of the centuries before neuroscience?

Your answer then is that brains are a deception, a fleshy veil to conceal our true nature from those that persist in trying to work it out.

Humanity begins by believing in naive dualism, then, late in the day, people begin to question that and think we might be all-physical. So did all the rules change? Are the physicalists to be further led to physicalism, but immaterialists are to be left with their beliefs?

It isn't a very good deception, is it? There are plenty of people who believe the immaterial soul stuff. If brains are to deceive shouldn't they be more obvious, so that everyone is deceived? Brains could be in transparent skulls and they could flash when we think. That would work much better to ground people in the illusion of a physical being. Why hide the camouflage?

[GrahamH]

There's no doubt that experience is designed to yield the appearance of objects with causal influence.

Oops axiom not based in reality...

Now I seem to recall someone not liking that kind of logic.

Now who could it be?

Whoops, forgot that 'design' is a dirty word in these parts. Perhaps I should have said 'manufactured' instead.

You are certainly relying on some unprovable axioms to make that statement. Shame on you!

How can you talk of 'design'. It is only something you picked up from the experienced world. Don't be misled, get back to Reality.

It is only the appearance of 'design'.

[jamest]

There's no doubt that experience is designed to yield the appearance of objects with causal influence.

Oops axiom not based in reality...

Now I seem to recall someone not liking that kind of logic.

Now who could it be?

Whoops, forgot that 'design' is a dirty word in these parts. Perhaps I should have said 'manufactured' instead.

You are certainly relying on some unprovable axioms to make that statement. Shame on you!

How can you talk of 'design'. It is only something you picked up from the experienced world. Don't be misled, get back to Reality.

I've acknowledged that I haven't [yet] presented grounds for the useage of the word 'design'.

It is only the appearance of 'design'.

Actually, unless reality '2' can be proven, as above, then there is only knowledge of 'manufacture' at play. Even reality '1', above, requires the manufacture of experience.