DaveDodo007... I mean... Rationalskepticism,lol.

[Mr.Samsa]

Ok, I'm still not getting it. Explain to me the difference between empiricism and metaphysics. If they are distinct views of the world/reality (which is what I thought they were) then I don't see how they can have overlapping "evidence".

They aren't distinct views of the world. Empiricism isn't a view of the world at all.

Metaphysics is the area concerned with figuring out what is real (it's a little more diverse than that but we'll stick with that for now because it's easier), and empiricism is an epistemological position (a theory of knowledge). Epistemology and metaphysics are completely different areas of philosophy. In order to figure out what is real, we need to have some idea of what we think constitutes knowledge of what's real. For some people, they adopt an empiricist view of metaphysics and conclude that what is real is what can be observed - which would be a metaphysical position like scientific realism or naive realism.

Empirical evidence is that which we can observe and it is metaphysically neutral in itself. As such, we can't make metaphysical claims based on empirical evidence but if we conclude that reality is best understood under an empiricist view (like scientific realism) then what is metaphysically true is that which we observe (i.e. the empirical evidence becomes metaphysically true).

It would make no sense to say that metaphysics can't overlap with empiricism, or to contrast metaphysics with the empirical, when a number of the most prominent positions within metaphysics are based on the idea that what we observe is true.

[JimC]

Samsa is defining metaphysics very broadly, which is OK as long as you are clear about it. To me, he is using it as shorthand for making clear the epistemological underpinnings of any attempt to make assertions about the universe. In this sense, it is useful, in that unexamined assumptions may come along and bite you on the bum later in your argument...

[Gallstones]

Holyfuckinggawd, the sorting of navel lint.

[Mr.Samsa]

Holyfuckinggawd, the sorting of navel lint.

Meh, I don't really care about the practical utility of a field - if someone makes a stupid claim about it, then I want to correct them. For example, I don't give a shit about the intricate details of 'Great Expectations' but if someone says that Ms Havisham was Pip's secret benefactor then I'll point out that they're wrong, regardless of whether such a fact has any real world impact.

Sorry, spoiler alert.

[Gallstones]

Read it.

[Mr.Samsa]

Read it.

Great Expectations? I did, didn't care for it.

[pErvinalia]

Holyfuckinggawd, the sorting of navel lint.

Go away.

[pErvinalia]

Ok, I'm still not getting it. Explain to me the difference between empiricism and metaphysics. If they are distinct views of the world/reality (which is what I thought they were) then I don't see how they can have overlapping "evidence".

They aren't distinct views of the world. Empiricism isn't a view of the world at all.

Metaphysics is the area concerned with figuring out what is real (it's a little more diverse than that but we'll stick with that for now because it's easier), and empiricism is an epistemological position (a theory of knowledge). Epistemology and metaphysics are completely different areas of philosophy. In order to figure out what is real, we need to have some idea of what we think constitutes knowledge of what's real. For some people, they adopt an empiricist view of metaphysics and conclude that what is real is what can be observed - which would be a metaphysical position like scientific realism or naive realism.

Empirical evidence is that which we can observe and it is metaphysically neutral in itself. As such, we can't make metaphysical claims based on empirical evidence but if we conclude that reality is best understood under an empiricist view (like scientific realism) then what is metaphysically true is that which we observe (i.e. the empirical evidence becomes metaphysically true).

It would make no sense to say that metaphysics can't overlap with empiricism, or to contrast metaphysics with the empirical, when a number of the most prominent positions within metaphysics are based on the idea that what we observe is true.

Fair enough. But you didn't address the wiki quote.

[pErvinalia]

And again (sort of), what exactly is "metaphysical evidence"?

[Mr.Samsa]

Fair enough. But you didn't address the wiki quote.

The wiki quote wasn't there when I replied but my response will be the same. The wiki quote refers to a "non-empirical enquiry", which is what we're referring to as "logical reasoning" or "metaphysical evidence". We've accepted that metaphysical positions can't be decided based on empirical evidence and instead we need logical reasoning, but the distinction is that that doesn't mean metaphysical positions or claims are non-empirical.

If our logical reasoning leads us to conclude that what we observe is metaphysically true, then our metaphysics and empirical evidence are literally interchangeable. Metaphysics in that case cannot be synonymous with the "non-empirical" when it's defined as everything empirical.

Essentially what we are doing is distinguishing between the methods used to reach a conclusion and the conclusion itself. In metaphysics, the methods are non-empirical (because they consist of logical reasoning) but the conclusions can be empirical (because we can conclude that what we observe is real).

[pErvinalia]

Fair enough. But you didn't address the wiki quote.

The wiki quote wasn't there when I replied but my response will be the same. The wiki quote refers to a "non-empirical enquiry", which is what we're referring to as "logical reasoning" or "metaphysical evidence".

So we get to the question above again: What is 'metaphysical evidence'? And how do we enquire into the reality of the world without empiricism? What else is likely to potentially give us access to the true nature of the world?

[Mr.Samsa]

The wiki quote wasn't there when I replied but my response will be the same. The wiki quote refers to a "non-empirical enquiry", which is what we're referring to as "logical reasoning" or "metaphysical evidence".

So we get to the question above again: What is 'metaphysical evidence'?

And the answer is logical evidence/reasoning.

And how do we enquire into the reality of the world without empiricism? What else is likely to potentially give us access to the true nature of the world?

I think the better question is how do we enquire into the reality of the world with empiricism? What would such a thing look like? When you're asking the question of what is real, including whether what we observe is real, how could you possibly find empirical evidence to answer that question?

[pErvinalia]

The wiki quote wasn't there when I replied but my response will be the same. The wiki quote refers to a "non-empirical enquiry", which is what we're referring to as "logical reasoning" or "metaphysical evidence".

So we get to the question above again: What is 'metaphysical evidence'?

And the answer is logical evidence/reasoning.

Hang on, I thought we established earlier that metaphysical evidence is a subset of logical evidence (i.e. not all logical evidence is metaphysical evidence). So what sets metaphysical evidence apart from other types of logical evidence? Is it logical evidence that is concerned with questions of reality? I assume that's what it is. If so, then give me an example of metaphysical evidence. And even more pertinently, give me an example of metaphysical evidence that doesn't rely on empiricism for its premises and yet still provides some part of the proof of some assertion.

And how do we enquire into the reality of the world without empiricism? What else is likely to potentially give us access to the true nature of the world?

I think the better question is how do we enquire into the reality of the world with empiricism? What would such a thing look like? When you're asking the question of what is real, including whether what we observe is real, how could you possibly find empirical evidence to answer that question?

That's dodging the question. I said that empiricism has the potential to perhaps provide us with clues about the true nature of reality. Not that it must, or even does. So answer the question - What else has the potential to give us access to the true nature of reality?

[pErvinalia]

To add to the above reply about metaphysical evidence and logical evidence, what does it functionally mean to separate metaphysical evidence from the rest of logical evidence? It's not quite the same as your example of the separation of biological and chemical evidence, I would say. Both of those disciplines provide us with some information that could be determined at some point to be part of reality, but information that differs in domain. What does metaphysics provide us? What does it tell us about reality that the rest of logical enquiry couldn't? I'm just not seeing what access to "reality" we are getting by employing "metaphysical evidence" as opposed to any other form of logical enquiry.

[Mr.Samsa]

And the answer is logical evidence/reasoning.

Hang on, I thought we established earlier that metaphysical evidence is a subset of logical evidence (i.e. not all logical evidence is metaphysical evidence). So what sets metaphysical evidence apart from other types of logical evidence? Is it logical evidence that is concerned with questions of reality? I assume that's what it is.

Yep, metaphysical evidence is logical evidence applied to metaphysical questions.

If so, then give me an example of metaphysical evidence. And even more pertinently, give me an example of metaphysical evidence that doesn't rely on empiricism for its premises and yet still provides some part of the proof of some assertion.

I can't think of any evidence in metaphysics that relies on empiricism but a few have been discussed in this thread, like pragmatism, parsimony, the unreasonable effectiveness of science, etc. All of those are logical arguments that don't rely on empiricism.

Just to be clear in case there is any confusion, any successful metaphysical theory must explain or account for empirical results. If someone were to say that we're brains in vats but give no reason as to why we observe the world as it is or have the sensations that we do then it's a theory we can treat as wrong, or at least useless. But accounting for empirical evidence obviously doesn't mean that it relies on empirical evidence.

I think the better question is how do we enquire into the reality of the world with empiricism? What would such a thing look like? When you're asking the question of what is real, including whether what we observe is real, how could you possibly find empirical evidence to answer that question?

That's dodging the question. I said that empiricism has the potential to perhaps provide us with clues about the true nature of reality. Not that it must, or even does. So answer the question - What else has the potential to give us access to the true nature of reality?

The answer is metaphysics, no other method is as successful as it is.

But I'm still interested in hearing exactly how you think empiricism could be relevant. Suppose that idealism is true and the world is a product of the imaginations of disembodied minds and that nothing physical at all exists - how do you use empiricism to support this claim?

To add to the above reply about metaphysical evidence and logical evidence, what does it functionally mean to separate metaphysical evidence from the rest of logical evidence?

It simply means that logical evidence is relevant to metaphysics but not to mathematics.

It's not quite the same as your example of the separation of biological and chemical evidence, I would say. Both of those disciplines provide us with some information that could be determined at some point to be part of reality, but information that differs in domain.

The claim about "reality" is irrelevant to the analogy. The point is that they both rely on empirical evidence, yet the empirical evidence in one field is not necessarily relevant to the other.

What does metaphysics provide us? What does it tell us about reality that the rest of logical enquiry couldn't? I'm just not seeing what access to "reality" we are getting by employing "metaphysical evidence" as opposed to any other form of logical enquiry.

..."Metaphysics" is simply the name we give to any kind of logical enquiry into the nature of reality. It's purely descriptive.

The distinction is just that questions into reality aren't necessarily relevant to questions about mathematics. If I demonstrate that substance dualism is impossible due to the logical issues that face claims of an interaction between the physical and non-physical, then this isn't exactly going to help me solve a question about calculating the internal angles of a triangle.