The subjective observer is a fictional character

[SpeedOfSound]

...
Consider your crime example.

this has entailed a rather large collection of decisions,

You made the bulk of those decisions in the past. Consciously of course. You consciously selected and trained the members of your intuitive team and they are now a substantive part of who you are. For that historical whole you are responsible. You are free to make changes in that whole by consciously seeking out and changing the presumptions.

Do you mean 'moral lessons' were learned consciously in the past? Would you agree that we don't have to be conscious of the implications of an event, at the time, for it to inform our decisions later?

A simple example - a child reaches out and touches a flame. It burns, it hurts, lesson learned. But, does the child have to make a conscious decision 'I will never touch a flame again' for its future behaviour to be modified? Conscious attention at the time is probably focussed on the pain, not the implications for future behaviour. Is the conscious attention send resulting in a not so specific message (synapse inhibiting?) 'whatever you just did remember to not do it again'?

Another example - a conversation occurs and nothing particular strikes you at the time. Later a similar subject is being discussed and the profound significance of something said in the previous conversation becomes obvious. The relevant information isn't consciously tagged as significant at the time, and not consciously in-mind next time. The significance is recognised unconsciously and comes to attention.

Hmmm. Have I got my self in a sticky wicket here?

I say no, the child does not make a conscious decision in the case of the flame or in the case of the conversation. I don't want to separate the two things by a solid line. I mean moral cogitation and other ways of learning something.

We may have to tease all this apart a bit and I'm foggy on the issue right now. Help me, help me!

Do you mean 'moral lessons' were learned consciously in the past? Would you agree that we don't have to be conscious of the implications of an event, at the time, for it to inform our decisions later?

I agree here. But you could have thought hard on it at the time and considered moral implications.

[SpeedOfSound]

My brain crashed this morning when MacRuby decided to return an NSDecimalNumber from valueForKeyPath and a float from valueForKey. Fuck! I couldn't tell the Sylvian fissure from the superior temporal sulcus right now. I gotta quit working for my kid and get back to full time neuroscience.

[SpeedOfSound]

Again, my point is that the brain shouldn't be aware of the fact that it is receiving "input from tactile and pain neurons in the body". In fact, the brain shouldn't be aware of anything, other than its own internal states. Upon this realisation, should all brain models be constructed.

Whenever I address the details of your model, as here, I see your failure to realise the limitations that your endeavour places upon you. I'm hoping, eventually, that you actually understand the purpose behind my posts. Then, you might see the value of them.

What I understand is that you are not listening and understanding. The thrust of your objection is that the brain can't know the difference between one type of input and another.

That would be true if NN's were marbles and they were rolling around free in your head. This is hopefully not the case.

As the embryo forms a brain it's like a big empty husk. Radial cells then grow outward like beautiful Japanese fans. Others fan across from side to side. This is what the genes construct.

Neurons form at the core and crawl up the fans veins and deposit themselves in 6 layers. The bottom layer(L6) first and then the second layer crawls up through the first and stops at L5. The layers are differentiated much like the leaf of a plant. This hooks the thalamus up to the cortex and the cortex up to itself in a very well defined way but with some fuzz in the boundaries. Synasthetes know about this fuzz.

Neurons climb from the retina down to the thalamus and various other lesser connections to other parts. Nerves crawl down the spine and hook to muscles. They crawl up the spine from tactile senses and hook to the brainstem.

It's like a giant ant farm with a great choreographer. There are about 300 billion ants. 200 billion of them croak by the end of year one.

That's it! That's how the brain gets it's meanings into the NN's. The rest is the slow etching of the connections inside each little area by experience.

The meaning is in the structure. Therefore james all of your arguments to data are trashed. The model works.

[LaMont Cranston]

GrahamH, We agree we make decisions. It's really not all that that difficult to weigh probabilities; we do it all the time. What part of me is doing that and how? If we are a complete unit, it could be that all parts are utilized. You seem to be arguing that consciousness and unconsciousness are an "either/or" thing, and I don't like your chances of proving that with any degree of certainty, especially if we agree (or at least some of us do) that the transition from conscious, barely conscious and unconscous is seamless.

Much of the information I pick up about people I learned from playing poker. Poker players have "tells" that reveal the kinds of hands they are holding, and people have tells in other parts of life, even people who think they are being anonymous on their computers. Yes, we recognize patterns, and, most likely, we have the capacity to recognize them both consciously and unconsciously. We also file that information away, and we utilize that information on a conscious and unconscious basis.

Is the decision to put attention on something a conscious act predicated by the unconscious parts of our brain. Sure, it's probably like that some (or much) of the time, but is that our only option? Are we limited to having it be just one way? Can we and do we consciously decide to put attention on something in our lives (i.e. another poker player) and come to whatever conclusions we do as a result of that attention? If it has come to our attention, and we are thinking about the object of that attention, it is within the realm of our consciousness, and we can make other conscious decisions from that point. Does that involve consciously accessing our memory banks? Sure, but our consciousness has the ability to do that. It's part of what being conscious is about.

[LaMont Cranston]

SOS, This exchange has been a pleasure for me too! It's funny, but, as a theist, I find that I have much more in common with many atheists than I do with the true believer types. I love science, I believe evolution happened (and is still happening) and I consider myself to be a rational thinker. When I add everything up, it turns out that there is a high probability (for me, that is) that there is an intelligence and an intentionality behind our existence and the existence of everything else. I call that intelligence and intentionality God...or, at the very minimum, part of God.

As for Jesus, I think he was very cool, and he was talking about some great stuff, which ultimately got him in a lot of trouble. Well, you know the story...
I do think that organized religions have screwed-up in many ways, including proselytizing and trying to convert others with a "believe it or else bad things will happen to you" kind of story line. The fact that I believe God exists and have an extremely high opinion of Jesus doesn't mean that either one of those entities have sent me a message that I'm supposed to go through life trying to change the minds of others; they haven't sent me any messages to that effect, and I'm not expecting any. On the other hand, Saul of Tarses probably wasn't expecting to be zapped while he was making that little trip to Damascus...

OK, see you soon.

[GrahamH]

GrahamH, We agree we make decisions. It's really not all that that difficult to weigh probabilities; we do it all the time. What part of me is doing that and how? If we are a complete unit, it could be that all parts are utilized. You seem to be arguing that consciousness and unconsciousness are an "either/or" thing, and I don't like your chances of proving that with any degree of certainty, especially if we agree (or at least some of us do) that the transition from conscious, barely conscious and unconscous is seamless.

Much of the information I pick up about people I learned from playing poker. Poker players have "tells" that reveal the kinds of hands they are holding, and people have tells in other parts of life, even people who think they are being anonymous on their computers. Yes, we recognize patterns, and, most likely, we have the capacity to recognize them both consciously and unconsciously. We also file that information away, and we utilize that information on a conscious and unconscious basis.

Is the decision to put attention on something a conscious act predicated by the unconscious parts of our brain. Sure, it's probably like that some (or much) of the time, but is that our only option? Are we limited to having it be just one way? Can we and do we consciously decide to put attention on something in our lives (i.e. another poker player) and come to whatever conclusions we do as a result of that attention? If it has come to our attention, and we are thinking about the object of that attention, it is within the realm of our consciousness, and we can make other conscious decisions from that point. Does that involve consciously accessing our memory banks? Sure, but our consciousness has the ability to do that. It's part of what being conscious is about.

If you don't particularly take issue with the idea that the difference between un-conscious, sub-conscious and conscious is one of degree, and the brain does at least un-C and sub-C our positions may be very close indeed. It follows that C is not metaphysically different to un-C and sub-C and it may well be that C is a more intensive version of attentional feedback and higher level abstractions / language.

That might take care of the cognitive issues. The brain can do all that. Do you disagree? If so, what, exactly, do you think the brain can't do?

[LaMont Cranston]

GrahamH, It's not about what the brain can't do; it's about how we live our lives. The point I've been trying to make to you is that the decisions we make do consciously determine the quality of our lives. If they are conscious decisions, that means we get to consider options and are responsible for those choices. That is a subjective thing, which means the subjective observer is not fictional, it is real.

It seems to me that from the OP, you have been trying to make a case that we are not responsible major parts of our lives because our brains our unconsciously running the show. If this is a misinterpretation of your arguments, please clarify. I am saying that we do consciously consider options, probabilities and other things...that doesn't mean that it's not also happening, to whatever extent that it is...on an unconscious level. However, if it is happening consciously, it means that we have a certain amount of control over many parts of our lives.

How much control? Which parts? How about whether or not we live happy or miserable lives?

[GrahamH]

GrahamH, It's not about what the brain can't do; it's about how we live our lives. The point I've been trying to make to you is that the decisions we make do consciously determine the quality of our lives. If they are conscious decisions, that means we get to consider options and are responsible for those choices. That is a subjective thing, which means the subjective observer is not fictional, it is real.

It seems to me that from the OP, you have been trying to make a case that we are not responsible major parts of our lives because our brains our unconsciously running the show. If this is a misinterpretation of your arguments, please clarify. I am saying that we do consciously consider options, probabilities and other things...that doesn't mean that it's not also happening, to whatever extent that it is...on an unconscious level. However, if it is happening consciously, it means that we have a certain amount of control over many parts of our lives.

How much control? Which parts? How about whether or not we live happy or miserable lives?

Unfortunately you have badly misunderstood my position, and the thrust of the topic in general. It is not that we aren't conscious and make decisions. It has nothing to do with personal responsibility (although understanding more about the nature of decision making might enable more effective interventions).

The topic is about the likely non-existence of a metaphysical entity - The Subjective Observer. It is assumed by many that even though the brain seems to account for our cognitive faculties, it is baffling how it could account for our Subjective Experience. It is said that subjectivity, the experiencing of qualia, cannot be accounted for by a physical (objective not subjective) cognitive mechanism such as the brain. If the brain cannot account for subjectivity, it is argued, there must be Something Else - a metaphysically distinct, non-material Eau d'Experience or Special Sauce sometimes referred to as a substance of awareness. It is this ghost in the machine, the homunculus in the Cartesian Theatre, the Subjective Observer of Qualia that is doubted here.

The physical brain accounts for an individual POV on the world, since every perception it makes is unique to it, made from it's body location, and interpreted in light of its learned life history.

Do you understand the distinctions?

[jamest]

Another interesting problem that arises, here, is about 'space'. That is, how could NNs accurately account for the space between objects? You say that NNs are responses to objects and events external to the brain. But, how can NNs ever account for the void [of space] between objects? Can there be an NN that accurately represents a void of material influence? Moreover, how can the brain respond to 'a void'?

Show me 'void'.
'Space between objects' is perception of objects correlated with relative position of the observer. This positional information is not mysterious. I look to the left I see a lamp. I look to the right, I see a door. The 'separation' is the angle I must move my head, and the binocular convergence of my eyes, to see one or the other. NNs can respond to such triangulating information. We don't perceive a void, we perceive objects.

Yes, moving the head left to right would entail different scenes - different NNs - but this doesn't answer my underlying question. That is, visual NNs are [deemed to be] responses to the photons emitted from external objects. BUT, the space between objects is devoid of any entities and events, so there can be no corresponding NNs that relate to that space. NNs could only relate to objects, then - not space.

This issue deserves more consideration, I think.

Of course, I'm of the opinion that space (and time) are [absolutely] constructed by the self. But your model cannot embrace this idea, for obvious reasons. Therefore, I'd like to hear your responses to my questions about 'space', here.

Relative location of objects can be inferred from an image

Graham, your model cannot have the brain inferring what is happening in the world. Your model needs to be purely 'robotic' (mechanistic). In fact, my point about space (and time) being constructed by the 'self' should have forewarned you not to reply as you have, because you're just playing the ball exactly where I want it to be played. Do you not see the relationship between assumption/semantics and inference?!

There are responses to objects at differing positions relative to short term memory, that is perceiving motion.

Actually, Graham, your model needs to be devoid of terms such as 'objects'. That is, the brain can only act upon its own brain states (NNs) - not 'objects'.

Flick books tube TVs and movies on film demonstrate that we perceieve motion from instants of perception of objects at different locations.

The fact that we perceive space/time/change, is not the issue. The issue is whether events external to 'me', are the cause of those concepts. And since "Flick books tube TVs and movies on film" are perceptions, you can't use such examples to prove anything, here. You might as well be disproving Berkeley's ideas by kicking a stone with your foot.

Object recognition, location recognition and short term memory account for motion perception.

Your model is about internal brain states, Graham. Therefore, you need to respond to my questions without referring to anything other than internal brain states. Remember, that time/location/distance/objects, are concepts that relate to the external world - not internal brain states.

You have to come up with a model that explains human behaviour with the external world without any reference to that world. Rather, you need to come up with a 'mechanism' that would explain human behaviour without reliance on the prior understanding of concepts such as time/location/distance/objects.

[SpeedOfSound]

That is, visual NNs are [deemed to be] responses to the photons emitted from external objects.

No! That makes no sense as worded! Your post is full of fail as usual. Your post is so far afield of reality and knowledge of the subject that I am left mouth agape. Read my last post and respond with some real arguments that are connected to the subject matter.

You know the story of the guy getting a tour of the university who keeps asking where the university is? This is what you are doing here.

[jamest]

That is, visual NNs are [deemed to be] responses to the photons emitted from external objects.

No! That makes no sense as worded! Your post is full of fail as usual. Your post is so far afield of reality and knowledge of the subject that I am left mouth agape. Read my last post and respond with some real arguments that are connected to the subject matter.

You know the story of the guy getting a tour of the university who keeps asking where the university is? This is what you are doing here.

What?!!

In a model where brain states are responses to the environment, how can visual NNs not be responses from photons emitted by external objects?

[SpeedOfSound]

That is, visual NNs are [deemed to be] responses to the photons emitted from external objects.

No! That makes no sense as worded! Your post is full of fail as usual. Your post is so far afield of reality and knowledge of the subject that I am left mouth agape. Read my last post and respond with some real arguments that are connected to the subject matter.

You know the story of the guy getting a tour of the university who keeps asking where the university is? This is what you are doing here.

What?!!

In a model where brain states are responses to the environment, how can visual NNs not be responses from photons emitted by external objects?

Calling an NN visual is probably the first clue that your thinking is wrong. Calling it a 'response' means you are out in orbit somewhere. Calling a response to a photon indicates that you have a most naive view of what all of this about.

You still have this bowl of legos fallacy.
You are locked into some kind of first order one to one representational fallacy.

My diagnosis of your future understanding is very grim indeed. I don't know where to go with you on this other than to point out that all of your arguments have failed here because of a misunderstanding of the deepest nature. Let me look at one more thing in your previous post.

[SpeedOfSound]

The fact that we perceive space/time/change, is not the issue. The issue is whether events external to 'me', are the cause of those concepts. And since "Flick books tube TVs and movies on film" are perceptions, you can't use such examples to prove anything, here. You might as well be disproving Berkeley's ideas by kicking a stone with your foot.

This paragraph pretty clearly shows that you are off in the corner having an argument with yourself about idealism rather than poking holes in a physical model of self. Why else would you say these things?

You are yelling over and over that we can't use this evidence and can't use that evidence with the common factor being that it is all evidence from the real world and real science. We've been here before haven't we? The place where you toss all empirical evidence in the trash can.

[Surendra Darathy]

You have to come up with a model that explains human behaviour with the external world without any reference to that world.

Not really, James. That's the task you've set for yourself. Don't ask other people to do your homework for you, if (for example) you are trying to write a thesis to obtain a university degree, especially if you don't really believe in the physical existence of other people. You know, as actually physical-physical, rather than as the physical category of an entirely mental universe.

I see that your request rather pushes the outside of the design envelope of what can be done with semantics. Bravo, James. What you're proposing, in a trivially obvious way, here, is to talk about human behavior in the "external world" without using any semaphores for the "external world". This removes every possible context from what any behaviorist could call "human behavior", and probably requires as well that your own idealism cease using semaphores for "human behavior" and "external world". This is very much a case of what is sauce for the goose is sauce for the gander, even alongside claims that you have some very special, special sauce to pour over it all.

The reason for this is that your retention of "external world" and "human behavior" in your own discourse fails the sort of parsimony that one always looks for in a good metaphysics. You have multiplied your entities without the necessity for having done so. If you ask other people to forego reference to the external world, I really think you need to clear away all your own references to it as well, even references to it as "illusory".

Other philosophers and scientists take the notion of the external world as a given (the empirical) and see what they can do with it. You've taken on a challenging task, James, that of creating a discourse that accounts for discourse without access to "external worlds". It will be an impressive feat for you to situate a necessary "subjective observer" in relation to an illusory (but necessary) external world to which you should not really be permitted to refer. Have at it, lad.

[GrahamH]

Another interesting problem that arises, here, is about 'space'. That is, how could NNs accurately account for the space between objects? You say that NNs are responses to objects and events external to the brain. But, how can NNs ever account for the void [of space] between objects? Can there be an NN that accurately represents a void of material influence? Moreover, how can the brain respond to 'a void'?

Show me 'void'.
'Space between objects' is perception of objects correlated with relative position of the observer. This positional information is not mysterious. I look to the left I see a lamp. I look to the right, I see a door. The 'separation' is the angle I must move my head, and the binocular convergence of my eyes, to see one or the other. NNs can respond to such triangulating information. We don't perceive a void, we perceive objects.

Yes, moving the head left to right would entail different scenes - different NNs - but this doesn't answer my underlying question. That is, visual NNs are [deemed to be] responses to the photons emitted from external objects. BUT, the space between objects is devoid of any entities and events, so there can be no corresponding NNs that relate to that space. NNs could only relate to objects, then - not space.

Different scenes does not imply different NNs! The same NN that recognises the tree is scene 1 also recognises it in scene 2 and some of it plays a role in recognising a bush, the cartoon illustration of a tree and an imagined tree.

Throw out your Lego bricks, there are only a wall that blocks your view.

We don't perceive space. Agreed. We perceive locations of objects, not 'void' between them. Perceiving locations of objects gives us 'separation', 'size' distance, absence...

This issue deserves more consideration, I think.

I doubt it, in the context of this topic.

Of course, I'm of the opinion that space (and time) are [absolutely] constructed by the self. But your model cannot embrace this idea, for obvious reasons. Therefore, I'd like to hear your responses to my questions about 'space', here.

Relative location of objects can be inferred from an image

Graham, your model cannot have the brain inferring what is happening in the world. Your model needs to be purely 'robotic' (mechanistic). In fact, my point about space (and time) being constructed by the 'self' should have forewarned you not to reply as you have, because you're just playing the ball exactly where I want it to be played. Do you not see the relationship between assumption/semantics and inference?!

Incorrect. You make this claim purely because you infer, you are 'conscious' and you conclude that 'consciousness' is doing the inferring. At its heart inference is generalising a pattern recognition function. We recognise a pattern, say a tree grows bigger over time. The same pattern is recognised in a bush growing over time, because it involves similar features. Other things may then be recognised as growing over time.

You cannot claim 'inference' for your side James, unless you can show how it works in ways that cannot be realised in brains. The nature of inference seems to fit well with what we know about the nature of brains.

There are responses to objects at differing positions relative to short term memory, that is perceiving motion.

Actually, Graham, your model needs to be devoid of terms such as 'objects'. That is, the brain can only act upon its own brain states (NNs) - not 'objects'.

I call foul on you yet again James. A 'object' is a recognisable pattern, and NNs recognise patterns. Recognising an object is a response in a NN pattern recogniser that indicates the presence of the pattern. Activation of the NN is 'seeing the tree', which is something that occurs when there are trees, or when a NN that has learned to recognise trees fires spuriously (hallucination or dream).
I do claim 'objects'.

Flick books tube TVs and movies on film demonstrate that we perceieve motion from instants of perception of objects at different locations.

The fact that we perceive space/time/change, is not the issue. The issue is whether events external to 'me', are the cause of those concepts. And since "Flick books tube TVs and movies on film" are perceptions, you can't use such examples to prove anything, here. You might as well be disproving Berkeley's ideas by kicking a stone with your foot.

Except that we can show that physical pattern recognition is taking place, and it accounts for the quirks of perception.

Do you have an idealist account of why flickering images appear to be moving smoothly?

Object recognition, location recognition and short term memory account for motion perception.

Your model is about internal brain states, Graham. Therefore, you need to respond to my questions without referring to anything other than internal brain states. Remember, that time/location/distance/objects, are concepts that relate to the external world - not internal brain states.

Explained, over and over James! Patterns of stimuli from the world promote growth of NN responses that recognise those patterns. The world accounts for the NN recogniser recognising that pattern, and the activation of the recogniser is perception of the presence of that object (pattern).

You have to come up with a model that explains human behaviour with the external world without any reference to that world. Rather, you need to come up with a 'mechanism' that would explain human behaviour without reliance on the prior understanding of concepts such as time/location/distance/objects.

Nonsense James, give it a rest and think about it. The brain is part of the world. It is all the same stuff. There is no metaphysical gulf between them. The world touches the brain and the brain touches the world. The world leaves its mark in the brain in ways that change the functioning of the brain.

The roots of the tree grow around the stone not because the tree knows about stones, but because there are physical interactions between the cells of the roots and the surfaces of the stones. Your Lego objection amounts to saying that the roots can't grow around the stones because they are only plant cells that know nothing of stones.

The pattern grow in response to the world. The patterns produce behaviour. In humans that behaviour includes making noises that have the effect of communicating about brain states to other brains. The communication extends to communicating within the brain, which gives us rational thought.