The subjective observer is a fictional character

[GrahamH]

GrahamH, If I understand where you are trying to get to, I disagree with where you are going. The experiencer and the observer of the experience are one and the same. Observing, in and of itself, is an experience...unless you can demonstrate that it is some other way...or you know of some why to have experiencing and observing to be two different things.

More than that, it appears that the act of observing determines how we judge the experience. That's on us, and we make decisions based on how we observe and judge. On that other thread, I asked when something becomes a thought. If we don't think it, is it a thought? I get it that there are all kinds of things going on in our bodies, and we are not aware of what is happening with every muscle, blood cell, nerve ending, etc. We are aware of whatever it is we are aware of, and we have that experience in present time.

There is this idea that are brain is segmented into parts that don't communicate with each other. Freud didn't invent this idea, but he had a great deal to do with popularizing it, and, ever since Sigmund, most others who have tried to describe how we function have had some version of that model. In case I've missed it, just where does our awareness/consciousness fit into all of this?

'observing' is not necessarily 'experiencing qualia', it could be obtaining information about events. In the latter case the brain is observer of body and world. It learns generalised patterns and responds to them when they occur. Some of the patterns are stimulated internally and some are initiated by the world. None of this requires a metaphysical 'subjectivity'.

If the brain observes how the person it controls behaves, and classifies that behaviour as <person inside having subjective experiences> it will respond to that pattern, as it does to the world, as factual information determining behaviour. If a brain can generate language to communicate about trees it can do the same about it's 'subjective observer' or 'I'. If the brain uses language to 'think about my mind' it ends up philosophising about how special subjective experience is, without there necessarily being anything different to other cognitive brain functions going on.

'Awareness / consciousness' fits in as labels for some of the things brains do in gathering and responding to the world. They are couched in the terms of the fictional subjective observer. That is, they are supposed properties of this fictional construct that represent a small part of what the brain does. More or less 'awareness' relates to an attentional loop activity where the brain amplifies or reinforces its responses to certain stimuli. SoS refers to this as standing waves and can probably provide some neuroscience references to back it up.

A robot analogy might clarify what I mean, perhaps. Imagine a robot that is pre-programmed (c.f. evolved) with capability to learn models of the world, but without information about what it is or how it works. Imagine that it has the ability to detect objects and learn the behaviour patterns of those objects. This might equate to pre-human social animals learning the behaviour of others of their kind.

If the robot is good enough at this task it is likely to apply it to itself. It isn't 'conscious' and there is no knowing homunculus inside intentionaly driving this process. The mechanism learns patterns and responds to the patterns. The learned patterns are objects and behaviours. One of the objects it learns the behaviour of is itself. The learned model predicts how the robot itself will behave. This model informs the behaviour of the robot in interactions with others. The model amounts to <robot inside>, but there is no <robot inside> it is all <robot>.

[LaMont Cranston]

SOS, OK, if it's true that there ain't no experiencer or observer at the level of how the brain works, then what is experience and observation? While we're on the subject, just where do such things as emotions fit into all of this? Does "how the brain works" determine how we live our lives, or is there something that is a very real part of us that has some control (we can talk about how much) over what we do?

[GrahamH]

SOS, OK, if it's true that there ain't no experiencer or observer at the level of how the brain works, then what is experience and observation? While we're on the subject, just where do such things as emotions fit into all of this? Does "how the brain works" determine how we live our lives, or is there something that is a very real part of us that has some control (we can talk about how much) over what we do?

The brain is a very real part of us that has some control over what we do.

[LaMont Cranston]

GrahamH, First of all, I disagree with you about observing and obtaining information. If, regardless of how we got there, we are aware we are doing these things, they are experiences. Or, if they aren't experiences, from our point of view, just what are they? If you'll notice, you use words like "not necessarily" and "none of this requires a metaphysical subjectivity." Does "not necessarily" mean "maybe it's like this, maybe it isn't?" It could be, if things are the way you describe them, that no metaphysical subjectivity is required. However, let's leave out the words "required" and "metaphysical," and just consider how we live our lives. Do you live with subjective judgements, viewpoints, beliefs, etc? If the answer to that question is "yes," are you able to differentiate, with certainty, about that part of your life and what you'd like to believe is objective reality?

I've also got to wonder, do you think of yourself as being limited to that robot model you described? If all that you are is that robot model, exactly how much responsibility do you have for how you live your life? Somewhere in al of this, if feels as if at least some people are looking for ways to duck responsibility for their words, thoughts and deeds.

I do not believe that anybody has even implied that the brain is not a very real part of us. It is. I believe that we would all agree that it has some control over what we do. What we are considering is how much more there is to our lives than that, and how much control we have over our decisions.

[LaMont Cranston]

GrahamH, Let me put the question to you another way...

Does subjectivity...or the illusion of subjectivity...exist in your life? It most certainly seems to exist in mine, and if it's all an illusion, it's a pretty fucking good illusion. If subjectivity or the illusion of it exist, they exist experientially. Is a thought an experience? If somebody is experiencing it, I'd say "yes." Is an action an experience? Once again, the answer is "yes."

It really does seem as if you are trying to build a case that there are things going on in our bodies and minds of which we are not aware. I hope you get it that we've already agreed on that. However, in the realm of awareness/consciousness, if we are aware of something, it is part of our experiences. I also might point out to out that, so far, you have not addressed that thing about how we only experience what we do in present time, here and now. I'm not saying that your robot analogy isn't a rather interesting take on how we live our lives, make choices, etc., but it does seem quite limited.

[GrahamH]

GrahamH, First of all, I disagree with you about observing and obtaining information. If, regardless of how we got there, we are aware we are doing these things, they are experiences. Or, if they aren't experiences, from our point of view, just what are they? If you'll notice, you use words like "not necessarily" and "none of this requires a metaphysical subjectivity." Does "not necessarily" mean "maybe it's like this, maybe it isn't?" It could be, if things are the way you describe them, that no metaphysical subjectivity is required.

If the model explains how we know 'subjective experience' without resort to inexplicable it-just-ism then metaphysical subjectivity is not necessary.

However, let's leave out the words "required" and "metaphysical," and just consider how we live our lives. Do you live with subjective judgements, viewpoints, beliefs, etc? If the answer to that question is "yes," are you able to differentiate, with certainty, about that part of your life and what you'd like to believe is objective reality?[/quote}
We don't get far in understanding things if we only consider their surface appearance. Ask what "subjective judgements, viewpoints, beliefs, etc" are! How do they work? Whay doe we chose this rather than that? Why don't we know how our own thoughts are made? How would you even begin to answer that if you stop at the naive interpretation?

I've also got to wonder, do you think of yourself as being limited to that robot model you described? If all that you are is that robot model, exactly how much responsibility do you have for how you live your life? Somewhere in al of this, if feels as if at least some people are looking for ways to duck responsibility for their words, thoughts and deeds.

I don't think the model is limited. It doesn't rule out any aspect of being human. Nothing that actually does anything is eliminated. You have limited your thinking to 'just a machine' as if we are suggesting the brain is nothing more than bicycle or PC.

I do not believe that anybody has even implied that the brain is not a very real part of us. It is. I believe that we would all agree that it has some control over what we do. What we are considering is how much more there is to our lives than that, and how much control we have over our decisions.

What exerts control, where and how? The brain most likely generates every thought and every word each of us is typing, then moves the fingers to type it.

Can you account for exactly why you typed what you did? Maybe that is because your brain is cleverer than it thinks it is. There is a lot more to you than your 'consciousness'. You are a creative human being, yet your 'consciousness' knows nothing of the creation of the ideas that come to you. Some will call it sub-conscious and claim that thought is produced by the conscious mind, but introspect on that. If 'sub-conscious' is generating your thoughts, isn't that the thinker, not your conscious mind?

The thinker / knower is not conscious and the conscious doesn't generate thoughts.
The thinker thinks about a conscious mind, the conscious mind is a fiction that does not think.
'Experience is known about by the thinker, but not experienced there. There is no need then for an un-knowing experiencer.

I find it interesting how often people raise moral concerns in these discussions. Your brain can factor in moral concerns into its responses. If it's too warm move into the shade. If your neighbours will treat you harshly for taking their property don't take it without a damn good reason. Brains can make 'moral choices'.

The model accounts for why 'conscience' is not analytic. It is a recognition of patterns of behaviour that typically have consequences best avoided. It isn't accessible to self-analysis because it is the brain doing it, not a separate rational mind.

Rational thought is probably quite a recently evolved trait that possibly arose in conjunction with evolution of language.

I don't bother much with 'objective reality'. It is clear enough to me that it isn't all subjective, since the subjective cannot account for what I observe. We can seek to explain thing relative to where we are and by what we can perceive. To attempt to go far beyond that, and speak of how things really are is to engage in fantasy storytelling.

If we can account for 'subjective experience' within the context we can observe we have something useful. If we are stuck without explanation and have to make up stories of un-knowable things to calm our curiosity I think we gain nothing, certainly not Truth.

[GrahamH]

GrahamH, Let me put the question to you another way...

Does subjectivity...or the illusion of subjectivity...exist in your life? It most certainly seems to exist in mine, and if it's all an illusion, it's a pretty fucking good illusion. If subjectivity or the illusion of it exist, they exist experientially. Is a thought an experience? If somebody is experiencing it, I'd say "yes." Is an action an experience? Once again, the answer is "yes."

Do I 'have experiences'? Yes, of course, but what is their nature?
Can I dispel them through doubting their solidity? No, no more than I can perceive a tree to be a hippopotamus by wishing it.
A thought is clearly more than an experience. It has un-experienced depth and is formed in dark and unknown corners.
I suspect the only difference bweteen a conscious decision and an unconscious response is that the brain recognises the significance of one as something needing attention. It becomes <something I think> which feeds back into the matrix so that subsequent responses have <I think X> as an input.

It really does seem as if you are trying to build a case that there are things going on in our bodies and minds of which we are not aware. I hope you get it that we've already agreed on that. However, in the realm of awareness/consciousness, if we are aware of something, it is part of our experiences.

It is demonstrable that a person responds to things she is not 'aware of'. We can account for that because the information is processed by the brain and determines the repsonse. Only a limited subset is worthwhile as <I experience X>. The limitations that clearly apply to consciousness are utilitarian. There is no need to give attention to most of what we do as humans. It isn't 'conscious self in charge', it is 'more aware brain in action'.

I also might point out to out that, so far, you have not addressed that thing about how we only experience what we do in present time, here and now. I'm not saying that your robot analogy isn't a rather interesting take on how we live our lives, make choices, etc., but it does seem quite limited.

I not that you keep mentioning "here and now" as if it had particular significance, but what do you think is significant about it? Perhaps there really is a present where change occurs, in which case 'experience' could only happen 'now'. This isn;t the place to get into the nature of time. That it happens 'here' is amply accounted for. Where else would it happen than where the brain is?

[jamest]

Alas, no agreement then.

However, you did write

The experienced self is the identity discerned from the totality of its experiences.

Okay, I made a mistake there. My apologies. I should have said that the experienced self is the identity discerned from the totality of experiences. (I've omitted the 'its').

So do you mean that the 'experienced self', that 'nearly everyone identifies' as 'I who experience' does not in fact have experiences? At least we might agree there.

Yes, we can agree there.

I think I see your subtle distinction. The experiencer is unable to know anything about itself. It knows itself only as this fictional character 'The Self who experiences'.

I don't agree that the experiencER is [absolutely] unable to know anything about itself. Indeed, you're telling me that 'you' are the brain doing this and that... and I am an idealist with my own thoughts about what the experiencer is. We both recognise that the experience of identity is 'fictional'. And we both should recognise that there is 'something' that harbours this fiction.

The distance between us on this point then is that I suggest that knowing this character accounts for S.O., but you say that Experiencing what is mistakenly attributed to this character is necessary in addition to any information held about it.

Imo, the only difference between us concerns what harbours the subjective beliefs about itself and the world in relation to it. Mind you, that's quite a significant difference!

[jamest]

Talking about the internal functioning of a brain does not prove anything, then, unless such models avoid the problems associated with assumption; consideration; causality; purpose; meaning; etc., required as a basis for formulating these models.

Please tell me in more detail what this sentence is on about.

Maybe break these things out.

My opinion is that any credible materialistic model of the brain would have to come up with a mechanism to explain the finer intricacies of human behaviour. Clearly, mechanisms cannot be endowed with 'assumption'; 'consideration'; 'purpose'; 'meaning'; etc. - not unless they have been 'programmed' to act as if they are endowed thus. So, another prerequisite for any credible brain-model, would have to be that it wasn't acting as if it were 'programmed' (effected) by something external to itself to behave in such a manner.
From my own perspective, a credible [materialistic] brain model has to be about something that explains human behaviour entirely in terms of blind mechanistic processes. This is what my statement amounts to.

My further opinion, is that models of the brain do not satisfy this need to be formulated in terms of blind mechanistic processes. In fact, I don't think that it's possible to account for human behaviour without endowing the brain with the capability to 'assume'; 'consider'; 'assign self-meaning'; and to have 'self-purpose'. In a nutshell, that's the nitty gritty of my own perspective and objections, here.

[SpeedOfSound]

Talking about the internal functioning of a brain does not prove anything, then, unless such models avoid the problems associated with assumption; consideration; causality; purpose; meaning; etc., required as a basis for formulating these models.

Please tell me in more detail what this sentence is on about.

Maybe break these things out.

My opinion is that any credible materialistic model of the brain would have to come up with a mechanism to explain the finer intricacies of human behaviour. Clearly, mechanisms cannot be endowed with 'assumption'; 'consideration'; 'purpose'; 'meaning'; etc. - not unless they have been 'programmed' to act as if they are endowed thus. So, another prerequisite for any credible brain-model, would have to be that it wasn't acting as if it were 'programmed' (effected) by something external to itself to behave in such a manner.
From my own perspective, a credible [materialistic] brain model has to be about something that explains human behaviour entirely in terms of blind mechanistic processes. This is what my statement amounts to.

My further opinion, is that models of the brain do not satisfy this need to be formulated in terms of blind mechanistic processes. In fact, I don't think that it's possible to account for human behaviour without endowing the brain with the capability to 'assume'; 'consider'; 'assign self-meaning'; and to have 'self-purpose'. In a nutshell, that's the nitty gritty of my own perspective and objections, here.

And you have been provided with the scientific answers and you reject them because they aren't metaphysics. I'm confused. You want the scientific explanation of the brain to be metaphysical?

[jamest]

I'm hoping to have more time tomorrow - especially in the evening - to deal with previous posts from the past couple of days. But I have a nagging question and wondered if there were any reasonable answers:

If brains states (NNs) are responses to the external environment, then how does the brain distinguish between those NNs that refer to its own body and those that refer to the environment beyond that body? That is, how does the brain distinguish between 'the self' (body) and the non-self (world)?

In answering the question, we have to remember that 'the body' is actually external to the brain. So, there will be NNs associated with the body in which the brain is housed and NNs associated with the environment beyond that body. The question is, how does the brain know which NNs refer to which?

By the connections, James. NN that are in a functional chain from neurons in the retina are responding to things 'seen in the world'.

But, one's body is "seen in the world", also. It's part of what is external to the brain.

Relative location of objects can be inferred from an image,

Here's another problem: if the brain is privy to nothing other than its own brain states, then how does the brain know that specific NNs refer to 'an image'? To use the lego analogy again (of being aware of nothing other than complex lego structures - commensurate with NNs), how would you know that specific groups of lego structures referred to 'an image'? You couldn't ever possibly know that unless you had been told that they were.

Another interesting problem that arises, here, is about 'space'. That is, how could NNs accurately account for the space between objects? You say that NNs are responses to objects and events external to the brain. But, how can NNs ever account for the void [of space] between objects? Can there be an NN that accurately represents a void of material influence? Moreover, how can the brain respond to 'a void'?
Of course, I'm of the opinion that space (and time) are [absolutely] constructed by the self. But your model cannot embrace this idea, for obvious reasons. Therefore, I'd like to hear your responses to my questions about 'space', here.

Relative location of objects can be inferred from an image

Sure, if you are looking directly at that image. But please remember that the brain is privy to nothing other than [relatively] static neurons. That is, there are no images of motion, per se, just change [of states of those neurons]. At the very least, this implies that the change of states of neurons just gives the impression of motion - something that is discerned, rather than is actual. Again, concepts such as 'consideration' and 'meaning' rear their ugly heads.

NNs receiving input from tactile and pain neurons in the body 'feel the body'.

Again, my point is that the brain shouldn't be aware of the fact that it is receiving "input from tactile and pain neurons in the body". In fact, the brain shouldn't be aware of anything, other than its own internal states. Upon this realisation, should all brain models be constructed.

Whenever I address the details of your model, as here, I see your failure to realise the limitations that your endeavour places upon you. I'm hoping, eventually, that you actually understand the purpose behind my posts. Then, you might see the value of them.

[jamest]

And you have been provided with the scientific answers and you reject them because they aren't metaphysics. I'm confused. You want the scientific explanation of the brain to be metaphysical?

Any utilisation of 'science' to explain human experience without the need for an immaterial essence, essentially harbours an ontological/metaphysical basis upon which this science is constructed. It's logically impossible to fully explain/reduce 'human experience' to processes of a material brain, without that explanation/reduction being essentially metaphysical.

[Bruce Burleson]

Any utilisation of 'science' to explain human experience without the need for an immaterial essence, essentially harbours an ontological/metaphysical basis upon which this science is constructed. It's logically impossible to fully explain/reduce 'human experience' to processes of a material brain, without that explanation/reduction being essentially metaphysical.

If there is an immaterial essence at the core of human experience, it arises out of the brain. The complexity of the brain gives rise to the experience of consciousness. Kill the brain and you kill consciousness. There is simply no reason to think that consciousness is anything other than a consequence of a living brain. What that consciousness does after it arises is another story - it can look at its own navel and get lost in a hall of mirrors - but there is no basis for asserting that consciousness exists apart from the brain. If you can give an example of consciousness apart from a brain which can be verified, you have something to talk about. Otherwise, you have simply created a mental merry-go-round.

[Bruce Burleson]

If "I" (whatever that is) still have consciousness when I go to sleep, then surely there would be some echo of that experience that would register in my brain when it wakes up. I have continued to exist, so surely the brain would pick up on some aspect of that experience. But this is not my experience. My experience all relates to stimuli detected by my brain, whether external or internal, and there is nothing there that indicates that I have had an experience while unconscious. Speculation about consciousness apart from brain function is a wild goose chase.

[jamest]

Any utilisation of 'science' to explain human experience without the need for an immaterial essence, essentially harbours an ontological/metaphysical basis upon which this science is constructed. It's logically impossible to fully explain/reduce 'human experience' to processes of a material brain, without that explanation/reduction being essentially metaphysical.

If there is an immaterial essence at the core of human experience, it arises out of the brain. The complexity of the brain gives rise to the experience of consciousness.

You sure exemplify everything I say about ontologies associated with theories about the brain!

Kill the brain and you kill consciousness.

Actually, kill consciousness of the brain and then, no knowledge of 'brain' exists.

There is simply no reason to think that consciousness is anything other than a consequence of a living brain.

Of course there is: the concept of 'brain' is an entity that is given life by 'consciousness'.

but there is no basis for asserting that consciousness exists apart from the brain.

And, pray tell, what evidence do you have of 'brain', other than that forthcoming by 'consciousness'?

If you can give an example of consciousness apart from a brain which can be verified, you have something to talk about.

If you can give an example of any 'thing' - least of all 'brain' - that exists apart from consciousness, then I'll show my ass to the masses.

Otherwise, you have simply created a mental merry-go-round.

No... that is what you are doing. You're just embroiled within your own self-constructed reality. You even believe that you hold the higher [philosophical] ground. But that's just a reflection of your philosophical naivity.