colubridae wrote:
Surendra Darathy wrote:
It's not odd that thoughts exclusive of awareness of direct sensory inputs are not identifiable until they reach the level of language.
I didn’t feel that was correct. Am trying to identify a non-linguistic thought.
All I could come up with was memory. Or dream.
Unless you mean ‘exclusive of direct sensory input’ includes random/transient neural activity.
I don't mean to leave out the remark that we do a lot of processing of environmental conditions without pushing it up into the linguistic, which is where we finally establish it as "conscious". There's a whole host of simple experiments, though, in which organisms respond non-linguistically to stimuli, such as pressing a button. Even lab rats do it.
If the experimentalist sees you press a button, though, she will note that you were "aware" of the stimulus. Later, you can report that you were aware of the stimulus, by remembering that you were.
I want to keep hammering, though, on how paltry is this "self-awareness" in comparison to the stuff of which we can be made only
subsequently "aware". Or we could fly off in the direction of dissecting that for which people first claim to have been aware, that then rapidly decays into the unreliability of eyewitness testimony.
What I am expressing is that "self-awareness" looks to me like a lot less than is sometimes made of it. We give the notion so much respect because we've simply inherited the awe that ancient people expressed in relation to it. Now we put down our superstitions, and give up hunting for ghosts. It's up to any individual whether or not she thinks the cure is worse than the disease on that account.
A thought is a thought, and a dream is a dream. That's why we have separate words for two different kinds of activity in a brain. Language is notoriously inadequate for recapturing the "content" of dreams, or so I would say.