Ted Cruz is Ineligible for the Presidency

[L'Emmerdeur]

In regard to quotations from the two Supreme Court cases previously mentioned, the first of which explicitly cited Lynch v. Clarke (see preceding post) as established precedent--

From United States v. Wong Kim Ark:

So far as we are informed, there is no authority, legislative, executive or judicial, in England or America, which maintains or intimates that the statutes (whether considered as declaratory, or as merely prospective,) conferring citizenship on foreign-born children of citizens, have superseded or restricted, in any respect, the established rule of citizenship by birth within the dominion. Even those authorities in this country, which have gone the farthest towards holding such statutes to be but declaratory of the common law, have distinctly recognized and emphatically asserted the citizenship of native-born children of foreign parents.

The power of naturalization, vested in Congress by the Constitution, is a power to confer citizenship, not a power to take it away. "A naturalized citizen," said Chief Justice Marshall, "becomes a member of the society, possessing all the rights of a native citizen, and standing, in the view of the Constitution, on the footing of a native. The Constitution does not authorize Congress to enlarge or abridge those rights. The simple power of the National Legislature is to prescribe a uniform rule of naturalization, and the exercise of this power exhausts it, so far as respects the individual. The Constitution then takes him up, and, among other rights, extends to him the capacity of suing in the courts of the United States, precisely under the same circumstances under which a native might sue." Osborn v. United States Bank, 9 Wheat. 738, 827. Congress having no power to abridge the rights conferred by the Constitution upon those who have become naturalized citizens by virtue of acts of Congress, a fortiori no act or omission of Congress, as to providing for the naturalization of parents or children of a particular race, can affect citizenship acquired as a birthright, by virtue of the Constitution itself, without any aid of legislation. The Fourteenth Amendment, while it leaves the power, where it was before, in Congress, to regulate naturalization, has conferred no authority upon Congress to restrict the effect of birth, declared by the Constitution to constitute a sufficient and complete right to citizenship.

No one doubts that the Amendment, as soon as it was promulgated, applied to persons of African descent born in the United States, wherever the birthplace of their parents might have been; and yet, for two years afterwards, there was no statute authorizing persons of that race to be naturalized. If the omission or the refusal of Congress to permit certain classes of persons to be made citizens by naturalization could be allowed the effect of correspondingly restricting the classes of persons who should become citizens by birth, it would be in the power of Congress, at any time, by striking negroes out of the naturalization laws, and limiting those laws, as they were formerly limited, to white persons only, to defeat the main purpose of the Constitutional Amendment.

The fact, therefore, that acts of Congress or treaties have not permitted Chinese persons born out of this country to become citizens by naturalization, cannot exclude Chinese persons born in this country from the operation of the broad and clear words of the Constitution, "All persons born in the United States, and subject to the jurisdiction thereof, are citizens of the United States."

From Perkins v. Elg:

On her birth in New York, the plaintiff became a citizen of the United States. Civil Rights Act of 1866, [307 U.S. 325, 329] 14 Stat. 27; Fourteenth Amendment, Section 1, U.S.C.A.Const.; United States v. Wong Kim Ark, 169 U.S. 649 , 18 S.Ct. 456. In a comprehensive review of the principles and authorities governing the decision in that case-that a child born here of alien parentage becomes a citizen of the United States-the Court adverted to the 'inherent right of every independent nation to determine for itself, and according to its own constitution and laws, what classes of persons shall be entitled to its citizenship.' United States v. Wong Kim Ark, supra, 169 U.S. page 668, 18 S.Ct. page 164. As municipal law determines how citizenship may be acquired, it follows that persons may have a dual nationality. 1 And the mere fact that the plaintiff may have acquired Swedish citizenship by virtue of the operation of Swedish law, on the resumption of that citizenship by her parents, does not compel the conclusion that she has lost her own citizenship acquired under our law. As at birth she became a citizen of the United States, a citizenship must be deemed to continue unless she has been deprived of it through the operation of a treaty or congressional enactment or by her voluntary action in conformity with applicable legal principles.

[Seth]

Well that explains an article I saw the byline to this morning with Cruz claiming that Trump couldn't be Prez either. Fuck, none of them are eligible. They'll have to go with Bush III.

That was just Cruz embarrassing himself when he said that, and to think he used to Clerk for the Supreme Court. We've had several Presidents in the past where one of the spouses was a naturalized citizen, and that could never have been the original intent of the article since so much of the population in the early 1800's had parents born in the UK.

Actually, if you read the pertinent clause and understood what it says you'd find that the Founders thought of that and provided a legal remedy:

No person except a natural born citizen, or a citizen of the United States, at the time of the adoption of this Constitution, shall be eligible to the office of President; neither shall any person be eligible to that office who shall not have attained to the age of thirty five years, and been fourteen Years a resident within the United States.

The highlighted text took care of that potential ambiguity by allowing a "citizen" of the United States (note: not a "natural born citizen", which again points out the legal distinction between a citizen and a natural born citizen) who was a citizen at the time of the adoption of the Constitution, which was June 21, 1788 when the 9th state, New Hampshire, ratified it. According to American legal usage, the date at which the United States came into being was September 5, 1774, when the first Continental Congress was formed and declared itself the supreme authority in the land. Add 14 years to 1774 and you get 1788, which is when the Constitution was ratified, and the First Congress convened on March 4, 1789, with George Washington being elected as President on April 30, 1789.

The qualifications for President were intentionally more strict than for Congress, which required that one be a citizen for 9 years to serve in the Senate and 7 years to serve in the House of Representatives. Note that there is no mention of "natural born citizen" in any qualification to hold office in Congress. That restriction ONLY applies to the presidency, for a very good reason.

So, anyone who was a resident within the Colonies at the time of the formation of the Continental Congress on September 5, 1774 was by virtue of that declaration of authority, a "citizen of the United States" even if they were not born here and even if both their parents were English subjects (or anybody else's subjects for that matter), but no such person was defined as a "natural born" citizen, and no such person could be President if they were not at least 35 years old, which meant being born before September 5, 1739. This provision allowed the subsequent Presidents who were either not born here or whose parents were not both American citizens to hold the office during the necessary transition to the "natural born citizen" requirement.

However, that particular clause of the article became inoperative when the last individual who was a citizen of the United States as of September 5, 1774, and who was born before September 5, 1739, died.

The first person eligible to hold the office of President under the "natural born citizen" clause rather than the "35 years old and 14 years a citizen as of the date the Constitution was adopted" clause would have been someone born within the US to parents who were both American citizens (either by their presence as of September 5, 1774 or who were BOTH naturalized American citizens at the time of that person's birth regardless of where that person was physically born) born on or after June 21, 1823, which is 35 years after the adoption of the Constitution.

So, you see, the Founders thought of all that and planned for it, leaving a "loophole" open for the obvious problem facing citizens who were not natural born citizens who wanted to run for the office of President in the early years of the nation who were citizens as of March 4, 1789 and met the other qualifications.

You should try reading the Constitution sometime in order to avoid making such ignorant errors.

[Seth]

Good point. Tell that to Seth.

Not a good point, unfortunately. See above.

[Seth]

They basically say that anyone born in the US and grown up there is a citizen independent of the status of the parents. This is an answer to the claim of "anchor babies". It is not actually related to the presidency.

This is correct, anyone born on US soil is a US citizen, but not necessarily a "natural born citizen!"

A child born on US soil to two illegal immigrant parents is a "citizen" but is NOT a "natural born citizen" and cannot be President.

A child born on US soil or anywhere else on earth to two parents who were both American citizens, naturalized or born here is a citizen of the United States, and is also a "natural born citizen" eligible to hold the office of President.

But, a child born to ONLY ONE American citizen (naturalized or born here) and a FOREIGN NATIONAL at the time of the child's birth,no matter where that child is born, either inside the US or outside of it, is NOT a "natural born citizen" eligible to hold the office of President of the United States.

The distinction between "citizen" and "natural born citizen" is not where the child was born, it depends on the legal citizenship status of BOTH of the parents.

[Seth]

The common law referred to here is British common law, with its concept of birthright citizenship, or jus soli.

First, Lynch is a Chancery Court case out of the State of New York, not a Supreme Court or even a federal court ruling.

Second, the issue in Lynch is whether Julia Lynch was entitled to inherit certain property from her uncle, Thomas Lynch, not whether Julia was eligible to be President of the United States, so the case is dispositive to begin with.

Moreover, the opinion of a New York Chancery Court judge on the meaning of "natural born citizen," which in the text he uses interchangeably with "native citizen" (which you would have know if you HAD read the text, as I just did) is completely irrelevant to this discussion. He ruled that Julia, who was born in New York City in 1819 to Irish parents who came here in 1815 and returned to Ireland permanently with Julia, in 1819, shortly after Julia was born, was properly a US citizen due to her circumstance of being born on US soil, and was therefore entitled to inherit. It was neither necessary nor within the Chancery Court's power to do anything but declare Julia to be a citizen or not a citizen for the purposes of inheritance law, and the ruling provides no precedent whatsoever as to what "class" of citizen she is with respect to the presidency and her eligibility to hold that office.

The common law you refer to, while the basis of, and in part adopted into the statutes of the various states, and explicitly rejected as being of any force or effect by many other states, does not control who is and is not a citizen of the United States, as that power is a plenary power of Congress according to Article 1, Section 8 of the Constitution.

The common law principles that inform the status of individuals as citizens of the United States with respect to the parentage of a person born within the boundaries of the United States were codified in part, and necessarily rejected in part, by the Congress when it enacts immigration and naturalization laws.

And in no such existing law does "natural born citizen" appear as synonymous with "citizen" or "naturalized citizen." They are three different and distinct classes of citizenship. But because "natural born citizen" is not statutorily defined, and has never been ruled upon by the Supreme Court, there is indeed some ambiguity and therefore resort to the original intent of the Founders is necessary to discern what that phrase means in the context in which it is used.

The Founders were quite clear in their writings that the office of President was of grave concern at the founding of the nation, and that concern PRIMARILY revolved around who should be eligible to be President, and who should not be. Their writings clearly show a fear that if they did not place restrictions on holding that office it was a possibility, and even a likelihood that someone who had foreign affiliations through his parents might take the office and operate it to the detriment of the American people as a puppet for some foreign government. So they constructed the requirement as best they could to ensure that only those with full allegiance to the United States, and with parents who also were either born into or had sworn allegiance to the United States and foresworn all foreign allegiances through the naturalization process, would be eligible to hold the office after the transition period following the establishment of the United States.

They took great pains to craft the provision to reflect that concern as best they could without disqualifying anyone from holding the office for 35 years, which would have been an absurd result. The fact that they did this is proof that they did so with intent, and their intent is clearly seen in their contemporary writings. And it is THAT original intent that rules, not English common law, even if that common law informed the Founder's construction of the provision.

[Seth]

In regard to quotations from the two Supreme Court cases previously mentioned, the first of which explicitly cited Lynch v. Clarke (see preceding post) as established precedent--

Neither of these cases decides the issue before us. In both cases the issue was whether or not a child born on US soil to foreign parents is a US citizen.

There is no doubt in the law that they are citizens, and this has been affirmed many times. But what this means is that they are "citizens" or perhaps "native citizens" in the sense that their citizenship status is dependent upon their PLACE of birth, not their parentage.

The issue we are discussing has to do with the citizenship status of the child's parents as it affects that child's qualification to hold the office of President.

And you'll note that these cases talk about alien "parentS" (plural). If that child were born to those same parents OUTSIDE of the United States, there would be no question that the child is not a citizen of the United States. While it is true that a single American parent confers basic citizenship upon a child no matter where the child is born, it does not confer the status of "natural born citizen" with respect to holding the office of President because that particular status has more stringent requirements of parental affiliation to the United States than simple citizenship.

[L'Emmerdeur]

I think that the ruling of an American judge schooled in American law in the first part of the 19th century--that is, within living memory of the founding generation--to be a sufficiently reliable source in regard to "original intent." The New York Court of Chancery (Lewis H. Sandford's court) was "one of the pre-eminent courts in the United States." The opinions of internet barrack-room lawyers, on the other hand, are of very little interest, or relevance.

[Seth]

I think that the ruling of an American judge schooled in American law in the first part of the 19th century--that is, within living memory of the founding generation--to be a sufficiently reliable source in regard to "original intent." The New York Court of Chancery "was one of the pre-eminent courts in the United States." The opinions of internet barrack-room lawyers are of very little interest, or relevance.

Sorry, not precedent even as published because it did NOT examine the issue at hand. All he had to do was to determine whether Julia was eligible to inherit due to the place of her parentage, which granted her citizenship. Everything else is, as they say in the barracks, "obiter dictum."

Obiter Dictum

[Latin, By the way.] Words of an opinion entirely unnecessary for the decision of the case. A remark made or opinion expressed by a judge in a decision upon a cause, "by the way", that is, incidentally or collaterally, and not directly upon the question before the court or upon a point not necessarily involved in the determination of the cause, or introduced by way of illustration, or analogy or argument. Such are not binding as precedent. (emphasis added)

[L'Emmerdeur]

Sandford directly addressed the issue of who would be eligible to stand for the office of president of the United States in his ruling in Lynch v. Clarke; obiter dictum does not negate the value of his opinion in regards to "original intent" absent any more authoritative source.

[pErvinalia]

Good point. Tell that to Seth.

Not a good point, unfortunately. See above.

Good point.

[Seth]

Sandford directly addressed the issue of who would be eligible to stand for the office of president of the United States in his ruling in Lynch v. Clarke; obiter dictum does not negate the value of his opinion in regards to "original intent" absent any more authoritative source.

Absolutely untrue. In the first place, if as you and Sandford suggest it was the common law of England that, in the absence of express declaration of the constitution, defines "natural born citizen" then what we find, upon careful examination of the common law of England is precisely that a child born to an English citizen, at the time only the father, as they were the only ones at the time upon whom the citizenship of a child was dependent, and a foreign woman, born outside the juridiction of the King (on the soil of England) was not deemed to be an English citizen at all and in order to become one, the father had to apply to Parliament (or the King) for a special bill of naturalization, which was discretionary and very rarely approved.

This construction was put in place to deal with the very common instance of British soldiers and sailors screwing some whore in port or in the baggage train, knocking them up and then having the woman claim that the child was a citizen of England, which the Crown had no particular interest in allowing, even if the soldier or sailor (or anyone else) had married the woman. This was a bulwark against the heritability of such children which might eventually grant foreigners either title or property though inheritance based on a one-night-stand in some foreign port or during some (at the time often protracted) military campaign, which progeny were exceedingly common throughout British history. And with rare exceptions they were always denied citizenship and therefore the right to inherit either property or title of their father.

Even marriage to a foreigner was not enough to provide a birthright grant of citizenship to a child born outside of the domain of the King. Only if the wife were either an English citizen to begin with, or had been naturalized prior to the child's birth, was a child of such a union considered to be any sort of citizen at all.

To be a "natural born citizen" under English common law, the child had to be born of TWO parents, both of whom were at the time citizens and subjects of the Crown, either within the jurisdiction of the Crown or outside it if the male parent was an official Ambassador of the King. It was possible for a child of two British citizens to NOT be a British citizen if born outside of Crown territory, a distinction also intended to prevent the children of expatriate Brits from inheriting title or property unless the child was naturalized first.

"The term citizen was used in the constitution as a word, the meaning of which was already established and well understood. And the constitution itself contains a direct recognition of the subsisting common law principle, in the section with defines the qualification of the President. “No person except a natural born citizen, or a citizen of the United States at the time of the adoption of this constitution, shall be eligible to the office of President,” &c. The only standard which then existed, of a natural born citizen, was the rule of the common law, and no different standard has been adopted since.

Suppose a person should be elected President who was native born, but of alien parents, could there be any reasonable doubt that he was eligible under the constitution? I think not. The position wold be decisive in his favor that by the rule of the common law, in force when the constitution was adopted, he is a citizen.

Moreover, the absence of any avowal or expression in the constitution, of a design to affect the exiting law of the country on this subject, is conclusive against the existence of such a design. It is inconceivable that the representatives of the thirteen sovereign states, assembled in convention for the purpose of framing a confederation and union for national purposes, should have intended to subvert the long established rule of law governing their constituents on a question of such great moment to them all, without solemnly providing for the change in the constitution; still more that they should have come to that conclusion without even once declaring their object." Source: Clarke v. Lynch and Clarke,

Sandford is in error in his already irrelevant obiter dictum because he refers to the term "natural born citizen" in the constitution and then draws a false conclusion that because the person was born on American soil and is therefore a "citizen" by the common law, despite being born of foreign parents, that this status is the same thing as his being a "natural born citizen" according to the English common law, which is not the case.

If you examine the case itself you will find that Sandford repeatedly conflates the terms "citizen" and "native citizen", using them interchangeably and only distinguishing between them and "naturalized" citizens. Nowhere in the entire document does Sandford address the derivation of the term "natural born citizen" in English common law. He only discusses "citizen" and "native citizen" and only examines the common law of England with respect to whether, at the time, English common law held that a child born on English soil of foreign parents was a "citizen" legally entitled to inherit property.

His statements about the presidency are, in addition to being obiter dictum, a simple misstatement of the very English common law upon which his entire argument with respect to Julia Clarke is based.

Yes, in English common law, and therefore in American law prior to Congress making up rules of naturalization, any child born ON English soil was an English citizen regardless of the citizenship status of his or her parents.

But he is simply wrong in failing to both distinguish and support his claim that "natural born citizen," "native citizen" and "citizen" have exactly the same meaning.

They do not, and the proof of this fact is the very fact that the term "natural born citizen" is used ONLY in the qualification for the presidency and nowhere else in American law, including the Constitution. That fact alone means, according to the rules of statutory construction and interpretation that were ALSO part of the implicitly adopted common law, that a "natural born citizen" is something different and distinguishable from a "citizen" or a "naturalized citizen," or a "native citizen."

Statutes must be interpreted with the understanding that EVERY WORD in a statute has meaning, and than no word may be ignored or is "surplusage." It is a presumption that the legislature that enacted the law (including the constitution) had a specific intent for including each word, each comma, each period and every other punctuation mark used and that none of them may be ignored or have their original meanings changed when interpreting the law.

Therefore, the words "natural born" when added to the word "citizen" by deliberate intent of the Founders, has meaning and distinguishes that class of citizenship from all other classes of citizenship which might exist or be brought into existence by a later legislative action. The constitution mentions "citizens" and "naturalization" and infers that there are "citizens" and "naturalized citizens" and grants Congress exclusive and plenary powers to make rules for naturalization but not for citizenship by birthright, which is to say birth within the United States. So to those two expressly mentioned classes of citizenship, "birthright" citizenship and "naturalized" citizenship, there is added a THIRD category, which is "natural born" citizenship.

Since "natural born citizenship" is not defined in the constitution, as Sandford suggests, resort to English common law and the common and contemporary understandings of what a "citizen," "naturalized citizen" and "natural born citizen" are is determinative of original intent.

And what we find when we examine those common law and contemporary understandings of the people who wrote and ratified the constitution is that "natural born citizen" means something distinctly different from either "citizen" or "naturalized citizen," and what it means is that a "natural born citizen" is a person whose parents were at the time of birth, both citizens of the United States, either by birthright citizenship of their own or through one or both parents being naturalized citizens.

The physical place of that person's birth is completely irrelevant to that definition so long as both parents were American citizens at the time of birth.

So, no, Sandford's obiter dictum comments are neither precedent nor ruling precedent in the first place because the question of qualification for the presidency was not before his court, nor was his court a court of competent jurisdiction to decide that matter and therefore his statements are of no legal weight at all. Nor are his statements factually representative of the English common law at the time with respect to the common law definition of "natural born citizen." Quite simply, Sanford was in error in his analysis because he wrongly assumed that birthright citizenship based on the physical location of birth controlled the definition of "natural born citizen."

It doesn't. He had no jurisdiction or authority to create precedent in the matter of qualifications for the presidency because he was a state judge not a Supreme Court Justice or even a federal court judge. He was wrong. His statements are legally meaningless.

[L'Emmerdeur]

Sandford supports his opinion via reference to laws then current, and their use of the term "natural born citizen." See pages 17-18 of the PDF, marked as 250-251.

Upon principle, therefore, I can entertain no doubt, but that by the law of the United States, every person born within the dominions and allegiance of the United States, whatever were the situation of his parents, is a natural born citizen. It is surprising that there has been no judicial decision upon this question. None was found by the counsel who argued this cause, and so far as I have been able to ascertain, it never has been expressly decided in any of the courts of the respective states, or of the United States. This circumstance itself, in regard to a point which must have occurred so often in the administration of justice, furnishes a strong inference that there has never been any doubt but that the common law rule was the law of the land. This inference is confirmed, and the position made morally certain, by such legislative, judicial and legal expositions as bear upon the question. Before referring to those, I am bound to say that the general understanding of the legal profession, and the universal impression of the public mind, so far as I have had the opportunity of knowing it, is that birth in this country does itself constitute citizenship. Thus when at an election, the inquiry is made whether a person offering to vote is a citizen or an alien, if he answers that he is a native of this country, it is received as conclusive that he is a citizen. No one inquires farther. No one asks whether his parents were citizens or were foreigners. It is enough that he was born here, whatever were the status of his parents. I know that common consent is sometimes only a common error, and that public opinion is not any authority on a point of law. But this is a question which is more important and more deeply felt in reference to political rights, than to rights of property. The universality of the public sentiment in this instance, is a part of the historical evidence of the state and the progress of the law on the subject. It indicates the strength and depth of the common law principle, and confirms the position that the adoption of the Federal Constitution wrought no change in that principle.

The legislative expositions speak but one language on this question. Thus the various acts on the subject of naturalization which have been passed by Congress presuppose that all who are to be benefited by their provisions were born abroad. They abound in expressions of this sort, viz.: the country "from which he came;" all "persons who may arrive in the United States;" the country from whence they migrated is to be stated, and the like. This language is inappropriate to a person who was born here, and wholly inapplicable to one who has always resided in the country. If Julia Lynch had remained here till she was of age, the argument in regard to her citizenship would be no different, because during the intervening time she would have been incapable of election [as to her citizenship status]. In this state, the constitution adopted by the people in 1822, provides that no person except a native citizen of the United States shall be eligible to the office of governor. Native citizen is used as contradistinguished from citizens of foreign birth, and as a term perfectly intelligible and definite. It is based on the assumption that there was a known rule of law, ascertaining who were native citizens of the United States; and as has already been shown that there was no such rule known, except that of the common law. In various statutes which have been enacted from time to time for more than fifty years past, to authorize aliens to take, purchase, hold and convey real estate, the expression used by the legislature in declaring the extent of the rights granted, is that they are to as full as those of "any natural born citizen," or of "natural born citizens." (See Laws of 1806, ch 164, § 1, 3: of 1807, ch. 123; of 1808, ch 175, of 1812, ch 240; of 1825, ch 310; 1 Rev. Stat., 720 and many others, both general and particular in their application.) In one statute, passed April 27, 1836, Laws of 1836, ch 200, the alien was to hold land as fully as if he had been a naturalized or natural born citizen; as if those two constituted all the classes of citizens known to our laws. In the numerous colonial statutes of naturalization to which I have already referred, the expression which is used, is "natural born subjects." Both expressions assume that birth is a test of citizenship; and the continuance of the language subsequent to the Revolution and to the Federal Constitution, shows that the effect of birth continued to be the same as it was before.

Again, as far as I'm concerned, there is no contest in regard to whose analysis of this question is more reliable: A respected jurist educated in the United States in the early years of the 18th century, sitting on the bench of one of the pre-eminent courts of the United States, or some guy on the internet. As Sandford states, this issue had not been ruled on previously. Unless a subsequent contradictory ruling exists, then his analysis has validity. You have not presented a contradictory ruling, in fact you've failed to cite any sources at all.

[L'Emmerdeur]

Error in the post above: should read "early years of the 19th century."

[pErvinalia]

Sandford supports his opinion via reference to laws then current, and their use of the term "natural born citizen." See pages 17-18 of the PDF, marked as 250-251.

Upon principle, therefore, I can entertain no doubt, but that by the law of the United States, every person born within the dominions and allegiance of the United States, whatever were the situation of his parents, is a natural born citizen. It is surprising that there has been no judicial decision upon this question. None was found by the counsel who argued this cause, and so far as I have been able to ascertain, it never has been expressly decided in any of the courts of the respective states, or of the United States. This circumstance itself, in regard to a point which must have occurred so often in the administration of justice, furnishes a strong inference that there has never been any doubt but that the common law rule was the law of the land. This inference is confirmed, and the position made morally certain, by such legislative, judicial and legal expositions as bear upon the question. Before referring to those, I am bound to say that the general understanding of the legal profession, and the universal impression of the public mind, so far as I have had the opportunity of knowing it, is that birth in this country does itself constitute citizenship. Thus when at an election, the inquiry is made whether a person offering to vote is a citizen or an alien, if he answers that he is a native of this country, it is received as conclusive that he is a citizen. No one inquires farther. No one asks whether his parents were citizens or were foreigners. It is enough that he was born here, whatever were the status of his parents. I know that common consent is sometimes only a common error, and that public opinion is not any authority on a point of law. But this is a question which is more important and more deeply felt in reference to political rights, than to rights of property. The universality of the public sentiment in this instance, is a part of the historical evidence of the state and the progress of the law on the subject. It indicates the strength and depth of the common law principle, and confirms the position that the adoption of the Federal Constitution wrought no change in that principle.

The legislative expositions speak but one language on this question. Thus the various acts on the subject of naturalization which have been passed by Congress presuppose that all who are to be benefited by their provisions were born abroad. They abound in expressions of this sort, viz.: the country "from which he came;" all "persons who may arrive in the United States;" the country from whence they migrated is to be stated, and the like. This language is inappropriate to a person who was born here, and wholly inapplicable to one who has always resided in the country. If Julia Lynch had remained here till she was of age, the argument in regard to her citizenship would be no different, because during the intervening time she would have been incapable of election [as to her citizenship status]. In this state, the constitution adopted by the people in 1822, provides that no person except a native citizen of the United States shall be eligible to the office of governor. Native citizen is used as contradistinguished from citizens of foreign birth, and as a term perfectly intelligible and definite. It is based on the assumption that there was a known rule of law, ascertaining who were native citizens of the United States; and as has already been shown that there was no such rule known, except that of the common law. In various statutes which have been enacted from time to time for more than fifty years past, to authorize aliens to take, purchase, hold and convey real estate, the expression used by the legislature in declaring the extent of the rights granted, is that they are to as full as those of "any natural born citizen," or of "natural born citizens." (See Laws of 1806, ch 164, § 1, 3: of 1807, ch. 123; of 1808, ch 175, of 1812, ch 240; of 1825, ch 310; 1 Rev. Stat., 720 and many others, both general and particular in their application.) In one statute, passed April 27, 1836, Laws of 1836, ch 200, the alien was to hold land as fully as if he had been a naturalized or natural born citizen; as if those two constituted all the classes of citizens known to our laws. In the numerous colonial statutes of naturalization to which I have already referred, the expression which is used, is "natural born subjects." Both expressions assume that birth is a test of citizenship; and the continuance of the language subsequent to the Revolution and to the Federal Constitution, shows that the effect of birth continued to be the same as it was before.

Again, as far as I'm concerned, there is no contest in regard to whose analysis of this question is more reliable: A respected jurist educated in the United States in the early years of the 18th century, sitting on the bench of one of the pre-eminent courts of the United States, or some guy on the internet. As Sandford states, this issue had not been ruled on previously. Unless a subsequent contradictory ruling exists, then his analysis has validity. You have not presented a contradictory ruling, in fact you've failed to cite any sources at all.

He was probably a Marxist.

[Tero]

Cruz was not born in the US. You have to look at Canadian law. If being born in Canada gave him Canadian citizenship, he could not be a US citizen at the same time. The US had very few dual citizenships at the time. Probably with no countries. I have one but it only came around 1990s after the USSR collapsed.