Coito ergo sum wrote:Seth wrote:Coito ergo sum wrote:Additional authority:
The Attorney General's Duty to Defend and Enforce Constitutionally Objectionable Legislation, 4A Op. O.L.C. 55 (1980): Attorney General Civiletti, in answer to a congressional inquiry, observed that "Myersv. United States, 272 U.S. 52 (1926). holds that the President's constitutional duty does not require him to execute unconstitutional statutes; nor does it require him to execute them provisionally, against the day that they are declared unconstitutional by the courts." Id. at 59. He added as a cautionary note that "[t]he President has no `dispensing power,'" meaning that the President and his subordinates "may not lawfully defy an Act of Congress if the Act is constitutional. . . . In those rare instances in which the Executive may lawfully act in contravention of a statute, it is the Constitution that dispenses with the operation of the statute. The Executive cannot." Id. at 59-60.
Thus, my analysis is in line with the Executive Branch's opinion on this topic. The Congress inquired of the Office of Legal Council of the Attorney General (cabinet level lawyer for the President) what the President's lawful power was here. And, they stated that the President CAN refuse to implement unconstitutional legislation. That power comes from the Constitution, and the Prez is not required to execute them provisionally, against the day that they are declared unconstitutional by the courts.
There really is nothing wrong with Obama announcing he will not defend DOMA. It is most certainly in line with the equal dignity of the three branches of government and the independent obligation of EACH BRANCH to act constitutionally and to protect and defend the Constitution of the US.
An Attorney General's opinion carries no legal force whatsoever. It's just an attorney's opinion.
That's absolutely false. It carries no precedential force in court, as in common law precedent. But, it is the opinion of the executive branch which carries as much weight as an opinion of the judicial branch on this kind of an issue. That's why Congress sent an inquiry to the AG to get this opinion.
An Attorney General's opinion, whether it be at the state or federal level, is "to be given great weight" by a court, but does not in any way constitute a legal precedent that is binding upon a court. It's an attorney's opinion, that's all. It is most certainly does NOT "carry as much weight as an opinion of the judicial branch." No way, no how. The AG is the attorney for Congress, and asking an opinion of the AG is merely one branch of government asking its lawyer for an opinion letter, which is no different from a corporation asking its corporate attorneys for an opinion on a legal matter. While a court might grant more deference to the U.S. Attorney General when considering a case, it is absolutely untrue that the court is under any requirement whatsoever to defer to the AG. An "opinion" of the judicial branch, which is to say a ruling by a court, has binding legal authority upon even the AG, the obverse is not true.
Seth wrote:
In reading the Myers case, I do not find that it stands for the proposition cited. The case is regarding the Tenure in Office Act and whether the President must obtain the consent of Congress, as stated in the Act, in order to dismiss a Postmaster of the First Class. Directly, it was a claim by a Postmaster of the First Class against the federal government for his full salary for a four-year term because he was unlawfully dismissed in violation of the Act by the President without the consent of Congress. The Court of Claims denied him his salary, and the Supreme Court affirmed the Court of Claims.
In doing so, the Court made a long exegesis on the history of the Constitutional Convention as it relates to the powers of the Executive Branch and specifically the President. In doing so, the Court ruled that in spite of the fact that Congress has, on several occasions, trenched upon Presidential executive authority as regards the hiring of employees, including Cabinet and high-level officers, that the Founders did not authorize Congress to interfere with the FIRING of any such officers, and that the Tenure in Office Act, insofar as it interferes with the President's authority to fire Congress-approved Cabinet or other high government officials, is invalid.
It held that the president is not obliged to enforce an unconstitutional statute.
No, it didn't. It held that the plaintiff was not entitled to recovery of his lost wages as a result of being discharged by the President, and in that ruling, the court overruled that part of the Tenure in Office Act that prevents the President from discharging an Executive Branch employee at will. It says NOTHING about the President being permitted to ignore a statute he believes to be unconstitutional. In fact, the Act endured, and was enforced, from it's passage in 1867 until 1926, when the Court ruled in Myers. While several Presidents, most notably the Progressive Presidents beginning with Woodrow Wilson, complained bitterly about Congress interfering in what they viewed as their Executive privilege to discharge federal officers without the consent of Congress, the statue remained on the books and was presumptively valid for more than 50 years. And it's worth noting that the Court, when it ruled in Myers, was liberal in it's interpretations and, in the body of the ruling found it necessary to weasel its way around the long-standing acquiescence to the Tenure in Office Act by the Executive Branch in order to justify its ruling. Ordinarily, a statute that addresses ambiguities in the Constitution, such as the unstated but implied authority of a President to discharge Congress-approved officers without the consent of Congress, is presumed to be constitutional, and when it is observed and not challenged for a long period of time, the court is to give deference to historic practice in judging the validity of the law.
Because the Constitution only expressly discusses the constraints upon a President in the APPOINTMENT of certain officers that require Congressional consent, but makes NO MENTION of the process of DISCHARGING such officers, the Congress justifiably made law on the matter, and the Myers Court had to go far back into the debates on the Constitution to try to bolster its argument that the Founders never intended that the Congress have control over the discharge of certain Executive Branch officers.
Rightly or wrongly, the Myers ruling overturns the Tenure in Office act and grants the President plenary authority to discharge federal officers without Congressional consent.
But that's ALL IT DOES. It does NOT stand for the proposition that the President may ignore the law. Nowhere in the ruling does the Court even suggest this. In fact, it's careful analysis of the various cases and controversies that came before it, and other courts, over time, demonstrates that the proper recourse for a dispute about the constitutionality of a law, even one which trenches upon Presidential executive authority, is recourse to the courts, not independent judicial decision-making sua sponte by the President.
Our conclusion on the merits, sustained by the arguments before stated, is that Article II grants to the President [p164] the executive power of the Government, i.e., the general administrative control of those executing the laws, including the power of appointment and removal of executive officers -- a conclusion confirmed by his obligation to take care that the laws be faithfully executed; that Article II excludes the exercise of legislative power by Congress to provide for appointments and removals, except only as granted therein to Congress in the matter of inferior offices; that Congress is only given power to provide for appointments and removals of inferior officers after it has vested, and on condition that it does vest, their appointment in other authority than the President with the Senate's consent; that the provisions of the second section of Article II, which blend action by the legislative branch, or by part of it, in the work of the executive are limitations to be strictly construed, and not to be extended by implication; that the President's power of removal is further established as an incident to his specifically enumerated function of appointment by and with the advice of the Senate, but that such incident does not, by implication, extend to removals the Senate's power of checking appointments, and finally that to hold otherwise would make it impossible for the President, in case of political or other differences with the Senate or Congress, to take care that the laws be faithfully executed.
...
When, on the merits, we find our conclusion strongly favoring the view which prevailed in the First Congress, we have no hesitation in holding that conclusion to be correct, and it therefore follows that the Tenure of Office Act of 1867, insofar as it attempted to prevent the President from removing executive officer who had been appointed by him by and with the advice and consent of the Senate, was invalid, and that subsequent legislation of the same effect was equally so. Source:
Myers v. United States, 272 U.S. 52 (1926)
Seth wrote:
Civiletti's opinion, which you cite, is an example of over-reading and cherry-picking a case to make a specific argument.
I disagree. Moreover, your argument is based on nothing at all, besides your own opinion. You haven't cited anything at all for the proposition that the Court has the power to declare laws unconstitutional, but the President does not. So, if overreaching is objectionable to you, then you ought to start with your own argument, which is based on nothing.
Well, since declaring laws unconstitutional is inherently a judicial act, and the President is not a part of the Judicial Branch, I would think it would be pretty obvious why the Supreme Court, which IS a part of the Judicial Branch, is empowered to render judicial judgments.
Further, nowhere in the concept of "executive" is judicial authority found. The Executive Branch is tasked with the day-to-day operations of the federal government and its employees, and it is bound to "faithful enforcement" of the laws passed by the Legislative Branch.
The whole Separation of Powers Doctrine is based on a sharp and distinct division of authority between the three branches of government, and that they may not trench upon the authority of the other branches without constitutional authority to do so.
That being the case, you will now need to point to what explicit or implied authority in the Executive Branch gives the President authority to either make law (a Legislative Branch prerogative) or judge the validity of a law (a Judicial Branch prerogative).
I'll be fascinated to see your authorities on this subject.
Seth wrote:
His reference to Freytag v. Commissioner is a reference to a dissenting opinion by Justice Scalia in which Scalia says, in obiter dictum, "The means selected were various, including a separate political constituency, to which he alone was responsible, and the power to veto encroaching laws, see Art. I, § 7, or even to disregard them when they are unconstitutional. See Easterbrook, Presidential Review, 40 Case W.Res.L.Rev. 905, 920-924 (1990)." (emphasis added)
He then refers to other opinions of LAWYERS (not the Supreme Court) and points to an alleged acquiescence by the courts to Presidential "signing statements" without acknowledging that the Court cannot act sua sponte to resolve such matters, but must await the presentation of the question to them in the proper form.
That's because the Supreme Court hasn't passed on the issue that Scalia was referring to directly. However, the opinion of 4 supreme court justices (none of the other 5 addressed the issue at all), is persuasive evidence of what the law is, when the opposite opinion is advanced without support.
Wrong. Such statements are called "obiter dicta" and they are interesting insights into the thinking of the Justices, but they have no LEGAL PRECEDENT. Only the ruling itself has binding legal precedent. Dicta statements are useful to lawyers who might be preparing a case in an attempt to persuade a judge (including a Supreme Court Justice) of the validity of their legal reasoning, but they are NOT part of the ruling and they are NOT precedent.
And, yes, the question has to be presented to the SCOTUS in proper form. That is, someone has to be arrested or charged or sued, and there has to be an actual case and actual controversy over the issue, and it has to reach the SCOTUS and the SCOTUS has to accept cert. That may never happen. The President need not wait for that to happen.
Show me the constitutional authority of the President to make judicial determinations regarding the constitutionality of a law. If you cannot, which you cannot, then the President is bound to exercise the judicial process just as any other plaintiff would be. If he believes that a law of Congress, like the Tenure in Office Act unconstitutionally trenches upon his executive authority to fire federal officials, he can file a case in court like anybody else who has a constitutional claim. Nowhere in his executive authority is he granted power to ignore the law, and in fact he is constitutionally REQUIRED by Article II, Section 3, to "faithfully enforce" the law. If the Founders had intended the President to have the power to render an "Executive Veto" over a law passed by Congress over his veto, and if they had intended to grant to the President the power to engage in "Executive Judicial Determination" of the constitutionality of the Acts of Congress, they would have done so. They did not. In fact, they expressly commanded the President to "faithfully enforce" ALL of the laws of Congress, and the Separation of Powers Doctrine requires him to defer to the Supreme Court when it comes to interpreting or throwing out laws.
Seth wrote:
Civiletti says,
"The President should presume that enactments are constitutional. There will be some occasions, however, when a statute appears to conflict with the Constitution. In such cases, the President can and should exercise his independent judgment to determine whether the statute is constitutional. In reaching a conclusion, the President should give great deference to the fact that Congress passed the statute and that Congress believed it was upholding its obligation to enact constitutional legislation. Where possible, the President should construe provisions to avoid constitutional problems."
The problem with this is that he is basing his recommendation on the opinions of lawyers, not upon the requirements of the Constitution or the rulings of the Supreme Court, which has never squarely addressed the issue.
The fact that the SCOTUS hasn't addressed the issue doesn't preclude the President from finding that it is unconstitutional. His hands aren't tied, waiting for some industrious litigant to spend the $200,000 needed to get from a trial court to the US Supreme Court, on the if-come that the SCOTUS will accept Certiorari, which it need not do.
True, the fact that the SCOTUS has not ruled does not preclude the President from finding a law unconstitutional, the Separation of Powers Doctrine and Article II, Section 3 does. The President simply has no power or authority to pass judgment on the laws Congress enacts, with the sole exceptions of the Veto and the Pardon. The legal maxim
Expressio unius est exclusio alterius ("the express mention of one thing excludes all others") requires that where certain "legislative" or "judicial" authorities are expressly mentioned as being within the authority of the President in the Constitution, that the FAILURE to mention OTHER legislative or judicial powers is deliberate and intentional, and that other things (powers or authorities) of the same kind, CANNOT be assumed or granted.
Thus, the Veto and the Pardon, being expressly mentioned as executive powers that fall OUTSIDE of the ordinary executive powers available to the President, one being a legislative function (the veto) and the other being a judicial function (the pardon), limit the President's authority to those expressly-mentioned powers, and NO OTHERS (
Expressio unius est exclusio alterius).
So, the Founders, recognizing a need for the President to exercise LIMITED legislative and LIMITED judicial powers, expressly mentioned and authorized those exercises in the Constitution. But in so doing they DENIED to the President ANY OTHER legislative or judicial powers, including the power to exercise a super-veto of a law passed over his legislative veto, and the power to "determine" whether a law is unconstitutional, which is an expressly judicial, not an executive, function.
Seth wrote:
The President should not merely "presume" that enactments are constitutional, he is REQUIRED to see that the laws enacted by Congress are "faithfully enforce" unless and until they are declared unconstitutional by a competent authority, which means the courts.
Here is where you are just dead wrong. You cite no Constitutional authority for this. You complain that my authority is insufficient, but you make an argument with zero authority behind it. The SCOTUS never ruled thusly. The Executive Branch takes the opposite position you take. And, the Congress inquired of the AG as to what the requirement was and the Office of Legal Council said that the President could make his own determination whether a statute was constitutional or not.
I have just done so. And the AG does not make law either, he just gives opinions, which Congress, and the Court are free to ignore.
The President has an obligation to protect and defend the Constitution. Enforcing unconstitutional laws does not do that. Does it?
Yup. But since all laws duly enacted by Congress are PRESUMPTIVELY CONSTITUTIONAL, according to the canons of legislative interpretation used by the courts, the President is obliged to enforce all laws unless and until they are declared by a court of competent jurisdiction to be unconstitutional. His duty to preserve, protect and defend the Constitution therefore REQUIRES him to bring a case challenging a statute he believes is unconstitutional before the court for adjudication. Nowhere does his oath permit him to determine for himself what is constitutional and what is not. If this were true, he could simply declare any law that he disliked to be unconstitutional and enforce, or not enforce however it pleases him, and it would place the burden upon citizens who were damaged by his refusal to enforce a law, or his enforcement of a law in a manner not authorized by Congress, to challenge the President's actions.
This makes of the President a tyrant, who can simply declare every law issued by Congress to be "unconstitutional" and thereby become a tyrant in fact, free to run the country as he sees fit while ignoring the representatives of the people. This was not only never contemplated by the Founders, it was expressly PREVENTED by them pursuant to Article II, Section 3 and the Separation of Powers Doctrine.
Under your theory the POTUS must continue to enforce a law he thinks is unconstitutional, on the if-come that the SCOTUS is ever going to decide it, which might be one year, or 5 years, or 10 years down the road, or never.
Wrong. The President can mount a legal challenge to any statute he believes to be unconstitutional on the basis that enforcing it would violate his duty to preserve, protect and defend the Constitution, or on the basis that the law (like the Tenure in Office Act) trenches unconstitutionally upon his executive authority.
Seth wrote:
Even the Supreme Court is required by the canons of legislative interpretation to make the strong presumption that a duly-enacted statute is constitutional, and the bar for finding a statute unconstitutional is quite high, and the courts are required to defer to legislative judgment unless the act is manifestly a violation of some superior constitutional provision, in order to avoid usurping the role of the legislature.
That's a rule of construction created by the SCOTUS. It's not some immutable constitutional concept. They don't presume all laws to be constitutional. Laws that make distinctions based on certain classifications - like race - are strictly scrutinized and not at all presumed to be valid. These are not "canons" - they are rules of construction.
Wrong. The supremacy of the Legislative Branch in making law requires the Court to give strong deference to the legislature, which is the representative of the People. Courts must presume such acts to be valid, and may not, sua sponte, rule a law invalid. They must await a case properly brought and argued challenging the constitutionality of a statute. The level of scrutiny applied, which is to say the legal bar that the plaintiff must hurdle in proving the law unconstitutional varies with the specific law and whether it trenches upon fundamental constitutional rights or not. But it is the case that all duly-enacted laws are given the presumption of constitutionality, and that a case must be proven to the satisfaction of the court that the law is NOT constitutional.
Now, it is true that the Congress, or the People, could amend the Constitution to set the bar for constitutional scrutiny at some other level than that created by the courts, but they have not done so.
Seth wrote:
To say that the President has greater powers than the Supreme Court, and may, in his sovereign judgment, and without recourse to the tribunal appointed to resolve such issues,
The SCOTUS is not appointed to resolve such issues. Nothing in the Constitution gives the SCOTUS that power. The SCOTUS gave itself that power in Marbury v Madison and the court opined that it was an "implied" power. The President is not "above" the SCOTUS - the President is equal to the SCOTUS and within its purview may determine a statute unconstitutional and not enforce it.
No, he's not. He is the Chief Executive, not the Chief Justice. You need to go read the Federalist Papers and perhaps some of the original debates, where you will discover that the Founders clearly separated the executive functions, the legislative functions, and the judicial functions into the three branches of government, granting DIFFERENT powers to each branch. Your fallacious construction suggests that the Supreme Court, as "equal" to the President, can exercise executive functions, run the military, hire and fire federal employees or negotiate treaties, and that the Congress, which is also presumably "equal" can do the same. This, of course, is utter nonsense.
Only Progressives believe that the Separation of Powers Doctrine does not constrain the President to the executive role and grants him legislative and judicial powers. And they are delusionally wrong.
Seth wrote:
declare sua sponte that a law duly enacted by Congress is unconstitutional is to vest supreme judicial authority in the President, and nowhere in the Constitution is such authority even suggested.
The Constitution vests executive power in the President and that executive power must be undertaken in accordance with the constitution. Enforcing unconstitutional laws is an improper execution of executive power. It is not only the President's power, but his DUTY to preserve and protect and defend the Cosntitution, and if he sees that a law is unconstitutional it would exceed his executive authority and violate the constitution to enforce it.
And his recourse is to set a case before the court for adjudication.
Or, are you claiming that enforcing unconstitutional laws is part of the President's duty to preserve, protect and defend the Constitution? That does appear to be what you are claiming. You state that the President has to be "see no evil, hear no evil, speak no evil" and simply bow to the Congress - if Congress enacts a law, the President (a coequal political branch) in your opinion must accept the Congress' determination. If the POTUS thinks the law is unconstitutional, he has no choice but to wait for SCOTUS to get a writ of certiorari from a litigant, and then SCOTUS has to accept cert and make a decision, and if SCOTUS doesn't accept cert then POTUS is fucked on that issue. Yes?
Nope. He has full authority to bring a case before the court for resolution. He can even ask for an injunction to prevent its enforcement and an expedited appeal if it's a critical matter requiring the swift adjudication of justice. Of course, to obtain such an injunction, he has to show a substantial likelyhood of success on the merits of the case.
Seth wrote:
But his opinion is just that, and is not a particularly strong one either.
Stronger than yours. Yours makes no sense, and places places POTUS in the position of having to sit there and enforce laws POTUS has found are unconstitutional, and simply hope the SCOTUS some day gets a case or controversy to decide. That's not the law, never has been the law, and you have not even advanced one shred of legal support whether from the Constitution, a federal law, or a SCOTUS opinion, or even the opinion of a lawyer, counsel, judge, or anyone else, to support your personal supposition. If any opinion is "not particularly strong" it's the one you are advancing.

Hardly. My opinion is supported by the Constitution, history, and the statements of the Founders regarding the separation of powers.
"Seth is Grandmaster Zen Troll who trains his victims to troll themselves every time they think of him" Robert_S
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