Preface
This book is intended to elucidate United States policy during the Korean War and to describe the strategies and command methods by which that policy was carried out. The major decisions that determined the United States course in Korea and continued to influence the nation's responses to Communist aggression during the two decades that followed were taken during the first twelve months of the Korean fighting. Although the war continued for another two years, no significant change was made in the policy developed between President Truman's decision to intervene in June 1950 and the beginning of Armistice negotiations at Kaesong in July 1951. This book concentrates on that initial period.
One of the unique aspects of the Korean War was the close control which Washington maintained at all times over operations in the field. Routine transactions and problems which during World War II would have been handled by a theater commander became, during Korea, matters of great concern to the nation's highest officials in Washington. These exceptional practices were owing in large part to the scarcity of United States military resources when the war began and to the real danger that a miscalculation in Korea might result in a full-scale war with the Soviet Union and/or Communist China. The vast distance between Washington and the Far East served to hinder effective, timely communication, further complicating the problems of directing the war.
I was not aware of it at the time, but work on this book began three days after the North Korean invasion when I, as an Army captain of artillery assigned to the Historical Branch, G-2, GHQ, FEC, in Tokyo, was called to General MacArthur's personal file room in the Dai Ichi Building to examine copies of first teleconferences between CINCFE and Washington. Notes taken that day marked the beginning of nearly three years of research in Tokyo and, briefly, in Korea. Upon my return to Washington in mid-1953 I was designated to prepare the present volume. The first draft of this work was submitted to the Office, Chief of Military History, in June 1956 concurrently with my transfer to Paris, where I served until June 1960 as Chief Historian, SHAPE and Allied Command Europe. Returning to the Office of the Chief of Military History in July 1960 I was able, although assigned additional duties, to make revisions indicated as a result of the intensive review and criticism of the manuscript that had taken place in my four-year absence. Following my retirement from the Army in August 1964 further revision was performed by Mr. Billy C. Mossman and by Dr. Stetson Conn, then Chief Historian.
So many individuals have contributed to the present volume that it would be impossible for me to thank all of them publicly. There are those, however, to whom I owe special debts of gratitude. During the early years of my work on this history I received particular encouragement and very wise counsel from Col. Allison R. Hartman, then Chief, Historical Branch, G-2, GHQ, FEC. Among those outside critics who have reviewed all or part of the manuscript in its various stages and to whom I am indebted for valuable comments and ideas are General J. Lawton Collins, General Matthew B. Ridgway, Lt. Gen. Edward M. Almond, Mr. Robert Amory, formerly Deputy for Intelligence, Central Intelligence Agency, and Mr. Wilber W. Hoare, Jr., Chief, Historical Division, Joint Chiefs of Staff.
Other individuals within the Office of the Chief of Military History whose help and advice have been exceptionally valuable to me include the Editor in Chief, Mr. Joseph R. Friedman, whose literary guidance has contributed greatly in the final revision of the manuscript; Mr. Charles V. P. von Luttichau, who is responsible for the fine maps which accompany the text; Dr. Louis Morton and Dr. John Miller, jr., for their suggestions and criticism while they were with the Office of the Chief of Military History; Mr. David Jaffe, whose diligence and skill as an editor I have good reason to appreciate; and Mrs. Stephanie B. Demma, who rendered most able assistance to Mr. Jaffe. The index was prepared by Mr. Nicholas J. Anthony.
Finally, I would be remiss were I not to recognize gratefully the support I received from the several Chiefs of Military History under whom I served during the preparation of this volume: Maj. Gen. Orlando Ward, Maj. Gen. Albert C. Smith, Brig. Gen. James A. Norell, Brig. Gen. William H. Harris, and Brig. Gen. Hal C. Pattison.
That I have acknowledged the contributions made by those persons named above in no way implies that they share responsibility for the interpretations of this book or for any deficiencies that it may have. Responsibility for them is mine alone
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