The subjective observer is a fictional character

[Surendra Darathy]

Are you introducing psychology into the proceedings?

If you think I have introduced anything into the proceedings that implies I want to talk about more than what we can intersubjectively and empirically discuss, point out what it is. This includes the language that people use to describe their "subjective experience". What is a fact is the language, and the content of it is fiction. Would I deny that literature exists? No. Would I deny that I "enjoy" literature? No. All I've done as far as you know is used the word "enjoy" in a way that is in accord with the dictionary and syntactic requirements, and it means I am expressing an opinion. I use the word "enjoy" to distinguish it from statements where I use the word "despise". My purpose is to communicate, not to control your "mind".

Opinions are like assholes. Everybody has one. When we say of a dancer that "he has two left feet", we don't mean it literally. It's like judging the free skate at the Olympics. Somebody's going to be pissed off about the medal results. Not so in a hockey game. At the end of the game, everybody sees the same score. But even there, sometimes it's not clear whether or not a goal really was scored before the net came off its posts.

When we express our beliefs, they are just opinions. We now have criteria that take us away from the merely-opinionated, and to declare what is empirically so. It is an opinion to say "the subjective observer is a fictional character" as much as it is to say "your immortal soul is in jeopardy". Everyone is entitled to an opinion, but trying to control other people's minds is a "minefield". Generally, it just leads to acrimony.

[SpeedOfSound]

Okay, but I'm not interested in the specific structure of brain states. So I'll by-pass this.

You ask how the physical model of mind explains things and then reject any talk about the physical model of mind. Is that consistent?

[jamest]

Okay, but I'm not interested in the specific structure of brain states. So I'll by-pass this.

You ask how the physical model of mind explains things and then reject any talk about the physical model of mind. Is that consistent?

What difference does it make what the brain looks like internally? I'm just interested in the claims about what it does. And none of my counters are going to be along the lines of "banana-shaped regions of matter cannot do that".

[jamest]

Are you introducing psychology into the proceedings?

If you think I have introduced anything into the proceedings that implies I want to talk about more than what we can intersubjectively and empirically discuss, point out what it is.

Well, we could discuss the relevance of social constructionism, if you like? Or psychoanalysis?

I'm not the one who mentioned processes of acquiring identity, as though there was no individual prior to this process. I'd very much like to hear your version of what this process entails.

[GrahamH]

Okay, but I'm not interested in the specific structure of brain states. So I'll by-pass this.

You ask how the physical model of mind explains things and then reject any talk about the physical model of mind. Is that consistent?

What difference does it make what the brain looks like internally? I'm just interested in the claims about what it does. And none of my counters are going to be along the lines of "banana-shaped regions of matter cannot do that".

'What it does' is not separable from 'what it is'. The structure is the function. We can talk in analogies but to grasp the argument you will need to engage with the issue of structure and growth of patterns.

Would you seek understanding of trees yet say you didn't what to know about their structure? Can you understand what a tree does without understanding what its structure is and how it grows?

Would you try to comprehend how computers work but ignore all discussion of digital logic circuits and silicon chips?

If you take such an approach you gain only abstract knowledge of the system that leaves that actual causal mechanisms hidden and mysterious. Perhaps you prefer it that way. Maybe you prefer to talk about program and data than to grasp what it is a computer really does behind that abstract façade.

[GrahamH]

Are you introducing psychology into the proceedings?

If you think I have introduced anything into the proceedings that implies I want to talk about more than what we can intersubjectively and empirically discuss, point out what it is.

Well, we could discuss the relevance of social constructionism, if you like? Or psychoanalysis?

I'm not the one who mentioned processes of acquiring identity, as though there was no individual prior to this process. I'd very much like to hear your version of what this process entails.

As you say, such topics start from a pre-existing and complex mind. I don't think it will help this discussion to turn in that direction.

The only reason I mentioned identity at all was that LI suggested that his 'subjective experiencer' absolutely must be continuous. I suggested this is quite possibly a mistake since it relies on some way to identify a moment of 'awareness' with previous (remembered) moments.

You then asked how physical brains could produce individual minds, rather than all-identical minds, which I think has been answered more than adequately for this topic.

SD's passing reference to identity in response was not an invitation to digress into personal identity issues.

[Kenny Login]

I'm intrigued as to how someone would go about eliminating the observer rather than merely accounting for the fiction? How would scientific knowledge alone do the job? It's hard to imagine a world where neuro/cognitive science has totally superceded folk psychology through advancements in those fields, even if this was a desirable state (a big if).

I think also the terms observer/subjectivity/awareness are being used interchangeably and none of these necessarily equate to the individual personality. For example the big mind that LI speaks of is of quite a different order it would seem.

[jamest]

Okay, but I'm not interested in the specific structure of brain states. So I'll by-pass this.

You ask how the physical model of mind explains things and then reject any talk about the physical model of mind. Is that consistent?

What difference does it make what the brain looks like internally? I'm just interested in the claims about what it does. And none of my counters are going to be along the lines of "banana-shaped regions of matter cannot do that".

'What it does' is not separable from 'what it is'. The structure is the function. We can talk in analogies but to grasp the argument you will need to engage with the issue of structure and growth of patterns.

Would you seek understanding of trees yet say you didn't what to know about their structure? Can you understand what a tree does without understanding what its structure is and how it grows?

Would you try to comprehend how computers work but ignore all discussion of digital logic circuits and silicon chips?

If you take such an approach you gain only abstract knowledge of the system that leaves that actual causal mechanisms hidden and mysterious. Perhaps you prefer it that way. Maybe you prefer to talk about program and data than to grasp what it is a computer really does behind that abstract façade.

Look Graham, I understood what you said about growing roots. But I'm not about to present my counter grounded upon something I saw on 'Garderner's World', am I? Clearly, I've had other things on my mind.

[Kenny Login]

'What it does' is not separable from 'what it is'. The structure is the function.

I think there is a lot of merit in this approach generally, although trees and computers being quite different to an observer (fictional or otherwise), it may benefit from a different approach.

[GrahamH]

I'm intrigued as to how someone would go about eliminating the observer rather than merely accounting for the fiction? How would scientific knowledge alone do the job? It's hard to imagine a world where neuro/cognitive science has totally superceded folk psychology through advancements in those fields, even if this was a desirable state (a big if).

I think also the terms observer/subjectivity/awareness are being used interchangeably and none of these necessarily equate to the individual personality. For example the big mind that LI speaks of is of quite a different order it would seem.

My interest is in accounting for the fiction. If the fiction can be established there is no 'Subjective Observer' and 'observation' is brain activity. I.e. the brain observes the world, including its own person (but not itself as a brain).

[GrahamH]

'What it does' is not separable from 'what it is'. The structure is the function.

I think there is a lot of merit in this approach generally, although trees and computers being quite different to an observer (fictional or otherwise), it may benefit from a different approach.

This line of reasoning is about how a physical system can acquire 'knowledge' that affects how the system behaves. It was precipitated by James' questions about individual minds.

[jamest]

Well, we could discuss the relevance of social constructionism, if you like? Or psychoanalysis?

I'm not the one who mentioned processes of acquiring identity, as though there was no individual prior to this process. I'd very much like to hear your version of what this process entails.

As you say, such topics start from a pre-existing and complex mind. I don't think it will help this discussion to turn in that direction.

The only reason I mentioned identity at all was that LI suggested that his 'subjective experiencer' absolutely must be continuous. I suggested this is quite possibly a mistake since it relies on some way to identify a moment of 'awareness' with previous (remembered) moments.

You then asked how physical brains could produce individual minds, rather than all-identical minds, which I think has been answered more than adequately for this topic.

SD's passing reference to identity in response was not an invitation to digress into personal identity issues.

But it's relevant and something that you have to incorporate into your theory. I mean, how an organism - especially a human - responds to its environment, depends very much upon the traits inherent within their personality. Now, it is quite clear that the environment alone cannot be held responsible for the diversity of human personality and demeanour, yet your theory implies that it should be. So, you have some explaining to do. And you still haven't addressed the problem of beliefs, either.

[GrahamH]

Well, we could discuss the relevance of social constructionism, if you like? Or psychoanalysis?

I'm not the one who mentioned processes of acquiring identity, as though there was no individual prior to this process. I'd very much like to hear your version of what this process entails.

As you say, such topics start from a pre-existing and complex mind. I don't think it will help this discussion to turn in that direction.

The only reason I mentioned identity at all was that LI suggested that his 'subjective experiencer' absolutely must be continuous. I suggested this is quite possibly a mistake since it relies on some way to identify a moment of 'awareness' with previous (remembered) moments.

You then asked how physical brains could produce individual minds, rather than all-identical minds, which I think has been answered more than adequately for this topic.

SD's passing reference to identity in response was not an invitation to digress into personal identity issues.

But it's relevant and something that you have to incorporate into your theory. I mean, how an organism - especially a human - responds to its environment, depends very much upon the traits inherent within their personality. Now, it is quite clear that the environment alone cannot be held responsible for the diversity of human personality and demeanour, yet your theory implies that it should be. So, you have some explaining to do. And you still haven't addressed the problem of beliefs, either.

In summary, different brain = different mind = different personality. Personality is how people respond to circumstances.

Some differences are from the genetic inheritance lottery (shich chromosome mix you get from your parents) , some from gestation, some from life experience. I don't intend to attempt to explain details of personality in terms of neurology! That is a very different topic.

[SpeedOfSound]

Okay, but I'm not interested in the specific structure of brain states. So I'll by-pass this.

You ask how the physical model of mind explains things and then reject any talk about the physical model of mind. Is that consistent?

What difference does it make what the brain looks like internally? I'm just interested in the claims about what it does. And none of my counters are going to be along the lines of "banana-shaped regions of matter cannot do that".

Which is a little ridiculous. No. A lot ridiculous. You want an explanation that involves nothing deeper than how the mush in a muskmelon might be conscious. This I believe is indicative of your belief system and the closing of your mind.

But not here. If you want to argue about functionality with intelligent people then you are going to have to talk about more than fruit.

YOU are the one that asked questions about how the brain does things.

[jamest]

Okay, but I'm not interested in the specific structure of brain states. So I'll by-pass this.

You ask how the physical model of mind explains things and then reject any talk about the physical model of mind. Is that consistent?

What difference does it make what the brain looks like internally? I'm just interested in the claims about what it does. And none of my counters are going to be along the lines of "banana-shaped regions of matter cannot do that".

Which is a little ridiculous. No. A lot ridiculous. You want an explanation that involves nothing deeper than how the mush in a muskmelon might be conscious. This I believe is indicative of your belief system and the closing of your mind.

But not here. If you want to argue about functionality with intelligent people then you are going to have to talk about more than fruit.

YOU are the one that asked questions about how the brain does things.

Look, Graham's theory is that brain states are responses to the environment and that words/languages are just consequences or bi-products of these brain states. So, for the sake of argument - in order to explore the possibility of this theory being correct - I'm willing to accept this base premise... and ask him to explain how such a theory can account for emotions; beliefs; personality; etc..
Clearly, the precise structure of the brain isn't going to be the focus of such a discussion, because if I ask him to explain and incorporate emotions; beliefs; personality; etc., into his theory, then answers such as "this can be explained because region x of the brain is shaped like a banana", will not suffice. That is, unless Graham has a mechanism in mind so accurate that he can answer my questions purely in terms of physical dynamics - as if I asked him how a bike could move, or suchlike - then Graham is required to answer my questions beyond those parameters.

The questions that I have asked Graham to answer go right to the heart of the controversies of his theory (which seems to me to be on a par with eliminative materialism). So, for instance, if Graham says that human behaviour and language are just effects of brain states that themselves are responses/effects to/of the environment, then he needs to present a logical account of how such a process could yield beliefs; emotions; erroneous thoughts; etc.. It would certainly be useless if Graham's response to my questions was that "region x of the brain is shaped like a banana". That is, there is no controversy - as far as I'm concerned - with the shape or structure or mechanism of the brain that might produce such effects. The controversy - as far as I'm concerned - is inherent within the proposed process itself. That is, I don't see how the brain's response to its environment could EVER lead to beliefs; emotions; personality; etc.. For me, then, it doesn't matter what the internal structure of the brain is. My problem then, is not with the brain's structure, but with the ability of the proposed process to produce the aforementioned traits within humanity.

If you think that Graham's theory has included sufficient physical detail to answer my questions, then you're living in a land full of clouds and cuckoos. Therefore, we must concentrate on the proposed process, or we have nothing at all to consider.

This is probably my last attempt at trying to explain this to you, as I don't envisage that you will have anything new or interesting-enough to say that will motivate me to respond again to a post with similar content. If you don't understand the issues here, then that's a problem inherent within your own thinking - not mine.