The subjective observer is a fictional character

[Surendra Darathy]

No, Kenny. A question of ontology is brought up by metaphysicians, while metaphysicians have yet to show that ontologic questions lead anywhere except up the poop chute of wibbling.

No. You may consciously find the thought of spending a Sunday afternoon discussing ontology repugnant, but sub- and pre-conscious processing does in fact operate to determine real from non-real, and all of the messy bits inbetween.

That's "real-empirical", Kenny, not "real-ontological". Jeeezuz Christ on a stick with chocolate sauce and a coating of nuts. Sorry, Kenny. I just don't suffer foolishness gladly, and after seeing enough of it, I start to suspect the source of it.

Real-empirical is distinct from empirical-imaginary, model-wise, (except that in mathematics the axis of reals is orthogonal to the axis of imaginaries.) Did you know that complex numbers incorporating "imaginary" parts are more real than real numbers? At least as far as their utility in physics is concerned? Do you know anything except a bunch of pompous-sounding language you cribbed from a book somewhere, incorporating such content free wibbling as

This could be rephrased as a question of whether there is any significant difference between R1, and those bits of R1 that make themselves accessible to R2 programmes. It's a demand consistent with R2 that evidence be communicated and then offered up for review and evaluation. R1 does not place these demands, but then to lump everything under R1 is a bit unsatisfying since it renders most psychological and neuro research meaningless.

R1 and R2 are tried as part of a model, and claiming R2 and R1 have some sort of ontology is plain bullshit, but I think that is what you are wibbling at, just above, if the paragraph can be taken to have any content whatsoever. You obfuscate so intensely, it's really hard to tell whether or not you're really trying to say anything. My personal opinion, pending your capacity to state your points plainly, is that you're not trying to say anything, but rather, to appear erudite by use of complicated diction without any structure.

It may be that if you try to bend R1/R2 modeling into some sort of structure with ontology, you will break it. Back to the drawing-board, then, Kenny. Your shipment of fail has arrived.

[SpeedOfSound]

SOS if I read correctly, roughly

1 There are 10^11 neurons.

2 There are 10^15 synaptic connections

3 Therefore 10^26 different brain structures.

Is each synapse different depending on its Long Term Potentiation state?

If so do you have a figure on the range of LTP states per synapse or is it virtually continuous?

Do you think that a brains response to stimuli (including ‘no stimuli’*) is affected by its.:-

1 structure as in 3 above.

2 The LTP ‘state’ of each synapse

3 The electrical/synapse firing just prior to stimulus.


* no stimuli in the sense ‘no preset test condition’. There being no such thing as no inbound electrical firing.


If this is the case a given response to a give stimuli from a given brain could be very similar or wildly different as in


‘Tree’

And

‘That’s enough trees ed.’


edit spelling

100 billion neurons each with up to 10,000 synapses or inputs. One to about a 100 outputs with 1 being common.

Probably the average number of synapses is 1000 so we have 100 trillion connections.

Each synapse is effectively continuously variable. There are a number of types of memory ranging from 2 secs to your lifetime. The short term memory is in ions laying around and the passing states of transmembrane receptors. The longer term (>2 sec.) is a complicated interplay of receptor states, ionic concentration and eventually genes being turned on to grow new connections and receptors.

The brains response is affected by EVERYTHING. All three of your items above. The important thing to remember is that all states are historically accumulated in complex ways. In essence everything is recorded in state but then the effects of state drop off over time with only the long term memory being etched for life.

It's damned hard to talk about because reality in your brain is smeared out over time in many different biochemical systems. Each system has it's own temporality.

Did I confuse further our answer your question?

Perhaps being confused is the best way to be.

[SpeedOfSound]

The empirical model entails an ontology because it speaks of a reality where brains interact with empirical objects. But the reality of the situation, is that the brain is just responding to its own internal states.

You're right about an ontology being entailed. (NB: Scientists please note - entailed rather than stated axiomatically). But I would say if you're persuing this line, then talk of 'external' becomes redundant.

Models are not to be dirtied with questions about ontology. To discuss a physical model of the brain you have to stay in closure within that model.

Any R2 model of brain function is going to talk about the spatial locations and boundaries of body, brain, and environment.

If we keep crossing over into the claims of idealists then we aren't talking about our model anymore are we?

James keeps trying to fuck things up with this:

the brain has no access to anything, other than its own internal states.

No No. If we are called upon to explain things with our model then you y'all don't get to sully up our model with your metaphysical conclusions.

But I would like to point something out that is often missed. To even begin to talk about how the brain has representations and those are our reality you have to take that knowledge from R2 knowledge of how brains work.

The idealist gambit of our brain only knows it's internals is science to begin with.

So what the fuck?

[Surendra Darathy]

If we are called upon to explain things with our model then you y'all don't get to sully up our model with your metaphysical conclusions.

I am willing to start a thread about how metaphysics is necessary just to roll out of bed in the morning, and then do a reductio ad absurdum on it. I'm sure it will be not only fun, but educational.

[jamest]

You can have another thread about ontology if you want, Kenny, but don't piss metaphysics all over a brain model thread.

Actually, as per the title of this thread, we're discussing brain models in relation to subjective (immaterial) observers being a fiction... which is actually a metaphysical claim, because it tries to refute a particular metaphysic (idealism) in the process of providing a proposed mechanism that makes sense of human behaviour without the need for such an observer. I am arguing that such models make no sense at all, which means that such models cannot explain-away the need for said observer. Further, any 'empirical' model is reducible to materialism, also, since it is founded upon the the interaction of brains and entities that reside separately and external to the brain. Just because empiricism claims to make no claims about 'reality', doesn't mean that none have been made in the process of formulating said model.

Is this a metaphysical discussion, then? Of course it is. So, who the fugg are you trying to kid? You need to get clued up on the real issues here.

[GrahamH]

The model includes interactions the brain makes with objects that are distinguished empirically from the brain in the model. The model includes brain activity when the brain is not interacting with objects distinct from it in the model. The model does not purport ontology for either the brain or the objects distinct from the brain. They are just distinct components of a model.

Models of how the world interacts with the brain to effect human behaviour are internal assessments, constructed by the brain, of a reality beyond the brain's sphere of existence. Such models assume an ontology! (Again, remove that fuggin foot from the door! And don't dare tell me that no ontology is assumed in such models, or I'll get my rope out too.)

Again, for the umpteenth time, the brain only has access to its own internal states. Nothing else. The brain is not privy to external events - it's only privy to internal events.

Do you reject causality James, even in a discussion of a hypothetical model, such as this? I assume you do, or you could not justify your claim that the brain only has access to its internal states.

The model under discussion is all about physical causal chains. If you can't talk about such things there is little point continuing here, is there?

If you could get past this nonsense about brains only responding to brain states, and accept the principle that they are part of causal chains from outside events, we could delve into how NNs encode meaningful information about those causal chains and produce meaningful responses to them.

[jamest]

If we keep crossing over into the claims of idealists then we aren't talking about our model anymore are we?

James keeps trying to fuck things up with this:

the brain has no access to anything, other than its own internal states.

No No. If we are called upon to explain things with our model then you y'all don't get to sully up our model with your metaphysical conclusions.

You're supposed to be explaining-away the need for an immaterial subjective observer. Perhaps then, you are conflating the word 'explain' with 'assertion'.
"The brain does this and that and interacts with this and that and fuck the subjective observer", is not an explanation, dude.

The crux of the issue is this: your model requires a brain that can be privy to nothing other than its own internal states. Consequently, this model faces a severe rational crisis, because an entity that can be privy to nothing other than itself needs to do two things in order to satisfy said model:

1) It has to assume that there is a reality external to itself.
2) It has to give external meaning to its internal states, to reflect this assumption.

Now, as discussed, the brain's responses to its NN's can neither be 'blind' nor automatic (not completely, anyway), since how the brain responds to those NNs is largely dependent upon the current objective of the brain. This means that the brain decides which response to make wrt any given set of NN's. And, therefore, this means that the brain must process the information as a whole to do this.

And so, the whole model is screwed.

I've explained this clearly, so I'm not sure that I want to say alot more on the matter. And I won't be wasting much time addressing people with ropes in their hands either.

Perhaps the time has now come to turn the tables: The brain is a fictional character.

[SpeedOfSound]

If we keep crossing over into the claims of idealists then we aren't talking about our model anymore are we?

James keeps trying to fuck things up with this:

the brain has no access to anything, other than its own internal states.

No No. If we are called upon to explain things with our model then you y'all don't get to sully up our model with your metaphysical conclusions.

You're supposed to be explaining-away the need for an immaterial subjective observer. Perhaps then, you are conflating the word 'explain' with 'assertion'.
"The brain does this and that and interacts with this and that and fuck the subjective observer", is not an explanation, dude.

Well!! I'm sorry Deuude!!!! But that's how fucking scientific explanations fucking work now isn't it? But you need a brain and then you need to be willing to use the brain to buckle down and have a hard think about it.

[jamest]

Do you reject causality James, even in a discussion of a hypothetical model, such as this? I assume you do, or you could not justify your claim that the brain only has access to its internal states.

Of course the brain only has access to its own internal states - EVEN IF THERE IS AN EXTERNAL WORLD. "Rejecting causality"? That's just a giant red herring. Even if I allow you to assume that the brain's internal states are caused by the external environment - which I have - the claim that the brain is only privy to its own internal states is still a true statement. Man, you must be getting desperate.

The model under discussion is all about physical causal chains. If you can't talk about such things there is little point continuing here, is there?

I have talked about such things - to the point where it was realised that such a model demands a brain that makes metaphysical assumptions and gives external meaning to its own internal states. That is, to the point where the model imploded upon itself because it made no sense.

Why do you think that I'm here - to just agree with you? Not quite. I'm here to destroy a model that claims to expose the immaterial subjective observer as a fictional character, by explaining-away the need for said character. Well, your model wasn't upto the task, I'm afraid.

[jamest]

The empirical model entails an ontology because it speaks of a reality where brains interact with empirical objects. But the reality of the situation, is that the brain is just responding to its own internal states.

You're right about an ontology being entailed. (NB: Scientists please note - entailed rather than stated axiomatically). But I would say if you're persuing this line, then talk of 'external' becomes redundant.

Actually, it's a side-issue that I have with the empiricists and relativists and so-called sceptics of this forum. I was just having a dig at them.

In which case you seem to be hinting at some way for mind to know directly? I'm waiting for the main course.....!

I'm an idealist, Kenny. Hadn't you guessed?

[Surendra Darathy]

I was just having a dig at them.

Yeah, and it was kinda like the way more than one shit-ass student I've met takes digs at the teacher for failing in his mission after the student failed the exam.

This means that the brain decides which response to make wrt any given set of NN's. And, therefore, this means that the brain must process the information as a whole to do this.

I mean, really, Jimmy. Do you think this is proven by the fact that you don't try to hold conversations with the shade over your lamp? You might otherwise be a very busy, busy boy. No wonder you have so little time for studying science.

Brain models suggest the first thing we respond to is motion. Lampshades are so... so... inert. I mean, there you sit in a windowless room (possibly in your Mom's basement), and it's full of motionless objects (to the exclusion of your fingers, vigourously typing into the internet forum window). How do you choose which of the motionless objects NOT to respond to? As a whole, I mean.

[SpeedOfSound]

Hard to find a place to begin. So much is so wrong.
...
Arrogance at it's finest.

Even if I allow you to assume that the brain's internal states are caused by the external environment

Of course the brain only has access to its own internal states
...
Now, as discussed,
...
or suchlike - then Graham is required to answer my questions beyond those parameters.
...
I have talked about such things -
to the point where it was realised that ...

CSG is a little arrogant. Well... But the difference is that he has earned it both by his genetic predisposition and the work he did to know what he was talking about. Arrogance is always aggravating but arrogance without the backing is just plain ugly and embarrasses the fambly. You great grand children will be reading what you write here.

You should try on a pair of humble.

I have talked about such things - to the point where it was realised that such a model demands a brain that makes metaphysical assumptions and gives external meaning to its own internal states.
That is, to the point where the model imploded upon itself because it made no sense.

One problem. Semantics is not metaphysics and does not require metaphysical assumptions.

If you had even the weakest grasp of the model being talked about you would not talking about the brain doing this and the brain doing that. You would also understand why an internal semantics is a dualist concept and completely unnecessary to this model.

But you don't understand and apparently either lack the tools to do so or lack the willingness.

I'm here to destroy a model that claims to expose the immaterial subjective observer as a fictional character,

In other words you want to prove the need for an immaterial soul. Strange that you consider yourself THE philosopher of the post hunter-gatherer man who is going to pull that off. The kind of arguments you have supplied thus far are barely proving that you can grasp two abstract concepts simultaneously. See next.

So, now it comes to the crunch: can you explain all human behaviour in terms of that behaviour being nought other than automatic responses to NNs?

You seem incapable of understanding the simplest of state machines. It's either/or with you. What? 20 pages and you are still swing on about

That is, there's nothing inherent within the environment that would cause an emotional response to an environmental event.

You have not made the barest beginning of an argument here. I sincerely doubt that will change because I doubt you will understand anything I've written in this post.

[SpeedOfSound]

Now, as discussed,
the brain's responses to its NN's can neither be 'blind' nor automatic (not completely, anyway),
since how the brain responds to those NNs
is largely dependent upon the current objective of the brain.
This means that the brain decides
which response to make wrt any given set of NN's.
And, therefore, this means that the brain must process the information as a whole to do this.

And so, the whole model is screwed.

The model is fine. It is your thinking that is screwed and skewed.

A simple state machine can do the things you are arguing against here. A robot can do this stuff. You are still operating with idealism that has been abandoned for for about a hundred years or more.

Read Chalmers about the Easy Problem. You haven't even grasped that much yet, let alone go on to the more difficult one of subjectivity.

Now once you realize your error there, if that's possible, we can go on to deeper questions of functionality and behavior. At that point the structure of the brain and it's function becomes important. You are not going to get way with dismissing it with this 'Clearly, the precise structure of the brain isn't going to be the focus of such a discussion' because it clearly is going to be the discussion.

One other thing. Quit talking about NN's like they were marbles rolling around loose inside your head. You should not use the terminology until you grasp it's basics. It's embarrassing.

You should also stop talking about the brain responding to NN's or anything else. Replace the word brain with Homunculus and it will look like you are attempting intellectual honesty.

[GrahamH]

Do you reject causality James, even in a discussion of a hypothetical model, such as this? I assume you do, or you could not justify your claim that the brain only has access to its internal states.

Of course the brain only has access to its own internal states - EVEN IF THERE IS AN EXTERNAL WORLD. "Rejecting causality"? That's just a giant red herring. Even if I allow you to assume that the brain's internal states are caused by the external environment - which I have - the claim that the brain is only privy to its own internal states is still a true statement. Man, you must be getting desperate.

It seems it is you who is desperate to avoid reason. If brain states are caused by exterior events then obviously the brain has access to data about the external world. That is has this access via neural states does not invalidate the external data.

The model under discussion is all about physical causal chains. If you can't talk about such things there is little point continuing here, is there?

I have talked about such things - to the point where it was realised that such a model demands a brain that makes metaphysical assumptions and gives external meaning to its own internal states. That is, to the point where the model imploded upon itself because it made no sense.

You have denied that causality applies between world and brain states, which is an assertion you cannot support.

Why do you think that I'm here - to just agree with you? Not quite. I'm here to destroy a model that claims to expose the immaterial subjective observer as a fictional character, by explaining-away the need for said character. Well, your model wasn't upto the task, I'm afraid.

I was prepared to give you the benefit of the doubt and allow the possibility that you might be interested in honest discussion and constructive criticism of an idea. Thank you for making explict that fact that you have no interest is such discourse. So, you are here only to oppose an idea that you don't like.

[colubridae]

I've tried to scan throough the thread but must have missed it.

what are being reffered to by NN?