The subjective observer is a fictional character

[SpeedOfSound]

This is significant:

If the brain is only aware of NNs, then correlating those NN's to external events/objects requires semantics about different 'things' (things different to the NN's themselves).
'Reality' for the brain, is itself - the states of itself. Clearly, for the brain to think that its own internal states refer to another reality (other than itself), requires the utilisation and understanding of an ontology that the brain simply has no direct encounter with. The problem now stands out like a sore thumb: that of the brain correlating events within itself, with events external to itself.

My goodness, your model is in serious trouble.

We'll just keep explaining this to you every day anew like you were a loved one suffering from Alzheimers.

You haven't read my posts have you? Or perhaps not understood them?

[GrahamH]

SoS and SD have pointed out your error on this. You are thinking naive R1 and dualism when you are supposed to be looking at things as physical processes.

It should be obvious that by the model under discussion the brain isn't a dualist observer of brain states. Brain states are not perceived, they are perception. Brain states are not considered, they are cognition.

Graham, first of all you are contradicting yourself, as is obvious from something you said on p8 of this thread:

an individual brain does necessarily have a singular view, if it do any interpretation of 'data'.

Secondly, how can you accuse me of being a dualist when the model I was assessing was one of the brain itself processing numerous localities of brain states? That is, I was clearly considering a monistic model of reality. Your judgement about me discussing a dualist model is just bullshit whitewash. Do you even know what dualism is? It appears not, since dualistic philosophies regard a material brain AND an immaterial observer. Clearly, I wasn't discussing any thing of an immaterial nature in that post.

You've said it yourself - and my post just amouts to there being a "necessary singular view of data to be interpreted".

The dualism is a separation between 'brain states' and 'observer of brain states'. Your criticism doesn't explicitly name an immaterial observer, but it implies it, and that is the hollow basis of your objection. In effect you are saying that the model requires an inner observer that is not brain states, but observes brain states that are are merely 'tags', so it can't work because the (immaterial) observer would not know what the 'tags' mean.

There are no 'tags' involved besides the NN themselves.

This must be incorrect, since clearly our language is replete with those tags. And since you say that the brain is responsible for our language, then it must be the brain that assigns tags to any particular NN. If, for instance, I say "I see yellowness", then that yellowness is a tag associated with a particular NN. Otherwise, I'd be saying something like "I see a NN with physical characteristics xyz".

This is simply answered. The NN produce behaviour which includes language. Language is semantic tags generated by NNs to communicate. The tags are secondary and not involved in the function of the brain. The brain isn't a processor of data tags. It doesn't have a 'Language of Thought'.

Imagine a creature with a brain and eyes that sees an object it has never encountered before.

Actually, we should just imagine scenarios with human beings, so that we can relate to any responses that might come about from said scenarios.

Starting from the most complex mind is likely to make your task harder. Simpler examples help to unpack the subject.

Btw, your model only allows for brains seeing new NNs that they haven't encountered before, not 'objects'. Brains don't see anything external to themselves, Graham - they just process brain states therein.

It has no prior experience of that object.

Correction, it has no prior experience of that NN.

If contact is maintained, say by staring at the new object, a new NN recogniser will form.

Again, any "staring" would have to be focused upon the NN itself. Which, btw, enforces my point about the brain having to assess its own brain states, as a meaningful whole.

Activation of that NN means (I am) seeing object X.

Actually, it can mean nothing more than 'I' am seeing NN X.

The ability to recognise object X allows the creature to learn things about object x, such as object x is trying to eat (me), or object x tastes good. These new facts about object X are of the same NN form as recognition of object x.

This is significant:

If the brain is only aware of NNs, then correlating those NN's to external events/objects requires semantics about different 'things' (things different to the NN's themselves).

This is too messed up to bother respondign to in detail. You simply haven't grasped the concept. You are mired in Cartesian thinking.

'Reality' for the brain, is itself - the states of itself. Clearly, for the brain to think that its own internal states refer to another reality (other than itself), requires the utilisation and understanding of an ontology that the brain simply has no direct encounter with. The problem now stands out like a sore thumb: that of the brain correlating events within itself, with events external to itself.

As I said, the brain can be aware of nothing, other than its own internal states. It's just an 'internal show' of relationships between NNs. This is what your theory reduces to, Graham. That is what known 'reality' amounts to, for the brain.

Brains don't know brains, they are knowledge of a world, formed as the world impinges on the organism. There is no inner observer of brain states.

< snip more Cartesian nonsense >

'My goodness, your model is in serious trouble.

Get back to us once you have understood the model.

[jamest]

how can you accuse me of being a dualist when the model I was assessing was one of the brain itself processing numerous localities of brain states? That is, I was clearly considering a monistic model of reality. Your judgement about me discussing a dualist model is just bullshit whitewash. Do you even know what dualism is? It appears not, since dualistic philosophies regard a material brain AND an immaterial observer. Clearly, I wasn't discussing any thing of an immaterial nature in that post.

The dualism is a separation between 'brain states' and 'observer of brain states'. Your criticism doesn't explicitly name an immaterial observer, but it implies it, and that is the hollow basis of your objection.

Whitewash. I repeat, the model being considered is one of the brain processing numerous localities of NNs. That is not dualism, Graham.

Secondly, the problem of semantics is one that is well understood amongst philosophers of the mind. That means that it's a serious problem which shouldn't just be avoided as though it were a turd on the pavement.

In effect you are saying that the model requires an inner observer that is not brain states, but observes brain states that are are merely 'tags', so it can't work because the (immaterial) observer would not know what the 'tags' mean.

No, I'm saying that your model requires a brain that is able to process vast numbers of NNs in order to respond appropriately to those NNs.

Not all NNs are responded to. For example, a NN could be present in the brain but a response isn't automatic - the brain has to process the 'bigger picture' and will only respond to the said NN if there is a significance in doing so. For example, I would usually ignore a tree even if it was in my field of view. But, if that tree is an obstruction to my goal; or if I am looking for material to build a hut, or to make a fire; or if I'm looking to enhance my climbing prowess, then suddenly, that tree demands attention. Not only am I now focussed upon the tree, I have to consider appropriate ways of responding to it, depending upon the particular outcome required.

So, clearly, there are no 'automatic' responses to NNs. There might not be any response at all. Further, any necessary response would be dependent upon a specific goal. All of this demands that region(s) of the brain are required to process the significance of any current state of NNs present within the brain.

Any credible model of the brain must include a mechanism within the brain that processes the numerous states of NNs that are present within the brain, so that an appropriate response is forthcoming. You simply cannot state that there is an 'automatic' response to any given NN. Clearly, any response will be dependent upon the 'bigger picture' in tandem with the current goal of the brain. All of this requires 'consideration' - processing.

Brains don't know brains, they are knowledge of a world, formed as the world impinges on the organism. There is no inner observer of brain states.

The brain cannot be privy to external events - it can only be privy to its own internal states. This is true even if those states are responses to external events. The brain only has access to internal events. This is a fact associated with your model.

A credible model of the brain must include the capacity to process numerous NNs to produce an appropriate response in tandem with the current objective of the brain. And yet, any such model must face the dire problem of a brain that makes assumptions about a reality external to itself... and which, consequently, gives external meaning to its own internal states.

[SpeedOfSound]

Whitewash. I repeat, the model being considered is one of the brain processing numerous localities of NNs. That is not dualism, Graham.

Secondly, the problem of semantics is one that is well understood amongst philosophers of the mind. That means that it's a serious problem which shouldn't just be avoided as though it were a turd on the pavement.

Who are these philosophers of the mind that are having trouble understanding the brains 'problem' with semantics?

It's your turd james don't make up imaginary friends.

[SpeedOfSound]

Whitewash. I repeat, the model being considered is one of the brain processing numerous localities of NNs. That is not dualism, Graham.

Yes. We know that the model we offer is not dualism. Graham is saying that YOU and your counters are hopelessly dualist. Try to keep track of what's going on. Stop drinking. Stop smoking ganj. Get some rest and maybe take a multi-vitamin.

Until you get well I can break this up for you.

Model being considered - OUR model, the physicalist model
Dualistic talk about brains knowing, understanding, and viewing ITSELF - Those are YOUR arguments.

Got it now? Write it down so you don't forget again.

[SpeedOfSound]

No, I'm saying that your model requires a brain that is able to process vast numbers of NNs in order to respond appropriately to those NNs.

The last half of your post actually gets down to it a little. But I'm not going to take you seriously until you read my posts where the explanations for these things are addressed in foundation. I do not write well and it is a difficult subject. No one should be embarrassed to ask me to elaborate if you don't understand. I read stacks of books for four years and I am still a newbie myself.

Not all NNs are responded to. For example, a NN could be present in the brain but a response isn't automatic - the brain has to process the 'bigger picture' and will only respond to the said NN if there is a significance in doing so. For example, I would usually ignore a tree even if it was in my field of view. But, if that tree is an obstruction to my goal; or if I am looking for material to build a hut, or to make a fire; or if I'm looking to enhance my climbing prowess, then suddenly, that tree demands attention. Not only am I now focussed upon the tree, I have to consider appropriate ways of responding to it, depending upon the particular outcome required.

This is whee you have brought to the table the biological necessity of consciousness and higher order brain function. You have done it simply and well.

But how do we respond if you don't read the responses and understand the physics?

[SpeedOfSound]

A credible model of the brain must include the capacity to process numerous NNs to produce an appropriate response in tandem with the current objective of the brain. And yet, any such model must face the dire problem of a brain that makes assumptions about a reality external to itself... and which, consequently, gives external meaning to its own internal states.

This has already been answered. You are still countering your original assessment of the model not the counter-arguments, or the clarifications that were given.

[jamest]

A credible model of the brain must include the capacity to process numerous NNs to produce an appropriate response in tandem with the current objective of the brain. And yet, any such model must face the dire problem of a brain that makes assumptions about a reality external to itself... and which, consequently, gives external meaning to its own internal states.

This has already been answered. You are still countering your original assessment of the model not the counter-arguments, or the clarifications that were given.

As I said, I've focused upon a model described by Graham - I really don't have time to focus upon several models at once - especially when I've given so much time to responding to Graham - which is why I haven't addressed the specifics of your own posts. And I'm still waiting for Graham to respond properly to my most recent posts.

However, your model too will be one of the brain being unable to access nothing other than its own internal states. This is important to acknowledge - the brain has no access to anything, other than its own internal states.
So, now it comes to the crunch: can you explain all human behaviour in terms of that behaviour being nought other than automatic responses to NNs? If you can't, then your model faces the exact same problems that I've recently mentioned. However, if you think that you can explain human behaviour without the need to 'process' NNs prior to responding to them, then this time I will give your explanation a fair hearing. If you think that you've already explained-away this problem, then cut and paste the relevant material into your next post, and I will respond to that post.

[SpeedOfSound]

A credible model of the brain must include the capacity to process numerous NNs to produce an appropriate response in tandem with the current objective of the brain. And yet, any such model must face the dire problem of a brain that makes assumptions about a reality external to itself... and which, consequently, gives external meaning to its own internal states.

This has already been answered. You are still countering your original assessment of the model not the counter-arguments, or the clarifications that were given.

As I said, I've focused upon a model described by Graham - I really don't have time to focus upon several models at once - especially when I've given so much time to responding to Graham - which is why I haven't addressed the specifics of your own posts. And I'm still waiting for Graham to respond properly to my most recent posts.

Graham and I do not have two different models to the best of my knowledge. Maybe he can straighten this out. I made a number of posts that should have given us a foundation. If you have not spent the time to digest them then it will be quite difficult to give you snippets that are going to explain anything.

But I will try and respond to the rest of your post.

You don't seriously think that you are the first one person to ask these questions about the brain and behavior do you?

[jamest]

You don't seriously think that you are the first one person to ask these questions about the brain and behavior do you?

No I don't. Indeed, I've already stated that the problem of semantics has been discussed by philosophers of the mind for quite some time. Do a google on intentionality, if you don't believe me.
What is true, is that I'm doing my own thinking in assessing this issue. Further, I've highlighted another problem that I don't think has been exposed before - the necessity of the brain to make assumptions about an 'external reality', prior to assigning external meaning to its own internal NNs.

[Kenny Login]

many people are interested enough in the fiction to devote rather a lot of personal and professional time to investigating these things

Yes, and they're known as "literary critics", Kenny. If you want to be a critic, try to stay on the same page as they are.

That's right. And also psychologists, cognitive scientists and neuroscientists.

If the brain is only aware of NNs, then correlating those NN's to external events/objects requires semantics about different 'things' (things different to the NN's themselves).
'Reality' for the brain, is itself - the states of itself. Clearly, for the brain to think that its own internal states refer to another reality (other than itself), requires the utilisation and understanding of an ontology that the brain simply has no direct encounter with. The problem now stands out like a sore thumb: that of the brain correlating events within itself, with events external to itself.

James, your position would seem to lead you to a version of nativism so extreme that it doesn't sit well with the empirical evidence. Although, it is compatible with a non-dualist view, because you're suggesting that any interaction between 'mental stuff' and non-mental is an erroneous assumption, yes?

I don't think Graham is overlooking your points, because 'meaning' is determined either in the weighting of rules across distributed networks or in the syntax of a language of thought. Either way, the semantics and syntax is a property of the system, and you can not parse thoughts about 'tiger', 'yellow', 'nostalgia' or even thoughts about the system itself into neat internal vs external representations. These things do not have to be considered consciously - in fact most of the time sub- or pre-conscious operations are in play.

However, as you're saying this all implies "utilisation and understanding of an ontology that the brain simply has no direct encounter with", I am interested to hear what you have to say about how mind comes to directly encounter things (external to itself), where the brain can not.

[SpeedOfSound]

You don't seriously think that you are the first one person to ask these questions about the brain and behavior do you?

No I don't. Indeed, I've already stated that the problem of semantics has been discussed by philosophers of the mind for quite some time. Do a google on intentionality, if you don't believe me.
What is true, is that I'm doing my own thinking in assessing this issue. Further, I've highlighted another problem that I don't think has been exposed before - the necessity of the brain to make assumptions about an 'external reality', prior to assigning external meaning to its own internal NNs.

You are not the first one to bring that up either. On intention and philosloppers, they have laid down many turds. Not interested in them. We are talking about the physical model.

You simply cannot state that there is an 'automatic' response to any given NN.

Automatic responses to a neural state is badly stated as you state it.

Not even the simplest animals with nerves EVER have the same neural state twice in their lifetimes.

The brain only has access to internal events. This is a fact associated with your model.

No it is not. The brain has the purpose of recognizing and responding to EXTERNAL events as well as internal state. You brought up seeing trees. Our model requires that you accept that you see trees. Is that asking too much of you?

Note that we don't care if god made the trees or made you think you see them. They could be made of menticles or bunnies. We don't care. The physical model deals with sense organs and external connections.

How say you?

[Surendra Darathy]

What is true, is that I'm doing my own thinking in assessing this issue.

And your thinking in assessing this issue is, shall we say, narcissistic. If you cannot understand the scientific model, it doesn't mean, perforce, that the scientific model is wrong. It just means that you aren't a scientist.

The trick for a scientist is not to show that a scientific model is "wrong", but to show that another model is "better", i.e., that it explains more data. This is done statistically, by citing various data that the model explains by recapturing them.

There's a scientific model of a tree, and there's a scientific model of the brain, and there's actually a model of how the brain interacts with the tree. Trying to get at the semantic meaning, or metaphysical meaning of "tree" is something of a distraction, because the scientific model of the tree and its relation to the brain is not really related to the way our symbols, such as a picture of a tree, or the printed word act as semaphores.

For a philoslopper, the problem is more difficult, because you don't even believe "better" can be measured when an "explanation" is being considered. You seem to be suggesting that there is an "argument" that invalidates all of science, i.e., that the assumptions science is making (metaphysically) are wrong. But there is no basis to choose a metaphysical model of reality.

All there is are models, and the scientific model of brain function actually explains quite a lot. You should try it first, before being so dismissive. Then, when you appreciate it, you'll always have a chance to present your own model in an orderly fashion, and we can all see what it "explains". Then you can go into some wibbling about semantics and see whether there's anything that really must be explained about it that visual interaction with semaphores needs to clean up. But please wait to do that, because there's even some brain research on the organism's capacity to detect and translate semaphores. There's a lot of brain research, James. Either learn something about it, or admit you have not the desire.

I've highlighted another problem that I don't think has been exposed before - the necessity of the brain to make assumptions about an 'external reality', prior to assigning external meaning to its own internal NNs.

Try to focus for a moment or two, James. We're discussing a model of how the brain interacts with empirical objects, and not about how the brain interacts with concepts. The concepts themselves are brain activity, and how the brain interacts with empirical sensory information is part of a model. The model does not traffic in "external reality". Leave it out for the moment. We are just discussing an interaction model, not the ontology of the components of the model. That's why science progresses, and philosophy obfuscates, as Atkins would say.

[SpeedOfSound]

There's a lot of brain research, James. Either learn something about it, or admit you have not the desire.

Our good friend james is looking for a philosyphilitic shortcut to convince us that we are wrong about all of this sciency stuff. Then he can get on to the real magic show. Bothering him with all of these details may just make him grumpy.

[Surendra Darathy]

There's a lot of brain research, James. Either learn something about it, or admit you have not the desire.

Our good friend james is looking for a philosyphilitic shortcut to convince us that we are wrong about all of this sciency stuff. Then he can get on to the real magic show. Bothering him with all of these details may just make him grumpy.

He wants me to give up on science? On modeling? On what basis? I'll show him fucking grumpy. Empirically.