Morality, ethics and atheism

[JimC]

There is a certain train of thought for religious people concerning issues of ethics and morality in non-believers. Here, I'm talking about relatively reasonable, mainstream religious people, not fundamentalist zealots. It goes something like this:

"Without a belief in God, then there can be no sense of right or wrong, no morality or ethics, because those things can only come to humans via messages from the divine"

To me, a rebuttal of that argument is inextricably linked to the clear and certain knowledge of our evolutionary heritage. We are evolved organisms, and our evolutionary heritage has left its imprints on our nature. It is clear that our hominim heritage involves millions of years of living in small social groups. Natural selection does not only operate on physical phenotypes, but it has a significant influence on what could be called our cognitive phenotype. Now, I'm not implying some sort of robot psychology, utterly controlled by our genes, but what might be described loosely as tendencies, frequently based on emotions.

We have within us strong tendencies for compassion and cooperation within family and more broadly social groups. In terms of natural selection, the concepts of kin selection and reciprocal altruism provide a useful framework for such tendencies. There is of course a dark side - competition between rival groups is likely to have generated a tendency for distrust of out-groups...

Obviously, built on top of what may well be unconscious tendencies, we have the ability to think rationally about both our own selves, and the society in which we live. My contention is that we can use our evolutionary heritage in constructive ways, both as individuals and as societies, by conscious choice to focus on the positive elements and suppression of the "fear of others". There is zero need for divine assistance in such a project...

[macdoc]

a visitation of the weighty..... I applaud your sentiment but doubt the outcome without continued oversight. Self direction/correction of homo sapiens ?...... .

[JimC]

Whether we can actually use our cooperative tendencies to solve our problems is moot, I guess, but my point is simply that there is no deus ex machine - we use what we have from our evolutionary heritage, plus an overlay of rational thought, or we flounder in a morass of superstition...

[aufbahrung]

No j in them complex numbers either. Imaginary things serve all manner of purposes. Some good or bad, and sometimes the other way around. Don't think too deeply. And it is no more a issue than wallpaper. Isn't necessary but how many keep it pure black?

[pErvinalia]

There is a certain train of thought for religious people concerning issues of ethics and morality in non-believers. Here, I'm talking about relatively reasonable, mainstream religious people, not fundamentalist zealots. It goes something like this:

"Without a belief in God, then there can be no sense of right or wrong, no morality or ethics, because those things can only come to humans via messages from the divine"

I find this kind of reasoning frightening. The only thing stopping religious people from raping and murdering people is the thought that they'll go to hell for eternity.

[Brian Peacock]

There is a certain train of thought for religious people concerning issues of ethics and morality in non-believers. Here, I'm talking about relatively reasonable, mainstream religious people, not fundamentalist zealots. It goes something like this:

"Without a belief in God, then there can be no sense of right or wrong, no morality or ethics, because those things can only come to humans via messages from the divine"

To me, a rebuttal of that argument is inextricably linked to the clear and certain knowledge of our evolutionary heritage. We are evolved organisms, and our evolutionary heritage has left its imprints on our nature. It is clear that our hominim heritage involves millions of years of living in small social groups. Natural selection does not only operate on physical phenotypes, but it has a significant influence on what could be called our cognitive phenotype. Now, I'm not implying some sort of robot psychology, utterly controlled by our genes, but what might be described loosely as tendencies, frequently based on emotions.

We have within us strong tendencies for compassion and cooperation within family and more broadly social groups. In terms of natural selection, the concepts of kin selection and reciprocal altruism provide a useful framework for such tendencies. There is of course a dark side - competition between rival groups is likely to have generated a tendency for distrust of out-groups...

Obviously, built on top of what may well be unconscious tendencies, we have the ability to think rationally about both our own selves, and the society in which we live. My contention is that we can use our evolutionary heritage in constructive ways, both as individuals and as societies, by conscious choice to focus on the positive elements and suppression of the "fear of others". There is zero need for divine assistance in such a project...

I agree in every respect. However (!) I think there is an easier rebuttal to the notion that "Without a belief in God, then there can be no sense of right or wrong, no morality or ethics, because those things can only come to humans via messages from the divine." It is that, for the religous, what counts as a 'sense of right or wrong' is actually codified sets of moral and ethical precepts which prescribe and proscribe action. For example, hats might be prescribed whereas pork might be proscribed etc. Thus moral and ethical behaviour is conditional on accepting and adhering to certain moral and ethical precepts, typically those of <nominated deity>. If one acknowledges that that which is pro/prescribed (that which is 'the law' so to speak) can itself be unethical (the subjugation of women, the murder of the gayful, the ownership of people as property etc) then one must also acknowledge that what passes for morals and ethics is contingent on factors beyond, or aside from 'the divine'. In this way, all moral and ethical questions, and thus all moral and ethical action, are disengaged from an absolute, fixed, forever unchanging divine "Law" or "Truth" and simply become things which have to be addressed on their own merits, in their own terms, and within their own contexts.

In other words, when faced with the kind of declaration quoted above: if they're Muslim ask them if it is moral or ethical to murder the gayful, if they are Jewish as them if it is moral or ethical to wear clothes made from two different fabrics, and if they are Christian ask them if it is moral or ethical to do either - because, as Jesus said "I did not come to do away with The Law or the Prophets, but to fulfil them" (Matthew 5:17). If they are moderate they will say "No" - by which they acknowledge that the assumed divine root of morality and ethics is flexible, changeable, contingent, and therefore subjective. We don't need religious precepts to tell us that subjugating women, murdering the gayful, or slavery is wrong. We can work that out for ourselves thanks.

[rasetsu]

The argument from theists is an argument from ignorance, so I don't take it seriously in and of itself. It's basically arguing that we can't currently demonstrate a basis for morals other than the divine, therefore there is no basis for morals other than the divine. A similar argument has been made about evolution, to wit that we can't demonstrate the step-by-step evolution of the bacterial flagellum or the blood clotting cascade, therefore there can be no step-by-step pathway to the evolution of these things. Since the argument is founded on a fallacy, no response beyond pointing out the fallacy itself is really needed.

However, I appreciate your attempt to fill in an alternative to rebut the argument by pointing to the evolutionary utility of things like cooperation and altruism. One might suggest that you have committed Moore's naturalistic fallacy by equating what is moral with what is evolved. For example, we evolved brains which can recognize and manipulate logical relationships, recognizing some as correct and others as incorrect, but that itself doesn't mean that we evolved logic and these relationships. But that probably isn't the biggest issue with evolutionary explanations of morals.

I think the use of such evolutionary explanations lies at the root of the theist argument in the sense that there doesn't appear to be anything 'moral' about a necessary mechanistic fact, which altruism and cooperation are if the evolutionary explanation is valid. It just doesn't seem to satisfy our intuitions about what an explanation of morals needs to be. It seems to fall prey to the same charge of arbitrariness to which moral relativism is susceptible. If our specific evolution dictates our morals then a different evolution would dictate different morals. The Abrahamic god faces a similar problem due to his aseity; if whatever God's nature is dictates morality, and his nature isn't dependent upon anything else, then that nature could be anything and still check all the same boxes as this god does. God's morals are therefore arbitrary. This might point to a general problem with morals in that we're looking for both God's morals and evolved morals to somehow square with some objective truths about reality in the same way that logic does. If I were to guess, the features needed are that morals be in some sense objective and also transcend contingent realities. Our intuition tells us that morals are necessary truths, not contingent ones, which evolved morals would be.

The long and short for me is that I don't think the evolutionary explanation answers all the questions that it is tasked with answering. There are some holes in our understanding of morals and our intuitions about morals that evolutionary explanations haven't been shown to fill. I think it's entirely possible that this is simply a reflection of our intuitions being misleading, similar to the case in which our intuitions suggest we have free will when in reality we may not. That's another basic problem in that the correctness or incorrectness of explanations about morals and our will depend upon intuitions which themselves evolved, and whose evolution may have been dictated by utility rather than truth.

[Brian Peacock]

Nicely put.

[JimC]

It is that, for the religous, what counts as a 'sense of right or wrong' is actually codified sets of moral and ethical precepts which prescribe and proscribe action. For example, hats might be prescribed whereas pork might be proscribed etc. Thus moral and ethical behaviour is conditional on accepting and adhering to certain moral and ethical precepts, typically those of <nominated deity>. If one acknowledges that that which is pro/prescribed (that which is 'the law' so to speak) can itself be unethical (the subjugation of women, the murder of the gayful, the ownership of people as property etc) then one must also acknowledge that what passes for morals and ethics is contingent on factors beyond, or aside from 'the divine'. In this way, all moral and ethical questions, and thus all moral and ethical action, are disengaged from an absolute, fixed, forever unchanging divine "Law" or "Truth" and simply become things which have to be addressed on their own merits, in their own terms, and within their own contexts.

For religious people of rigid belief systems, I'm sure this analysis is correct. However, I was thinking more of the nuanced views of modern, moderate christians, who have moved beyond literalism, and who try to find the source of human goodness in the touch of a divine being. Partly, I think they do that because they cannot conceive of powerful moral impulses and compassionate behaviour arising from the purely material world.

I think the use of such evolutionary explanations lies at the root of the theist argument in the sense that there doesn't appear to be anything 'moral' about a necessary mechanistic fact, which altruism and cooperation are if the evolutionary explanation is valid. It just doesn't seem to satisfy our intuitions about what an explanation of morals needs to be. It seems to fall prey to the same charge of arbitrariness to which moral relativism is susceptible. If our specific evolution dictates our morals then a different evolution would dictate different morals.

That is very close to what I was trying to interpret about an argument from some religious people...

The long and short for me is that I don't think the evolutionary explanation answers all the questions that it is tasked with answering.

My point was much more modest than that. There is no way that an evolutionary perspective is going to answer all the complex and difficult questions of morality. However, I guess I'm suggesting that the starting point in developing ethical precepts on how one treats other people is the innate capacity we have for cooperation and compassion. Being social creatures deep in our nature gives us the initial emotional impetus to put ourselves in someone else's shoes. So, morality does not require the "touch of the divine", it can develop its complexity from a seed that is purely human, and that has a purely material origin.

[pErvinalia]

Is this just Sam Harris's argument?

[Sean Hayden]

It seems all our talk about morality constitutes more than what's out there that you might call moral. I'm okay with this. I've come to see us as creators. Having to build and rebuild something akin to a moral framework is just the kind of work/creation we as humans do. It's time to stop thinking less of our efforts on this front just because we can't build from universal truths.

regarding Sam Harris, his argument--if I remember correctly--was completely opposite. Rather than putting us as creators it had as discoverers, you might imagine the kind of trouble ahead there. Of course even then we'd steadily be creating....

[Sean Hayden]

That was worth reading.

[JimC]

Is this just Sam Harris's argument?

I don't think so, although I've certainly read similar ideas from a variety of sources. In a way, it's a continuation of the theme of religion losing its explanatory powers bit by bit as we learn more on how the Universe works. Before natural selection, religion had a genuinely good argument in favour of a powerful Creator, when naturalist demonstrated how beautifully the intricate structures of animals served their functions. Before astrophysics, the stars and planets could only have been created by fiat.

And, as I said, I mean my explanation to be very modest, simply providing a perfectly natural source for the emotional underpinning of a morality that seeks to do the right thing by other human beings...

[rasetsu]

The long and short for me is that I don't think the evolutionary explanation answers all the questions that it is tasked with answering.

My point was much more modest than that. There is no way that an evolutionary perspective is going to answer all the complex and difficult questions of morality. However, I guess I'm suggesting that the starting point in developing ethical precepts on how one treats other people is the innate capacity we have for cooperation and compassion. Being social creatures deep in our nature gives us the initial emotional impetus to put ourselves in someone else's shoes. So, morality does not require the "touch of the divine", it can develop its complexity from a seed that is purely human, and that has a purely material origin.

I think you miss my point here in that I am saying it doesn't seem to answer the most basic questions that such a seed must answer to qualify as a seed. According to our intuitions, morality is both objective and non-contingent. Your moral seed is neither. It's not objective because it depends upon values which are satisfied by cooperation and altruism, namely the prospering of the species. The universe doesn't care about the prospering of the species, nor do lions and bears care about human flourishing. And your morals are completely contingent. If our evolution worked out a different way, our morals would be different.

But there is an additional problem in that cooperation and altruism aren't the only evolved drives and inclinations we possess. Selfishness, greed, rape, aggression, and even warfare all have evolutionary underpinnings as well. If your only justification for considering cooperation and altruism as moral is that they evolved, then these things must be considered moral as well. I see two possible answers to this. One is only to recognize the good evolved traits as moral. But then one is no longer appealing to the evolved traits as good, but rather appealing to an external standard of good which these drives happen to facilitate. In that case, cooperation and altruism no longer serve as the seed of morals, as that role is played by whatever and wherever we're drawing our intuitions about what is good from. The other possibility is to suggest ala Harris that human flourishing, in this case at the species level, is good and what promotes that is therefore moral. The problem with this is that there doesn't appear to be any objective reason for preferring this to any other potential goal. Ethics than become entirely subjective, being whatever serves an individual or a group's chosen goals. If you have a death cult who thinks that the extermination of all human life is good, you really have no answer other than to say, nuh uh, my goal is better because it's mine!

And finally, you don't appear to have justified bridging the is-ought distinction. Cooperation and altruism are how we behave, but that in itself doesn't mean that's how we ought to behave. Unless of course you circle back to "whatever evolved is good," which as noted has problems.

So, no, I don't think you've made a convincing case that cooperation and altruism can function as a seed or base for morals.

[Hermit]

There is a certain train of thought for religious people concerning issues of ethics and morality in non-believers. Here, I'm talking about relatively reasonable, mainstream religious people, not fundamentalist zealots. It goes something like this:

"Without a belief in God, then there can be no sense of right or wrong, no morality or ethics, because those things can only come to humans via messages from the divine"

Morality is changeable regardless of whether it has come to humans via messages from the divine, or not. Just ask any Christian why it took 1500 years, or more, to realise that slavery is immoral. What happened there? Did their God change his mind?

And yes, moral precepts can be anything under the sun. The Nazis, for example, were very moral. Most of them were Christians too. They were intent on saving civilisation from the twin evils of Jews and communists. Then there were the witch hunts, the inquisitions, the burning at the stake of heretics, the exorcisms, the crusades, the 30 year war between catholics and protestants and so forth. Most of the perpetrators felt they were morally compelled to do the things they did.