Biblical Morality is an indefendible position

[hopey_dishwasher]

Hiya. A bit of a foreword:

When talking with people who happen to be theists, I'm generally happy to let most stuff slide in the interest of politeness and whatnot; I'm not going to start arguing and try to change someone's mind at a dinner party if they drop a comment suggesting, for instance that they doubt that evolution occurs. I'd like to, but I'd come off as an arsehole, so I bite my tongue. Usually I'm ok with this, but what really irks me is when folks suggest that atheists can't be moral. I find it pretty offensive actually.

Every time I hear or read something like that, I feel like logically laying out an argument explaining in detail just how wrong it is.

And so, in order to vent a bit, and because I felt like writing something, I've done just that, to no-one in particular. I'm after feedback; whether like-minded folk feel that any part of it could do with some improvement, or if there's anything they plain disagree with.

This is kind of a first draft, and one significant absence is any references. I'd like to add some at a later date, but for now, I'll fo without. I was planning to flesh it out a bit, but I think it's long enough already. I also planned to address "conscience", but I felt it was a bit off-topic.

It's gotten a bit long, so I've broken it up into sections.

Also, the H on my keyboard is a bit intermittent, along with some other keys. Please excuse any typos.


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On Morality.

"How can one act morally without absolute guidance, such as that in the bible?"
"What is to prevent societies acting in a barbaric, 'survival of the fittest' manner?"
"What is to prevent an atheist from murdering someone in a situation without chance of retribution?"


Defining Morality
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To address questions such as these, we must first address the concept of morality itself. The simplest definition that I can think of is a type of moderation of our actions determined by our feelings and emotions; After taking certain actions, people feel bad, after taking other actions, people feel good. This mechanism is not just reactive but also predictive, whereby we make judgements on our actions before we take them, based on our prediction of the outcome. This type of reaction can be so simplistic as to not be considered as pertaining to morality at all, such as eating food when hungry or avoiding pain. However when the action is more complex and does not only affect oneself, but affects others, it can be considered a moral choice. Indeed, most if not all actions that are considered to be based on morality (or conscience) are those that involve interaction with our peers, either directly or indirectly.

The question then is why do we make the choices that we do? Where does the morality & conscience that guides our actions come from?

Some would have you believe that there is an absolute morality; a set of unchanging rules handed down from above, or some other external source. This is patently ridiculous and not a defensible position. I'll get to that later, but to fully elaborate on it, I'll first need to outline how a relativistic morality could come about. To do that, I need to go back a bit.

Autonomy
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All living things with any ability to act receive some kind of feedback from their environment. To be successful and survive, they must act in an appropriate way. This feedback can be very simplistic and autonomous, such as plants moving towards light or single-celled creatures moving up scent concentration gradients towards food. I propose that there is a continuous spectrum between this type of autonomous reaction and complex moral judgments made by human beings, and that all of them come about by natural means. I don't claim to know the details of every step in the middle, but there is clear evidence that the spectrum exists.

It is first important to note that such autonomous actions exist in all living things, including humans. Many lower-brain functions are completely beyond conscious control, such as our heartbeat, digestion, sweating, and so forth. But the most significant step between autonomous actions and moral actions is conscious control; the ability to decide on actions.

Choice
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In nature, these kinds of actions are controlled via concepts that, for lack of a better term, I'll refer to as pleasure and displeasure, although to use these terms masks some of their complexity. Put simply, living things of sufficient complexity are 'wired' (mostly by their genes, some of it learned, but I'll get to that later) to feel pleasure when performing actions that are of evolutionary benefit to them, and displeasure at those that are not. Again, I don't propose the know where to draw the line on this, or even that a line exists, but it is clear that the spectrum exists. No sensible person would argue that plants sense a feeling of pleasure when they are in sunlight and consciously act so as to get as much sunlight as possible. Nor would many people deny that animals such as dogs & cats are capable of feeling pleasure, and act accordingly to increase their pleasure and minimise their displeasure. Between such extremes exist all sorts of in-between cases; one could argue whether, for instance, reptiles are capable of feeling pleasure, but it is clear that they would be more able to than insects, and less so than most mammals. The exact ordering is irrelevant; there is a multitude of creatures vastly differing ability, at least to our eyes, feel pleasure and displeasure.

This makes perfect evolutionary sense, creatures that are capable of making complex judgments taking many factors into account would have an evolutionary benefit over those that perform in simple, autonomous ways. Those who are wired up to, for instance, feel pleasure apon eating while hungry, are more likely to choose to find food, and hence survive, than one that does not feel pleasure, or feel displeasure. Likewise, one that feels pain when injured is more likely to avoid actions that cause more pain, and hence more likely to survive than one that ignores injuries, or feels pleasure when injured. This is an incredibly simplified view of it all. Decision-making is inevitably based on several factors, but most decisions can be understood in terms of competing emotions or feelings. A prey animal might feel something akin to fear when exposed, and something akin to security when protected. If such an animal has to leave cover in order to feed, they must weigh their fear against their hunger. Evolution can and does alter the weightings of such decisions; Dodos who were "afraid" to go out and feed were less successful than those that were not, since there were no predators. Over time, they as a species lost the inclination to seek cover and became so docile that they were wiped out when an efficient predator did arrive.

So clearly the concept of feeling pleasure or displeasure, and the decision-making processes that they enable, can be explained through natural means. To proceed much further than this requires understanding of some evolutionary concepts beyond what many of those who ask such questions understand or are willing to accept, so this is probably the point beyond which some readers will not go. Regardless, I'll press on.

Altruism
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What I've explained so far refers to individuals, but it is important to understand that evolution works on genes, not on individuals. The actions that I have described can be extended to those that involve other individuals, particularly those that are related; creatures can be wired up to act in conditionally altruistic ways. This applies both to autonomous and conscious actions.

Many types of insect, which few would argue possess conscious thought, live in colonies with many sterile drones or workers. Being sterile, their actions cannot directly be shaped by evolution, since they will have no offspring regardless of their actions. However, since they live in a colony composed of other insects to whom they are closely related and hence with whom they share many (or all) of their genes, actions that they take to benefit the colony indirectly benefit themselves.

Again, we can find many examples of similar behaviour in more complex animals, for whom there is much better evidence of some kind of consciousness, or at least ability to feel pleasure and displeasure. Almost any animal that typically lives in a group is a potential example, and they need not be sterile to be altruistic. Lions are a good example. They live in a group and work together for the common good of the group in various ways, such as hunting together, sharing food, and feeding cubs of related lions. (I'm not certain that lions do this, but if not, there's probably a better example.) I don't think it's too much to ask to suggest that they have some ability to choose how they act, and choose to act in the way that they do because they have an evolved system that causes them to feel some kind of 'pleasure' when they do so. The nature of this pleasure is not something I or anyone can profess to know precisely, but again, I don't believe it's too much of a stretch to believe for instance, that a lion separated from its pack is capable of feeling some kind of loneliness, for example, and given that precedent, it's no great leap to suppose that they can feel some kind of satisfaction or pleasure when helping out their kin. It's also noteworthy that although such mechanisms have evolved for the benefit of relatives, they are not necessarily enacted solely towards relatives. They are 'rules of thumb' that work on assumptions, such as an assumption that any small animal that is repeatedly in their presence is probably related. In the wild, where the traits evolved, these assumptions are usually true, but situations can be manufactured that abuse those assumptions and lead to behaviour that is not apparently of any evolutionary benefit, such as captive tigers suckling baby pigs. I could also go into depth here about how animals interact, for instance how various species of monkey will trade favours, and remember other members of their group who have been kind to them, but I fear I'm verging on rambling at this point, so I'll press on.


Intent & Empathy
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I hope that by this point I've made my position clear; Creatures can come to possess, solely by natural means, a system that causes them to have pleasurable or displeasurable feelings regarding their actions, and that these feelings can be quite complex and subtle. It shouldn't be too much of a leap, then, to extend this to humans, and finally begin talking about morality.

Humans clearly possess systems similar to those described so far to varying degrees. An important point to make is that humans have been social creatures, and have been living in groups of some size for a length of time at least long enough to evolve appropriate behavioural adaptations in the form of feelings and emotions. Since we experience them, we can use their names. Humans undeniably are capable, for instance, of feeling loneliness, and it doesn't take much to see an evolutionary benefit for being wired up to do so. This much is no great leap forward from other animals, however, humans are of course capable of much more complex, subtle thoughts than other animals and live in groups with much more complex interactions. Hence the way in which our brains, and by extension, our thoughts and actions have evolved is more complex as well. The way that animals choose to behave based on their environment, including interaction with their peers, is called instinct. The way humans choose to behave based on their environment is called (in part) morality. I propose that there is no difference between the two other than a greater level of sophistication.

Shortly, I'll go into detail on examples of moral actions, but first I'd like to be clear that I'm not trying to prove anything here, simply to disprove the concept that a force beyond nature is required for morality to exist. All that need be done to do that is to present a single plausible alternative. I have not done any specific research while writing this, and some of the statements I make might be dubious or even wrong, but any such errors are in details of the examples, and should not affect the overall point I'm making. If I'm shown to be in error in any of my assumptions, I'll happily reconsider my position, but don't let pedantry get in the way of the message here.

Continuing, a simple example I can explore is that of harming others. If a person harms someone else, they often feel guilt. Guilt is a commonly described characteristic of conscience, and acting so as to avoid feeling guilt can be considered a moral action. How then do we come to feel guilt after an act like harming someone else? Let's suppose for a moment that it was universal; that all people felt the same level of guilt whenever they harm another person. If we make the reasonable assumption that people lived in groups for a sufficiently long time, then it is plausible that a mechanism might evolve that prevented us from acting in ways that harmed the group, particularly if there is no benefit to the individual. This leads us to one of the more universal concepts of morality; empathy. If our actions make other people feel bad, then we feel bad as well. There is a clear evolutionary benefit here; if we make the assumption that those with whom we regularly interact are relatives (which would have been the case for most of our evolutionary history), then actions that are detrimental to others (and hence make them feel bad) are indirectly detrimental to our own genes' survival, and should be avoided. Thus a mechanism evolved that causes us to avoid such action. The extent to which this is learned or to which it is ingrained is arguable, but its near-universality suggests that we have evolved at least the capacity for empathy.

A slightly less universal example is that of theft; we often feel guilt at depriving others of possessions, but in this case there is a more direct benefit. Again, it seems evident that our brains (and emotions, and feelings) are wired up in a way that makes us consider the benefit of others. But the variability of such feelings, both between different individuals, and within the same individual under different circumstances, suggests that much of this is learned. A person who is not taught not to steal likely feels no guilt upon doing so. The same can be said for many moral actions. Indeed there is ample evidence that much of our morality is learned. Not too long ago, the morality of various subjects such as slavery, the subservience of women, and many kinds of prejudice were vastly different to what they are today.

So rather than evolving (or otherwise receiving) a mechanism of absolute morality, we are born as an open book, with little more than an ability to feel empathy for our peers, and a capacity to feel guilt, satisfaction, or other "moral" emotions. The precise situations that trigger these feelings, and the extent to which we do so, is learned as we grow up, from our families and from society. We have evolved the capacity for morality, and learn an individualised, relative morality as we grow up.

Further evidence for this exists in the exceptions. There are people who to varying degrees do not feel empathy, at least not in the same way as most, from autistics to psychopaths. Whether this deficiency is learned or innate is irrelevant; it clearly demonstrates that it is something that most, but not all of us posess, as would be expected from a relative, evolved sense of morality, but not from an absolute, external morality.

To reiterate, I am claiming that the morality of our actions is determined by our own feelings & emotions regarding those actions. The precise matching of actions to emotions is not fixed, but learned. The ability to develop those matchings is an evolved trait.

Why biblical morality is an indefensible position.
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I could continue on this but feel I've written enough for a first attempt at explaining my position. I'll finish by addressing biblical morality, and explaining why I see it as an indefensible position. What follows refers specifically to the Christian bible, as I am more familiar with it than other supposed sources, but applies just as well to any doctrine that professes an absolute morality.

Anyone who actually uses the bible as their sole source of morality would be an incredibly dangerous individual who should be locked up for the good of society.

That is not to say all Christians, or even all fundamentalists. The bible contains a dangerously unacceptable set of moral guidelines that would have been at least questionable in the bronze age when they were written, and are entirely worthless today. Beginning with the ten commandments, The seven that are not about subservience to god are relatively acceptable as guidelines, however taken as absolute rules, in conjunction with the specified punishments for disobedience would lead to anarchic vigilantism. Further, there are several glaring omissions, such as against slavery, rape or child abuse; which are apparently less important than keeping the sabbath. Beyond the ten commandments lie a vast collection of stories, many containing abhorrent behaviour, each of which can be taken as an example of morality. This point has been expressed many times, by authors much more effective than myself. It leads me to the following conclusion:

One simply cannot use only some of the bible as a source of absolute morality. To be an absolute source of morality, every part of it must be taken literally. No story contains a footnote explaining whether it is to be taken literally or not. Some may be relatively clear in the consequences that came from the actions, but the majority do not. One cannot disregard parts of the bible that one finds distasteful and still claim absolute morality.

The biblical morality that many claim to live by is not absolute. Parts of the bible get 'interpreted', or are claimed to be metaphors. But this is done not solely through the information within the bible; its meaning is altered and manipulated. Parts are disregarded or considered to be metaphors, and the decision to do so is done by people. The people that do so shape the meaning of the bible to what they themselves find to be the most acceptable, and they determine what they find to be acceptable based on their own, relative morality. This is clearly and undoubtedly demonstrated in many ways, such as by the fact that 200 years ago, the bible was used to support slavery, but when society progressed to the point where slavery became unacceptable, the very same words in the bible were re-interpreted to agree with society.

The bible does not shape the morality of society, the morality of society shapes the bible.

To claim otherwise is hypocritical and ignorant. Those who claim to get their morality from the bible actually have the same moral source as those who do not, but it has passed through an obfuscating filter of biblical interpretation that does no-one any good at all.

[Santa_Claus]

No pictures

[Rum]

Hi and welcome! An impressive first post too!

Your main argument seems to be that acting immorally creates unpleasant feelings within us. What you don't really explore enough in my view is why we feel unpleasant when we act immorally. Personally I think that part of our hard wired nature makes us. We are social apes through and through and we have evolved to generally, though not always, behave in ways that are for the common good. We get excluded from the social grouping we belong to if we step outside the 'moral' rules too much. This is a bad for survival and bad for the group - if numbers are low.

I fancy 'choice' is a bit of a red herring.

[Feck]

Hello have you been thinking while washing up ?

[Azathoth]

hello new person. TL:DR but good to have you here